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Abstract
This research investigates the determinants of retailer power within retailer-manufacturer
relationships by specifying and testing three models of retailer power. It is based on a
sample of 55 Irish food manufacturers and their experiences of relationships with Irish and
British retailers. The study adopts the view that the existing body of research into
relationships with retailers is fragmented, and that a more complete understanding of these
power relations may be obtained by simultaneously focusing on three sets of factors. The
factors are industry specific, firm and product specific, and relationship specific.
Much of the existing empirical work investigating power relations implicitly assumes
power to be unidimensional through the measures employed. Consequently, the current
study investigates retailer power, measured as a unidimensional construct. However, the
work proceeds to explicitly acknowledge that power is multidimensional by examining
retailers' power over manufacturers' product related and margin related activities. In
examining these two dimensions of power, findings ofa more strategic nature are obtained.
The analysis draws on the importance French and Raven (1959) attributed to observability
as a determinant of power. While neglected throughout the power literature, observability,
by introducing monitoring activities, provides a bridge with the transaction cost literature.
In this way, specific investments, and the role of retailers' branding strategies, are
incorporated into our study of power. The relationship between retailers' monitoring
activities and power is specified. Proceeding from monitoring activities, the analysis sheds
light on the determinants of inter-firm integration between retailers and food
manufacturers. The role of specific investments, symmetric dependency, brand portfolio
xiii
and retail influence on price are highlighted. The analysis of retailers' product related
power supports the role of retail concentration, product shelf-life, manufacturer specific
investments and retailers' product monitoring activities. Examining retail margin related
power points to the importance of retail concentration, own brand penetration, the
importance of economies of scale in manufacturing, product shelf life and manufacturer
specific investments. Finally, retail power, measured as a unidimensional construct, is
found to be related to own brand market penetration, the importance of economies of scale
in manufacturing, manufacturer specific investments and retailers' monitoring activities.
xiv
Chapter One
The Determinants of Retailer Power within Retailer-Manufacturer
Relationships: Evidence from the Irish Food Manufacturing Industry
1.1 Introduction
There is a groWIng body of literature that provides evidence of increasing retail
involvement in food manufacturing activities. This body of work supports the view that
food retailers are gaining greater control over strategic activities, which were formerly the
remit of manufacturers. Indeed it appears that some food manufacturers are
accommodating greater retail influence over strategic variables, which are themselves the
source of the manufacturer's competitive advantage. The basis for such accommodations
and the increase in retailer power is imprecise. An examination of the relevant literature
points to a series of variables that may contribute directly or possibly indirectly to the
growth in retailer power. Examples include greater retail concentration, excess capacity in
manufacturing, the growth in own brand penetration, more strategic use of own brands,
retail integration into the distribution function and the emergence of strategic alliances
among retailers and suppliers. However the existing literature is fragmented and does not
clearly take account of the potential interconnections among these variables. Consequently
some variables may be attributed with determinacy, which may be more appropriately
posited elsewhere.
Another trend clearly emergIng from the literature is the move away from market
contracting towards more "domesticated" markets with pronounced features such as
relationship stability and idiosyncratic investments. Focus is shifting from competition
among firms at the same level of the marketing channel to chains of competing firms
identified by their retail customer. Such developments have potentially unwelcome effects
such as increasing barriers to entry and exit and ultimately in the move towards more retail
specific supply chains. Under these conditions, manufacturers are more likely to face the
prospect of having to tie their allegiance and futures to individual retailers. The concern
here is that under such a regime, the disproportionate burden of risk is borne by the
manufacturer.
From a manufacturer's perspective, a greater understanding of the dynamics of retailer
power is criticaL. While it is proposed here that greater retail influence over manufacturing
activities is not in itself undesirable and may indeed be very positive, the surrender of
control over key strategic variables is not to be advised without extreme caution. This
study sets out to investigate the factors that determine the extent to which manufacturers
have ceded control to retailers. In doing so, it proposes to highlight some of the hidden
costs of doing business in an environment where retailers, for the moment, dominate.
Because the study focuses on industry, firm and mode of governance characteristics rather
than on individual retailers, the results should be more general providing applicability
across a range of retail markets and manufacturing industries.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of retailer power and influence
over food manufacturers' activities. In particular, the research proposes to:
. identify the range of food manufacturing activities over which retailers exert influence
and power;
. identify the factors that promote and facilitate such retail control;
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. To specify a model of retailer power and to estimate the contribution of each factor in
the determination of retail power.
Chapter two commences our review of the Irish grocery and food manufacturing sectors.
It is largely contextual. It adopts an evolutionary approach, tracing the development of the
Irish grocery sector since the 1950's. It highlights the changes that have occurred in the
Irish grocery channel over the period and points to some of the key drivers of change. One
of the chief aims of the review is to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the
interaction between the grocery and indigenous food manufacturing sectors over the
period. The second aim of the chapter is to ascertain whether or not the Irish food
manufacturing sector can act as an appropriate sampling frame for the study of retailer-
manufacturer relations in the food sector in general. To address this issue the chapter
examines the diversity of trading relationships that the Irish food manufacturing sector
enJoys. This part of the chapter is based on primary research, as little secondary
information existed regarding this issue. As much of the study takes individual retailer-
manufacturer trading relationships as its basic unit of analysis one requirement is 0 ensure
that our sampling frame offers a suffcient degree of variation of such relationships.
Chapter three sets out to identify constructs and measures that may prove fruitful in the
pursuit of this study. It reviews the existing literature on the organisation of economic
activity within a series of vertical relations. The chapter initially focuses on the marketing
channel literature, which draws heavily on the construct of power. The review aims to
develop a clear understanding of the power construct as it evolved through the literature,
the units of measurement employed by earlier authors and their findings with respect to
power and vertical relations. The second part of the chapter reviews an alternative
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explanation of the co-ordination of vertical relations as espoused in the neoclassical modeL.
In particular, the review focuses on the emergence of the transaction cost literature. This
literature is selected primarily because it facilitates the incorporation of information
asymmetries, monitoring costs and specific investments into the study. It is argued that by
considering both these literatures, a pool of mutually consistent constructs may be
identified, which can aid a more detailed examination of our specified relationships and
yield a more potent insight into and a deeper understanding of retailer power and influence.
Chapter four focuses on the existing literature on retailer-manufacturer relationships. The
purpose of the chapter is to assess the work of earlier scholars, the hypotheses tested,
methodologies employed and the findings on interrelationships that exist between the
sectors. The chapter sets out to gain a deeper understanding of the determinants of the
balance of power within retailer-manufacturer relationships and, by considering the
existing literature as a whole, establish a broader perspective in which to base the current
study. In this fashion the chapter acts as the basis for formulating a series of hypotheses
drawing on existing work but extending it by establishing new or formerly implicit
interconnections.
Chapter five addresses the methodology to be employed to test the hypotheses established
in chapter six. The chapter has two major concerns. The first is the composition of an
appropriate sample to test the hypotheses. The second is to construct a series of measures
with which to test the hypotheses. Much of the chapter is given to testing the individual
measures to establish that they measure what is required in a reliable fashion.
Consequently that chapter devotes considerable effort to establishing construct validity.
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Chapter six develops and tests the series of hypotheses that forms the basis of this study.
Because of the fragmented nature of existing empirical research on retailer-manufacturer
power relations, the chapter adopts a cumulative approach. The chapter formulates a series
of hypotheses based on earlier research, which cumulatively establish a more precise
understanding of the determinants of retailer power. In this manner the hypotheses are
intended to build upon on one another. Thus each finding represents a potential building
block for a more complete understanding of retailer power. One of the strengths of such a
broadened perspective is that it facilitates separating out determinants of retailer power.
More focused studies, while having their own particular strengths, run the risk of
identifying second order determinants as primary determinants because of the imposed
restriction on variables gathered. The chapter is based on the framework that retailer
power may be viewed as acting through three sets of characteristics:
. industry structure (retailing and manufacturing);
. firm and product characteristics;
. and mode of governance.
The hypotheses are organised according to this framework and, when considered together,
provide a broader and more detailed study of the phenomenon under review.
Chapter seven provides a more considered discussion of our results. Given the cumulative
nature of the results chapter, chapter seven draws on all our findings. It considers the
identified relationships and associations among the variables employed in more detail and,
based on the findings, establishes three models of retailer power. The first seeks to explain
retailer power over manufacturers' margin related activities. The second seeks to explain
retailer power over manufacturers' product related activities, while the third seeks to
explain retailer power when measured as a unidimensional construct. In the enSUIng
5
discussion, the findings are integrated into the existing literature highlighting its unique
contributions. To complete the study the chapter highlights some of the limitations of the
current investigation and points to some research questions emerging from the work.
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Chapter Two
The Irish Grocery and Food Manufacturing Industries
2.1 Introduction
The structure of the Irish grocery trade has changed considerably over the last forty years as
the forces of demographic trends, legislation and technology in addition to changing consumer
needs and preferences shaped and continue to shape the grocers' trading environment. Over
the period, structural change in the grocery sector has had substantial consequences for the
operation of the entire marketing channel delivering food products to the Irish consumer. The
role of the wholesaler has evolved substantially, embracing many of the functions associated
with the retail operation. Grocers themselves found the nature of their business changing
rapidly as economies of scale and scope, in conjunction with legal constraints, came to play
a central part in the way they operated and in the determination of their profitability. While
some grocers have prospered, managing to adapt to the changing times, others have
succumbed to competitive pressures. Moreover, there has been an increasing awareness of
the role of the grocer as an integral agent in the food marketing chain. The nature of retail and
manufacturer/supplier relations is being subjected to closer scrutiny as awareness of its impact
on the allocation of scarce resources, employment and consumer satisfaction increases.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it sets out to examine the conditions underlying
the evolution of the Irish grocery market over the last fort years and to assess the impact, if
any, on the evolution ofthe retailer-manufacturer relations. The analysis takes the mid 1950's
and the abolition of resale price maintenance as its starting point and proceeds to evaluate the
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effect of price competitive forces on a heretofore protected sector. It investigates the
conditions underlying the emergence of the multiple grocer together with the conflict and
resultant change that this new phenomenon introduced to the food marketing channeL. The
role of the legislature is central to the unfolding of competitive pressures in the Irish market
and the development of the Irish retail environment and as such is an integral part of the
review.
Second, the analysis turns to the food manufacturing sector, focusing on its development since
entry to the EEC, and evaluates the extent of its dependency on both domestic and foreign
retail markets. Here the concern is with the scope ofIrish food manufacturers' portfolio of
retail markets and the range of demands to which they have had to respond. The analysis
focuses on food manufacturers' dependency on the UK market in particular. While both the
Irish and UK markets display some similarities, they have differed significantly in many
strategic aspects of their businesses, e.g. own brand, distribution, use of technology etc.
Finally, the chapter draws the two sectors together highlighting the nature of the dependency
that exists between the manufacturing and the retailing sectors.
One of the chief difficulties in researching the Irish grocery sector is the lack of reliable
performance data on the main operators. This is due primarily to the fact that the sector is
dominated by private interests who are under no obligation to release details of their
commercial performance into the public domain. Other substantial operators have tended to
be foreign owned with their accounts consolidated into their parents' returns. Therefore much
of the data utilised below were sourced from enquiries into the grocery sector by various
agencies. Market share figures are frequently used. However, caution needs to be used when
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interpreting them. First, as they measure share within selected and limited product fields, they
serve as limited proxies for the overall market. Second, the product fields measured change
over time with additions and deletions occurrng on a relatively frequent basis. Unfortnately
the first problem cannot be surmounted. The second problem has been minimised by using
data series as they appear in existing literature. This is considered to be appropriate as much
of the data obtained was furnished to government advisory bodies such as the Restrictive
Practices Commission.
2.2 Retail Competition and the Channels of Distribution
At this point, it is appropriate to examIne the nature, evolution and consequences of
competition within the grocery sector. The 1955 enquiry into the grocery trade by the Fair
Trade Commission resulted in the implementation of the first (1956) Groceries Order and the
abolition of resale price maintenance (Fair Trade Commission 1956) (Hereafter FTC 1956).
Since then there have been three further public enquiries and four reviews ofthe Restrictive
Practices act as it applies to the grocery trade. This level of scrutiny has been primarily due
to the dramatic evolution of the sector and the concerns raised about the nature of competition
and the consequences for independent grocers, manufacturers and consumers.
2.2.1 The Demise of the Wholesale and Independent Sector
Traditionally the grocery wholesaler played an important role in the supply chain for food
products in the Irish market. However, in the early 1950's it became apparent that changes
were occurrng to wholesalers' share of trade. While imported goods were channelled through
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wholesalers, an increasing proportion of domestically produced products were being
purchased directly from manufacturers. The principal agents behind this trend were the larger
grocers in the Dublin area where most of the large manufacturers were also situated (FTC
1956).
The emergence of the multiple grocer had not yet gathered any real momentum. These
grocers existed to a limited extent in Dublin and on a very localised basis throughout the
country (FTC 1956). However, where they did exist, their limited geographical distribution
facilitated a considerable degree of centralised control. In many instances store managers had
discretion only with respect to the purchase of perishable produce, while longer life products
were purchased by the organisation's head offce. Many of the existing multiples also carried
out much of their own distribution, with most operators conducting a wholesale business. In
these cases, manufacturers delivered to the wholesale warehouse, where the individual store's
orders were assembled and dispatched to the outlet.
Retail trade associations played an important role in the marketing channel during the 1950's.
The largest of these was the Retail Grocery, Dairy and Alled Trade's Association
(RGDATA). One of the more important functions of this organisation was to ensure "fair
profit margins for its members in commodities, the prices of which are either offcially
controlled or fixed by manufacturers" (FTC 1956:41) and the maintenance of the independent
grocers' position in the marketing channeL. One of the more interesting activities carried out
by RGDATA was the policing of competition among its members to ensure adherence to the
pricing regime under the conditions of resale price maintenance. There is strong evidence
indicating the anti-competitive stance of the association. RGDATA itself argued that" the
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force of competition and the desire of manufacturers to achieve low prices and capture a wider
share of the market is so great that an association such as RGDATA is most necessary to
offset the inequality of bargaining power of the individual grocers when faced with strong
manufacturers" (FTC 1956:42). Indeed the Association frequently took upon itself to report
price-cutting grocers to the manufacturers concerned, requesting that forces be brought to bear
and either prices restored to recommended levels or supplies disrupted (FTC 1956).
Manufacturers who failed in this regard risked being boycotted by the organisation's
members.
The level of retail price competition prior to the abolition of resale price maintenance was
minimal with many products subject to price control. For instance, wholesale and retail prices
were specified by order of the official price control for both butter and sugar. Manufacturers
or suppliers specified the retail price for most other domestically produced and some imported
products. The price was usually enforced through price marking, advertising or direct
instructions to the grocer (FTC 1956:24). There is evidence that failure to charge prices in
accordance with recommendations regularly resulted in discontinuity of supply (FTC 1956).
Manufacturers frequently attempted to specify wholesale prices although allowances were
usually made to permit consideration of competing brands.
There is evidence to suggest increasing interchannel competition with manufacturers
attempting to usurp the wholesalers' role. "In many instances however, the gross margins
available to wholesalers make it economically diffcult for all but a small number of
wholesalers to compete with manufacturers for the business of grocers whose orders entitle
them to quantity terms at higher rates" (FTC 1956:33). Indeed it appears that price
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competition was more intense at wholesale level, with manufacturers, wholesalers and retail
buying groups all competing for the affections of the grocer. Further pressure was exerted on
the wholesale sector by grocers claiming wholesaler status and attempting to qualify for
discounts from manufacturers. These discounts served to either enhance the grocer's
profitability or price competitive position. The diffculty of identifying genuine wholesalers
was clearly recognised by various manufacturers but it does not appear that concerted efforts
were made to restore a level playing field (FTC 1956).
During the 1950's and 1960's, most channel innovation concerning the role of either the
grocer or wholesaler occurred in the Dublin area. This is unsurprising given the geographical
distribution of the population and the increasing concentration of consumer purchasing power
in and around the capitaL. One such innovation was the establishment of the retail buying
group, Allied Dublin Merchants (ADM) in 1954, which had a significant impact in the
wholesale market in the Dublin area. This development appears to have been the first major
onslaught by a component of the retail sector on the wholesale function. The retail members
of the group were its shareholders and provided the initial capital investments required to set
up and operate a warehouse. Many of the individual members had suffcient scale to purchase
supplies at the optimum terms provided by manufacturers. However, the buying group
enabled these to achieve increasing effciency through better management of stocks and
increasing stock turnover (FTC 1972).
ADM's success had an immediate impact on the channeL. Despite initial diffculties in
acquiring wholesale terms from many manufacturers, the group stimulated intense
competition within the wholesale sector. While RGDATA frequently took upon itselfthe role
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of price advisor with governent, manufacturers and suppliers alike, it had not intended to
act as a purchasing agent for its members. However, in light of continued pressure from its
members, due no doubt to the success of ADM, RGDATA established Merchants National
Co-operative (MNC) as a wholesale buying society in 1956. Within three years the co-
operative was operating three depots located in Dublin, Cork and Ballyshannon.
The pressures on the wholesale sector were partly self induced. Throughout the late 1940's
and early 1950's, wholesalers through their trade associations, attempted to fix prices to
grocers and obtain optimal terms from manufacturers and suppliers. The size of these fixed
margins would have proved alluring to the manufacturing, importing and retailing sectors.
Consequently many of these firms internalised the more attractive aspects of the wholesaling
function. Manufacturers' ability to identify the more lucrative segments ofthe retail business
and grocers' ability to identify the more attractive product areas would have left wholesalers
operating in fewer attractive product areas and serving the more costly components of the
grocery market. Indeed manufacturers' prices direct to grocery outlets would have had the
effect of reducing the wholesale margins, particularly in the concentrated Dublin market.
Given the constraints imposed by resale price maintenance, retail competition during the
1950's was largely based on differentiation with emphasis on service. Multiples competed
on the basis of delivery services, credit facilities and product range (FTC 1956:21). However,
moves to reduce costs through the reduction of these services were already appearing in the
Dublin market (FTC 1956:23). In general, multiple operators, because of their volume
purchases or wholesaler status, were given better buying terms than the single outlet operator,
although the generosity of the terms varied from manufacturer to manufacturer (FTC
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1956:37). Manufacturers argued that cost savings associated with central purchasing,
distribution and order size, in addition to higher operating expenses incurred by the grocer,
justified better buying terms. Under conditions of resale price maintenance these terms would
have contributed directly to profits. In the absence of such price restrictions they provided
another basis for the intensification of price competition.
In its deliberations, the Fair Trade Commission of 1955 concluded that existing retail price
competition was limited and should be stimulated to the benefit of the consumer. Thus it
proposed that resale price maintenance either by manufacturer, supplier or wholesaler be
prohibited. However, the Commission recommended that manufacturers and suppliers be
given the power to set maximum retail prices and withhold supplies from grocers who sold
products at prices below wholesale cost before the deduction of quantity discounts. Grocers
were also prohibited from using suppliers' recommended prices for advertising purposes under
conditions where the retail price charged was lower than the recommended selling price.
Cessation of supplies to grocers would be permitted when these conditions were broken.
Suppliers would also have the discretion to terminate supplies to a particular wholesaler if a
retail outlet served by that wholesaler consistently failed to operate within the conditions laid
down by the Commission.
For their part, suppliers were prohibited from engaging in unfair discrimination with respect
to the terms and conditions of a transaction. The Commission intended that terms and
conditions reflected the true costs of doing business and did not exceed the savings resulting
from direct dealings with the larger grocers. The Commission also attempted to introduce
some transparency to the price mechanism, and insisted on it having access to all terms and
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conditions available from both suppliers and manufacturers.
The introduction of a more liberal pricing regime immediately led to claims of excessive
price competition. Indeed an examination of the grocery sector indicates substantial structural
change, with the number of outlets declining by 5,224 or 21 % over the 1956-66 period (table
2.1). While the service oriented grocery outlet, i.e. "other grocery", had the largest absolute
decline in outlet numbers (fallng by 2,341), dairy outlets and country general shops recorded
dramatic declines of 64% and 52% in outlet numbers respectively. Tobacco, sweets and
newspaper outlets also suffered heavily with numbers falling by 39% or 1,741 units. The
substantial reduction in outlet numbers was reflected in the fall in employment in the sector.
This fell by 28% or 15,582 persons over the period!.
Table 2.1
Structural Change in the Grocery Sector (1956-1966)
No. Outlets Turnover £'OOOs Gross Mardn £'OOOs I Persons Engaged
1956 1966 1956 1966 1956 1966 1956 1966
Supermarket NA 41 NA 12,327 NA 1,597 NA 1,060
Delicatessen NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Other Grocery i 3, i 11 10,770 63,614 83,250 7,291 10,462 26,471 19,55 i
Grocery &Pub 3,742 3,007 2,1472 22,270 3,274 3,698 10,658 6,847
Fresh Meat 1,776 1,803 12,368 15,009 2,197 3,248 5,138 3,990
Bread 336 397 1,202 3,329 293 969 777 1,240
Dairy 195 71 2,281 5,970 591 2,130 1,004 1,406
Fish & Poultr 162 167 1,206 1,666 261 376 534 412
Fruit & Veg 546 362 1,262 1,350 253 289 916 510
CGS1 448 215 14,948 6,412 1,789 980 3,294 1,163
TSW 4,480 2,739 9,618 11,304 1,652 1,961 7,225 4,256
Total 24,796 19,572 127,971 162,887 17,601 25,692 56,017 40,435
¡Country General Shop 2 Tobacco Sweets and Newsagent
Source: CSO Census of Distribution 1956, 1966.
i This figure does not take full-time/part-time considerations into account.
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A further featue worth noting is that the 1966 census is the first census to provide a measure
of the impact of the supermarkee. Despite accounting for only 0.2% of outlet numbers it had
already gained 7.5% of turnover and 6.2 % of gross margin. The data also suggests that the
new retail format was operating at approximately the same gross margin in percentage terms
as its other grocery competitors. Sales per person employed of £11,629 versus £4,258 for
"other grocery" outlets, highlights the increased effciency that the supermarket was
introducing to the sector. Gross margin per person employed of £1,490 for the supermarket
was almost threefold that of the other grocery format at £535.
During the 1960's, the intensification of price competition was primarily a result of
competition among the multiples particularly in Dublin. There was a growing awareness of
the strength of the multiples on their respective supplier bases and the increasing asymmetry
in dependency. Concern was raised that the multiples' ability to obtain preferential terms and
conditions from their suppliers would result in the domination of the trade by a small number
of chains. This in turn might lead to oligopolistic pricing practices to the detriment of
consumer welfare. Furthermore the costs of entry into the grocery trade were increasing in
line with increasing store size. While not prohibitive, these costs were believed to limit entry
to existing multiples or foreign operators. Indeed the concentration of ownership and the
possibility of a take-over by a foreign operator was deemed to be potentially damaging to
indigenous manufacturers opening the way to imported products purchased centrally at head
offces located abroad (Fair Trade Commission 1972 ).
In 1966, the Commission undertook a further study of the trade in light of these claims and
2 A self service outlet where groceries and household provisions accounted for the bulk of turnover and
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the emerging new trends in consumer shopping habits and the growth in the supermarket and
multiple outlets. The Commission concluded that remedial action was not necessary and that
very few instances of unfair competition actually existed (FTC 1972). More importantly the
Commission held that manufacturers were coming to grips with the emerging trends in the
retail sector and left the various protagonists to their own devices. The Commission's findings
and recommendations were subjected to severe criticism and further complaints were made
by grocers and suppliers alike.
The impact of intensified price competition was immediately felt throughout the supply chain.
Emphasis on cost reductions to fuel price competition led to significant increases in the share
of product delivered directly to outlets as the multiples sought optimum terms of purchase.
Clearly the increase in direct deliveries to outlets, rather than through the wholesale
distribution system where economies associated with drop size could be enjoyed, resulted in
increased costs to manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, the multiples' ability to obtain
terms on a par with those obtained by wholesalers, despite the inherent ineffciencies
associated with split drops, resulted in claims of cross-subsidisation and reflected their
growing power. There was growing evidence to suggest that manufacturers were failing to
differentiate between the retail and wholesale functions in their pricing structures with the
supermarket multiples receiving supplementary terms over and above those justified by
economies of order size (FTC 1972).
It became clear that during the 1960's retail productivity was increasing at a faster rate than
wholesaling. Cogan (1978) estimated that retail productivity was increasing at approximately
operated at least three checkout points.
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3.5% per annum compared with 2.0% in the wholesale sector. In response to this reduction
in its relative competitiveness, the grocery wholesale sector underwent a process of
consolidation resulting in an 11 % decline in numbers over the period 1956-1966 (Table 2.2).
The immediate impact of the rationalisation appears to have paid dividends with grocery
wholesalers' share of the wholesale market increasing by four percentage points over the
1956-66 period. However, the gains were short-lived, and their share of the market declined
rapidly and dropped almost 15 percentage points over the next 11 years.
Table 2.2
The Wholesale Sector (1956-1977)
Establishment Numbers Sales £'oOOs Gross margin £
1956 1966 1977 1956 1966 1977 1956 1966 1977
Grocery 258 222 191 29,965 41,210 222,558 4,789 4,163 18,622
Tea, coffee, sugar 38 21 14 14,966 9,271 63,824 NA 1,577 9,718
Fruit & Veg 84 99 120 5,615 9,361 71,797 629 .121 9,316
Other food 162 196 236 8,963 15,393 196,040 1,248 3,946 24,917
Total 542 538 561 59,509 75,135 554,219 6,666 9,807 62,573
% Establishment % Sales % Gross margin
Numbers
Grocery 47.60 41.26 34.05 50.35 54.85 40.16 71.84 42.45 29.76
Tea, coffee, sugar 7.01 3.90 2.50 25.15 12.34 11.2 NA 16.08 15.53
Fruit & Veg 15.50 18.40 21.9 9.44 12.33 12.95 9.44 1.23 14.89
Other food 29.89 36.43 42.07 15.06 20.49 35.37 18.72 40.24 39.82
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO Census of Distribution 1956, 1966, 1977
In their attempt to adapt to the new competitive environment a number of wholesalers
committed themselves to the voluntary buying group concept which had been developed on
the continent. The emergence ofthese groups and their associated symbol outlets represented
an allance of two sectors, wholesalers and independent grocers, which individually had been
experiencing decline but together offered the hope of effective competition with the multiple
sector. In addition to better buying terms as a result of bulk orders, the benefits accruing to
the participating grocers were a clear identity supported by advertising, access to cheaper
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private label brands, together with marketing and operational support services. In time the
success of the symbol groups led ADM to acquire the Londis franchise for the Republic of
Ireland and enhance its ability to compete with the multiples through the introduction of its
own private label brands. The success of this organisational form can be partly measured by
the fact that by 1970,25% of all retail outlets belonged to either wholesale or co-operative
groups (FTC 1972). Operational changes also occurred as cash and carr wholesaling
emerged. Many grocers now assembled and took charge of their own orders at the
wholesaler's depot. Payment in cash and the resultant savings in wholesale costs could then
be passed on to the grocer in the form of lower prices.
Nevertheless, while the grocery sector was experiencing increasing competition and falling
numbers, specialist wholesalers were emerging to meet the retail market's requirements for
fresh produce and other foods. Consequently, the number of wholesalers held up remarkably
well and actually increased over the 1956-1977 period. The success of these new operators
was no doubt due to the limited shelf-life of their products, the fragmented nature of the
supply industry, the effciencies associated with order consolidation and the reduced costs of
holding safety stock at wholesale level rather than in the retail outlet.
However, these developments were possible only in the context of a changing retail
environment. The increase in price competition and the move towards cash and carr
wholesaling necessitated that the provision of credit at the retail level be curtailed. Further
cost economising in the retail outlet passed the functions of order assembly and delivery to
the customer, giving rise to the rapid growth in the self service supermarket. As mentioned
earlier, the 1966 census was the first to capture the initial impact and potential effciency of
19
the new retail format. Indeed, the efficiency of this new retail format and its suitability under
conditions of price competition as the primary means of retail differentiation ensured its
immediate success. Product standardisation, improved packaging and the proliferation of
brands removed much of the need for personal service while price competition, by its very
nature, reduced the number of dimensions on which operators could compete.
The late 1970's saw a degree of stabilisation return to the wholesale sector. While overall
volumes had declined considerably, it appears that manufacturers' decisions to cease direct
deliveries to independent grocers and focus instead on the larger multiples had the effect of
halting the wholesale sector's decline in share of trade (Restrictive Practices Commission
1980, hereafter RPC). The establishment in 1979 of the Irish Association of Distributive
Trades Ltd. (IADT), an allance of wholesalers and independent grocers, also assisted. This
allance represented 74 wholesale organisations operating from 151 warehouses. Of these 108
were cash and carries catering to the independent grocer while the remainder were delivered
warehouses catering to the symbol groups. One of the primary functions of IADT was to
negotiate the best terms for its members with manufacturers and suppliers. It also sought to
have cost reductions associated with the wholesale function recognised in the terms and
conditions negotiated with suppliers. The effectiveness of the organisation is partly measured
by the fact that by the mid 1980's it had achieved such recognition from a substantial number
of suppliers (RPC 1987)
One of the more important developments was the establishment of the Super Valu symbol
group and trading fascia by the wholesale group Musgraves in 1981 (RGDATA 1992). This
group was arguably the most innovative of the symbols and, with a minimum store size in the
20
region of 4,000 sq. ft, presented a substantial challenge to the multiples particularly outside the
Dublin region. Growth of the group came initially from the upgrading and conversion of
existing VG stores although over time new members joined though the construction of new
outlets and the purchase of some of the former H. Willams' stores. This group, together with
its sister group Centra, a trading fascia composed of convenience type outlets, enabled
Musgraves to achieve a substantial share of the grocery market and constrain both the growth
ofthe major multiples and the decline ofthe symbol groups. Members of both groups could
now benefit from the buying power of the third largest buying entity in the country as well as
from international linkages through the buying group European Marketing and Distribution
(EMD). In addition to buying power, group members could also enjoy the benefits of certain
retail services. These helped enhance retail expertise and operations at outlet level as well as
improved identity through extensive advertising.
The position of the independent grocer had been underpinned to a degree by governent
legislation. In 1982, the government issued a directive to local authorities in response to
sustained political pressure from the independent grocery sector. The General Policy
Directive was to provide local authorities with clear criteria to be considered in the case of
retail shopping development. In effect the planning process would now have to consider
planning applications in light of:
Adequacy of existing retail shopping outlets in terms of size, location, quality and
convenience;
Impact on existing communities, employment and established shopping outlets;
The needs of existing community members and their shopping requirements;
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Potential impact on existing infrastructure and urban development (Parker 1994b).
The impact of the planning directive was to make the securing of planning permission for new
retail locations significantly more diffcult. First, the need for such developments had to be
demonstrated. Second, it gave existing retailers greater scope to involve themselves in the
planning process thus either delaying or blocking planning applications. These delays could
be utilised to improve existing outlets such that the defined need would be either removed or
market share captured. While the planning directive did not halt the development of new and
larger scale retail outlets, it certainly introduced more balance to the development of the sector
(Parker 1994b). However, it could be argued that the legislation introduced a substantial
barrier to new entry. It clearly favoured both the existing retail infrastructure and competitive
structure thereby enhancing the position of the independent grocer. In particular, it favoured
those existing grocers who could avail of the most recent advances in retail technology and
operations through their affliation with the larger symbol groups.
2.2.2 The Rise of the Multiple Grocer and the Move Towards Government Intervention
Throughout the 1960's the growing mobility of the population through access to both private
and public transport increased the size of retailers' geographic catchment areas and hence the
area of effective competition. Potential savings motivated customers to travel further and
consolidate their purchases. This facilitated the development of larger scale outlets, the fixed
costs of which could be amortised over larger catchment areas. The increasing degree of sub-
urbanisation of the Irish population led to greater decentralisation of shopping opportnities
(Parker 1994a)(FTC 1972). This process was reflected in new retail formats, developed
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initially in Dublin, with the emergence of the large scale shopping centre during the mid
1960's. It was usual to find one of the main grocery multiples acting as the primary anchor
tenant. The development of shopping centres proceeded gradually during the early 1970's but
gathered momentum towards the end of the decade with the rapid expansion of the 3 Guys
discount chain operated by Albert Gubay. (Lord et al 1988)
In attempting to attract a greater share of the grocery market, the larger retail operators
frequently took recourse to various promotional devices, including below cost selling (sale
below purchase price), trading stamps, turnover tax exemptions and coupons (FTC 1972). The
incidence of below cost selling appears to have increased dramatically during the late 1960's
and early 1970's. The usual practice was to sell a narrow range of well-advertised staple
products at below cost. Larger operators could use their wider product ranges to increase the
probability of enticing sales of higher margin products thus managing their bottom line
margins and profitability.
Manufacturers, despite coming under increasing pressure from certain sectors of the retail
trade to employ their powers under the Groceries Order to withhold supplies from grocers who
refused to refrain from selling below wholesale cost, usually desisted from doing so. They
argued that such attempts would be in vain as the guilty grocers would simply source their
product elsewhere or substitute other competing products from wiling suppliers (FTC 1972).
Thus, this provision of the Order proved almost totally ineffective. Nevertheless, it is clear
that manufacturers did not advocate below cost sellng given the detrimental effect it had on
sales patterns and the impact on consumers' perception of normal prices and brand image.
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The intensification of price competition continued the process of structural change. The entry
of Associated British Foods into the Irish market through its acquisition of Quinnsworth
introduced a new dimension to existing retail competition. By 1977, there were 250
supermarkets in operation (table 2.3). While accounting for less than 2% of retail outlets, the
format had now amassed almost 31 % of grocery sales. The change within the sector was
considerable with outlet numbers falling by 28% or almost 5,500 units in eleven years.
Table 2.3
Structural Change in the Grocery Sector (1966-1977)
No. Outlets Turnover £'000 Gross Margin £'000 Persons Engaged
1966 1977 1966 1977 1966 1977 1966 1977
Supermarket 41 250 12,327 244,521 1,597 36,806 1,060 6,036
Delicatessen NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Other Grocery 10,770 7,305 83,250 26,370 10,462 39,904 19,551 18,598
Grocery & 3,007 1,362 22,270 57,851 3,698 9,622 6,847 4,662
Pub
Fresh Meat 1,803 1,862 15,009 105,829 3,248 19,464 3,990 5,157
Bread 397 270 3,329 13,111 969 3,171 1,240 952
Dairy 71 22 5,970 813 2,130 115 1,406 52
Fish & Poultr 167 141 1,666 6,717 376 1,475 412 460
Fruit & Veg 362 354 1,350 12,189 289 2,566 510 927
CGSl 215 105 6,412 21,527 980 3,590 1,163 794
TSW 2,739 2,404 11,304 68,803 1,961 12,331 4,256 6,078
Total 19,572 14,075 162,887 794,731 25,692 128,194 40,435 43,386lCountry General Shop 2 Tobacco Sweets and Newsagent
Source: CSO Census of Distribution i 966, 1977. Census of Seryices 1988
Once again it tended to be the smaller independent grocer that suffered most with "other
grocery" outlet numbers declining by almost 33%. The number of grocery outlets with pubs
declined by almost 55% but this probably reflected some degree of specialisation into either
the licensed trade or the grocery business. The number ofTSN's declined by approximately
12% representing a considerable slowdown in their demise following the dramatic decline
during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Despite the reported intensification in price
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competition, the census data suggests that gross margin as a percentage of sales increased
marginally for the sector as a whole but for the supermarket component in particular. Many
specialist areas such as bread and confectionary, dairy, fish and poultry record declining
shares of turnover and gross margin. Indeed gross margins expressed as a percentage of sales
declined substantially in all of these categories. The factors underlying these reductions
appear to have been the increasing competition with the multiple supermarkets as they
diversified into new but formerly specialist product areas.
The level of below cost selling continued to intensify during the late 1970's to such an extent
that further amendments were made to the Groceries Order. Under the 1973 Order,
manufacturers were permitted to cease supplies of any product that grocers were selling at
prices below the price at which they had bought them. The 1978 Order empowered
manufacturers or suppliers to withhold supplies of all products from a grocer who was sellng
any product at below net invoice price. However, below cost sellng continued to occur on
a regular basis as did the advertising of such activities. Despite being prohibited by law, H.
Wiliams, Tesco and Quinnsworth were all prosecuted for below cost advertising in 1980.
Nevertheless, there was growing evidence to indicate that suppliers were beginning to use
their powers to withhold supplies from offending grocers (RPC 1980). The effectiveness of
these actions was queried in the Second Report of the Joint Committee on Small Businesses
(Yates 1984) which indicated that increased competition among the multiples was generating
widespread below cost sellng. Indeed intense inter-multiple competition during the late
1970's probably contributed to the growing concentration in the market. The Five Star chain
of supermarkets was taken over by Quinnsworth and Albert Gubay's retail chain, 3 Guys, was
purchased by Tesco in 1979.
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While the impact of below cost sellng on the consumer price index remains unclear there was
much debate on its impact, both actual and potential, on the Irish food manufacturing sector.
The manufacturing and wholesale sectors argued that the practice endangered Irish
employment with imports ultimately substituted for domestically produced goods. Below cost
selling on the part of one grocer had a knock on effect as competing grocers demanded cost
prices to enable them to compete with the initiator but without loss of margin. Thus the
supplier had the choice of either terminating supplies to the offending grocer or providing his
competitors with even lower prices. Given low manufacturer margins and the concentration
of the grocery sector, either alternative could result in considerable financial diffculties and
possibly even closure.
On the other hand, the multiples argued that below cost sellng would not, in itself, lead to
additional imports as the level of imports was governed by price assuming a given level of
quality. Indeed, the inability to match retail competitors, who by way of special discounts
were gaining a temporary competitive advantage by selling below cost, might encourage the
importation of cheaper competing products from abroad. However, in its enquiry into the
below cost sellng of grocery goods in 1980, the Restrictive Practices Commission did not
recommend a ban on below cost sellng because the problems in the grocery trade have little
to do with the prevalence of the practice. "We believe that the real causes of the problems
must be looked for elsewhere, in the unequal power relationships which cause distortion and
disequilibrium of trade, in the discriminatory application of terms and conditions and in the
possible trend towards future oligopoly" (RPC 1980:67).
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The 1980's continued to witness considerable change in the grocery market particularly in
terms of the continuing concentration of the market and the organisation of the independent
sector. The multiples continued to experience rapid growth in market share, accounting for
58% of the total market and 81 % of the Dublin market by 1984 (Yates 1984). Tesco's entry
in 1979 and rapid expansion in terms of new store development made a significant
contribution to the increase in multiple concentration. The high multiple share of the Dublin
market encouraged the expansion into other regions. This is reflected in the increase in the
multiple outlet numbers from 84 in 1979 to 106 by 1986 throughout the rest of the country.
Table 2.4 indicates that multiple outlet numbers increased by 63% over the seventeen year
period 1970-1986 and that the entire increase occurred outside the Dublin area. Dublin did
witness considerable change as many outlets were refitted to cater for emerging consumer
trends and the substitution of new larger formats for existing retail stock.
Table 2.4
Multiple Outlet Numbers
Number of Outlets
Year No. of Mu1tiples Total No. in Dublin
1970 8 107 67
1972 8 128 NA
1975 6 137 69
1979 6 155 71
1986 6 174 68
1991 5 154 55
Source FTC 1991 (Table 13)
The multiples' steady expansion into the provinces resulted in casualties in terms of both
independent grocers and their organising agencies. The relentless growth in the multiple share
of the market is shown in table 2.5. The data show the continual decline in the independent
sector. However, during the early 1970's the share of trade accounted for by the symbol
groups held up reasonably well. It is probable that their share would have been supported by
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an inflow of new members from the independent sector. However, over time this flow would
have diminished in terms of both numbers and quality. Thus in the early to mid 1980's we
see a dramatic drop in the group share with two of the symbol groups, Merchants National
Cooperative (1983) and A&O (1985) ceasing to trade, leaving four groups in operation.
Table 2.5
Market Share by Ownership in the Grocery Market
Outlet 1971 1975 1979 1984
Multiples 30 16 44 58
Svmbol Groups 35 33 21 21
Independents 35 31 25 21
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Yeats (1984)
The multiple sector was dominated by five players, Dunnes Stores, Quinnsworth, Tesco,
H.Williams and Superquinn with approximately 50% share of the market in 1982 (Yates
1984). The fact that two of these operators, Quinnsworth and Tesco, were foreign owned and
had strong links with overseas supplying organisations, caused considerable concern for Irish
manufacturers particularly in light of existing legislation in relation to below cost sellng. It
was suggested that while the Restrictive Practices Commission had the authority to demand
supplier terms from companies within its jurisdiction it had no authority to obtain them from
companies based overseas. Thus, it would be a relatively straightforward procedure to
compete below cost using imported items.
The intense competition took its toll on even the larger of the multiple grocers, foreigners
included, with Tesco, H.Wiliams, Moyletts and Five Star all departing the sector in the 10-
year period 1977-1987. The concentration of multiple outlet ownership is presented in table
2.6 showing Power Supermarkets, in particular, increasing its outlet portfolio substantially.
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This was achieved by its purchase of the Five Star chain in 1979.
Table 2.6
Trends in Multiple Shop Numbers
1977 1983 1988 1991 1993
Power Supermarkets 36 65 68 69 70
Dunnes Stores 31 39 49 50 48
Superquinn 8 10 12 13 16
L&N 13 15 14 15 18
Roches Stores 4 5 6 7 8
H.Wiliams 17 13 0 0 0
Five Star 28 0 0 0 0
Tesco 0 14 0 0 0
Moyletts 4 0 0 0 0
Total 141 161 149 154 160
Source: Nielsen Retail Census 1994
The exit ofH.Wiliams had a significant impact in the Dublin area. the number of multiple
outlets fell for the first time from 68 in 1986 to 55 in 1991 (Table 2.4). The main beneficiaries
ofH.Wiliams' closure in terms of market share were Quinnsworth and Dunnes Stores. AGB
Attwood figures given in table 2.7 indicate that, while the multiples increased their share of
the product fields reviewed by 7 percentage points from 58% to 65%, Quinnsworth and
Dunnes Stores managed to achieve growth of 15 percentage points from 34% to 49% of the
market over the period 1982 - 1986.
Table 2.7
Growth in the Market Share of the Two Largest Multiple Retailers
Period Total Multiples Dunnes Stores & Ouinnsworth
1982,4 Weeks to (sic) December 58 34
1983,4 weeks to 8 October 57 35
1984,4 Weeks to 6 October 59 34
1985,4 Weeks to 5 October 64 43
1986,4 Weeks to 4 October 65 49
Source: Attood Consumer Panel as renorted by Restrictive Practices Commission 1987
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Increasing concentration of the market was now beginning to cause growing concern. In
1986, the Restrictive Practices Commission was again requested to review the Groceries
Order. Once again, the reasons for the request were political because the continued reduction
in grocery establishment numbers was causing concern. To understand the climate within
which the Commission was adjudicating it is worth examining the economic environment at
that time.
Since the 1970's, the Irish economy experienced both periods of considerable growth and
deep recession. During the mid 1970's to the early 1980's, Irish gross national product (GNP)
grew rapidly at approximately 4 % per annum. This increase in income was reflected in the
demand for retail services with corresponding average annual rates of growth in both grocery
(7.0%) and total retail volumes (3.1%). However in 1982, the Irish economy entered a
prolonged recession. GNP declined and indeed failed to recover to 1981 levels until 1987.
The impact on retail sales was immediate. Total retail volumes fell for three consecutive
years and recovered to 1981 levels in 1989. Grocery volumes, accounted largely by food
products, proved more resilient to the recession with continued growth until 1986. The
primary factor underlying the continued growth in grocery volumes was probably the strong
natural increase in population, which rose by 172,000 persons over the period 1980-1985.
Moreover, given the low income elasticity of demand for food, falling incomes in addition to
increasing population size saw the proportion of total expenditure on goods and services
accounted for by food increase rapidly during the earlier part of the decade (Figure 2.1).
However, even grocery volumes stagnated over the four year period 1986-1989. Headcount
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would appear to be a major contributory factor. Population growth ground to a halt in 1986
- 1987. The later part of the decade was characterised by increasing levels of net migration
so that the total population declined by 30,000 persons over the period. That the typical
emigrant tended to be relatively young and near the age of household formation would have
had a two edged sword effect. First, this age group would have had above average per capita
grocery expenditure while at the same time expected to produce the next generation of
consumers. Thus, the changing composition of the population and the resurgence in GNP
towards the latter part of the decade, resulted in a dramatic decline in food share of total
expenditure from approximately 26% in 1982 to less than 20% by 1993.
Figure 2.1
Food as a % of Total Consumption Expenditure
Food as % of Total Expenditure On Goods & Services
Constant Prices (1990)
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Nevertheless, it is clear that during the mid 1980's grocery volumes held up much better than
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food volumes alone (Figure 2.2). One possible explanation lies in the range diversification
embarked upon by the supermarket trade expanding into new product areas, both food and non
food, in ever increasing attempts to take advantage of economies of scope and obtain a larger
percentage of the household weekly expenditure. This strategy, initiated by the major
multiples during the late 1960's (FTC 1971), and continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's
(FTC 1991), could not have been adopted with equal success by the small independent grocer
given space constraints.
Figure 2.2
Food and Grocery (1990=100)
Food & Grocery Volumes
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Table 2.8 captures some of the changes in retail outlet formats over the 1977-1988 period.
The first feature to note is that the number of supermarkets grew by 86%. Retail sellng space
increased by 89%, representing an increase in average supermarket size of over 9%.
Nevertheless, average supermarket size at just over 9,000 sq. ft. appears small when compared
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with British multiple outlets. Some further information on store size was furnished by the
Restrictive Practices Commission in its 1991 review, indicating that of the major multiples,
Quinnsworth, Superquinn and L&N had most if not all of their store portfolio in excess of
8,000 sq .ft. Dunnes Stores, on the other hand had a substantial number of smaller outlets.
Examining other grocery outlets it is clear that average size increased substantially, growing
in the region of34% over the period (table 2.8). Thus, despite a 29% decline in other grocery
outlets numbers, actual sellng space fell by less than 5%, indicating that those grocers leaving
the sector were extremely small with little potential for diversification.
Table 2.8
Change in the Average Grocery Outlet Size
1977 1988 % Change
Number of Supermarkets 250 466 86.4
Number of Other Grocery Outlets 7,305 5,176 -29.14
Supermarket Selling Space ('000 Sq ft) 2,100.9 3,975.1 89.21
Other Grocery Selling Space ('000 Sq ft) 3,007.2 2,865 -4.73
A verag Supermarket Size ('000 Sq ft) 8.40 9.18 9.24
Average Other Grocery Size ('000 Sq ft) 0.41 0.55 34.46
Total Selling Space ('000 Sq ft) 5,108.1 6,840.1 33.91
Source: Census of Distribution 1977, Census ofSeryices 1988
2.2.3 Government Intervention
In its 1987 report, the Restrictive Practices Commission calculated that the multiples' grocery
sales increased by 38% over the period 1979-1985 while those of wholesalers declined by
12% in real terms (RPC 1987: Table 13). Thus, despite competing in a growing market, the
independent sector displayed a continual inability to compete. This inability to compete is
dramatically displayed in table 2.9, showing the rising level of concentration within the
industry. In 1977, the top 2% of outlets accounted for an estimated 25% of the market. By
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1993, these outlets accounted for 50% of food turnover (table 2.9). What is more remarkable
is that in 1993, 50% of all food outlets accounted for only 6% of turnover, suggesting that the
process of strctural change is incomplete and that the industry wil experience continued exit
on a large scale.
Table 2.9
C fG Toncentration 0 rocery urn over 
% of Grocery Turnover
% of Outlets 1977 1983 1988 1991 1993
2 25 39 48 49 50
5 37 53 58 60 61
10 47 62 66 68 70
20 61 71 75 78 80
50 84 87 89 93 94
100 100 100 100 LOO 100
Source: Nielsen Retail Census 1994
Given the evidence, it became patently clear that the existing Groceries Order was completely
ineffective in ensuring a level playing field between the multiple and independent grocers.
Buying power held by the multiples could and was being used to achieve considerably more
favourable terms and conditions from a weak and largely unprofitable Irish food
manufacturing sector. In its recommendations to the government in 1980, the Commission
had argued, that given existing constraints, to prevent below cost selling would not be in the
interest of free trade. Nevertheless, it could foresee a situation where multiple concentration,
by reducing the economic feasibility of the independent sector, might necessitate such a
provision. The existing practice of below cost selling was believed to have had the effect of
generating customer perceptions of lower multiple prices which did not match existing pricing
structures. Moreover, many believed that these perceptions were the primary factor
underlying the multiple retailers' increasing share of the market. The independent sector
argued the prohibition of such practices would redress these perceptions and restore a level
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of fairness to the trade.
By 1987, the Commission, swayed by the growth in market concentration, the rapid increase
in the sale of own label goods and its associated change in the balance of power between
grocers and their suppliers, decided to recommend the prohibition of sellng below net invoice
price inclusive of all discounts, rebates and allowances. "Hello money" or slotting
allowances, as well as advertising allowances, being considered discriminatory and unfair,
were also prohibited. Suppliers were to maintain a complete list of all terms and conditions,
which were to be made available to the Director of Consumer Affairs and Fair Trade on
request. However, the prohibition excluded a number of fresh and perishable products such
as fresh and frozen meat and fish, fresh fruit and vegetables (FTC 1991). These
recommendations were duly accepted and came into effect in late 1987.
In its review of the operation of the Groceries Order in 1991, the Restrictive Practices
Commission argued that the perceived price differential between the multiples and other
operators appeared to have diminished. While there were some isolated instances of intense
price competition, it was generally held that the prohibition was being observed and that the
nature of competition had shifted from a price to non price basis with more emphasis on store
attributes, convenience and service (FTC 1991). It also appeared that the level of multiple
concentration diminished over the 1986 - 1990 period (Table 2.10). The extent ofthis decline
was considerably greater than that accounted for by the exit of H Wiliams with substantial
gains recorded by both the symbol and independent sectors.
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Table 2.10
Changing Market Shares in the Irish Grocery Market
Dec 1983 Dec 1987 Dec 1994
Dunnes Stores 17.4 25.4 21.0
Power Supermarkets 
1 18.5 24.5 25.8
Superquinn 6.6 6.2 5.4
Tesco 8.4 0.00 0.0
Multiple (CRW 44.3 56.1 52.2
1 Trading under Quinnsworth and Crazy Prices
2Combined share of the 3 largest multiple retailers
Source: Tavlor Nelson AGB
While the combined share of the two largest multiple operators remained very substantial,
competition was clearly evident. During the late 1980's, attempts by a number of multiples
to increase margins encouraged Power Superniarkets to relaunch a number of their
Quinnsworth stores under the Crazy Prices trading fascia. This fascia was intended to appeal
to price conscious segment of the market. The fascia established its price position partly
through a new range of generic products under the KVI labeL. The success of the format was
such that by 1991,20% of Power Supermarkets' outlets traded under Crazy Prices.
The limited data that exists supports the view that margins have increased since the
prohibition of below cost selling. Table 2.11 displays grocery turnover, gross margin quantum
and gross margin percentages for the years 1977, 1988 and 1991. The data suggests that
margins increased slightly over the 1977-1988 period but then grew rapidly over the next three
years increasing by some four percentage points. This observation was supported by two of
the major multiples indicating that their gross margins had increased by approximately three
percentage points since the ban (FTC 1991).
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Table 2.11
Changing Grocery Margins
Year Turnover ex VAT Gross Margin Margin %
(£'000) (£'000)
1977 507,891 75,860 14.93
1988 2,093,905 327,868 15.66
1991 2,858,682 557,876 19.52
Sources: Census of Distribution 1977, Census of Seryices 1988, Annual
Census of Seryices 1991
However, it would be il-judged to argue that the increase in gross margin was entirely
attributed to the prohibition on below cost sellng as one could also identify a number of other
contributory factors. First, the exit ofTesco and its subsequent purchaser H. Wiliams from
the sector may have reduced the intensity of inter multiple price competition. Second, it is
plausible that rising incomes and changes in demographic trends changed the product mix
towards more fresh and convenience type products. The increased costs of retailing these
products would have required increased gross margins. In any case, the prohibition did not
cover many fresh items including meat together with fruit and vegetables. Third, non-price
attributes such as quality, range of products stocked and store ambience were becoming more
important to certain sections of the consumer market. The multiple operators could not have
responded to these requirements without the increase in gross margin. Nevertheless, recent
empirical work points to a positive and significant relationship between the ban on below cost
selling and grocery retail margins (Collns and Oustapassidis 1997).
The signing of the Competition Act in 1991 brought Irish competition law into harmony with
that throughout the EU. Despite providing an opportnity for the removal of the Restrictive
Practices Act, the new act made provision for retention of the Groceries Order. Indeed in its
conclusion to the 1991 review of the Groceries Order, two of the three members of the Fair
Trade Commission recommended the complete repeal of the Grocery Order and that
37
competition within the grocery sector should be subject to the Competition Act alone.
However, the then Minister for Industry and Commerce decided to amend the Restrictive
Practices Act, retaining the Groceries Order and those provisions facilitating the enforcement
of the Order by the offces of the Director of Consumer Affairs and Fair Trade. The need for
enforcement, according to the Director of Consumer Affairs and Fair Trade, was not
necessarily to prevent below cost sellng but to protect consumers against "price fixing and
price maintenance arrangements" even though "even if the ban were removed, these other
arrangements would continue to have a disadvantageous effect for the consumer and indeed
might strengthen and solidify and replace any effect the ban might have" (Director of
Consumer Affairs and Fair Trade 1991: 11). The decision to maintain the Grocery Order was
again reviewed in 1994 when, once again, the Minister decided on its retention for a minimum
of two years after which time a further review would be carried out. The Order continues to
remain in place today.
2.2.4 Consolidation
The 1990's continued to see continuing change in the retail sector. The enhanced performance
in the economy appears to have resulted in increasing segmentation of the market particularly
in Dublin, with the top end of the market served by Superquinn and Quinnsworth while the
price conscious segment's requirements are met by Crazy Prices and Dunnes Stores. This
fragmentation of the traditionally price conscious market has reduced Dunnes Stores global
appeal while Power Supermarket's trading fascias, Quinnsworth and Crazy Prices, enabled
it to chase both segments. This is one of the factors explaining Power Supermarket's
considerable success in attaining an increasing share of the market at the expense of its
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traditional major multiple competitor (Table 2.9). The symbol segment of the market
continued to perform well during the early 1990's with Musgrave's accounting for the lion's
share.
However, growth of the symbol sector halted and declined over the 1992 - 1994 period. One
of the possible explanations for this reduction in share is given in table 2.12 which shows that
the number of symbol outlets declined by 12% over the three year period 1988 - 1991. The
reduction in symbol outlets was in part due to attempts to improve the quality of the retail
stock, and members who were unwiling to make the required investments surrendered their
trading fascia. The need to improve standards in the symbol sector is displayed by the
increasing competition in the convenience market. This type of retail outlet, catering for top-
up and distress shopping, was a relatively recent arrival to the Irish market. However, despite
some relaxation in competitive pressures from the large multiples, the Seven-Eleven
convenience group went into receivership in 1991. Moreover, new entry on a substantial scale
has taken place on the petrol forecourt with Jet, Shell and Esso refitting most of their outlets
to cater for this segment of the market.
Table 2.12
Shop Numbers by Trade Sector
1988 1991 1993 % Change
1988/1993
Multiple 149 154 160 7.4
Symbol 1,134 999 1,015 -10.5
Independents 9,387 9,119 8,494 -9.5
Total 10,670 10,272 9,669 -9.4
Source: Nielsen Retail Census 1994
Further concentration on the buying side occurred in the grocery sector in 1995, when
Musgraves' acquired the L&N group of stores and subsequently sold off the individual outlets
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to independent members trading under the Super Valu fascia. Roches Stores' decision to enter
into an agreement with Musgraves in 1998 represented a further contraction of the multiple
sector but also an increase in buying concentration. Both the purchase of L&N and the
agreement with Roches Stores represent considerable defensive positions, given the potential
entry of further British or European grocers into the market. The acquisition also prevented
any of the remaining multiples from obtaining a more substantial foothold in many of the less
populated parts of the country where the Super Valu trading fascia has dominated to date.
2.2.5 Private Label Products
During the early 1970's, it became clear that the use of private label as a means of price
competition was gaining ground. Devoid of certain promotion and distribution costs private
label products could be sold at considerably lower prices than existing brands. These products
also tended to exist in well-established branded product categories and posed the greatest
threat to secondary and tertiary brands. The supply of these products reflected their
availability and consequently domestically sourced products were used where possible.
However, there was concern that the limited size of the Irish grocery market would prevent
the exploitation of economies of scale and that in such cases there would be a tendency to rely
on imports (FTC 1972:99).
Manufacturers' response to these products was to increase below the line expenditure,
providing an incentive to grocers to stock their products and attempting to maintain customer
franchise (FTC 1972). There is evidence pointing to a trend for manufacturers to substitute
below the line expenditure for advertising in the mass media, with the multiples obtaining the
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lion's share (FTC 1972). The multiples' growing strength is further seen with the increase in
supplementary terms with suppliers supplying merchandisers, preferential advertising
allowances, cash discounts and extended credit (FTC 1972). There was also increasing
concern about the adverse impact of extending credit facilities to the multiple grocers as many
manufacturers were operating on very low margins and grocers ran the risk of over extending
themselves.
By the late 1970's, the multiples had captured up to 40% of the Irish grocery market with
approximately 70% in Dublin (RPC 1980). However, marketing strategy with respect to
private label differed considerably among the main operators. Quinnsworth, the largest of
the multiples in terms of outlet numbers with 69 stores in 1979, offered a very narrow range
of private label products. Dunnes Stores, on the other hand, had a private label participation
in the region of 40% of grocery sales in its 40 outlets. Estimates for H. Wiliams suggest that
no more than 5% of its sales were accounted by private label in its 17 stores while Tesco,
operating from 12 outlets, had a private label share of less than 1 % of sales (RPC 1980).
The main concern with regard to private label products was that they would serve as a conduit
for increased imports from companies abroad who were better placed to reap economies of
scale in production. These fears proved unfounded and the market remained underdeveloped
by the early 1980's. However, during the mid 1980's there was a noticeable shift in the
strategy of the main multiples and symbol groups with increased emphasis placed on private
labeL. By 1987,50% ofDunnes Stores sales were accounted for by its private label brand St
Bernard, 12% of Quinnsworth sales and 15% of Superquinn' s (table 2.13) were accounted
for by private labels. This suggests an estimated private label share of 15.6% for the three
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firms combined. As expected, private label share varied significantly across product
categories with markets characterised by low advertising to sales ratios, excess manufacturing
capacities and low technical requirements displaying the highest shares. By and large, private
label was sold at a substantial discount to existing brands frequently by up to 25 % (Atwood
1993). However, the strategic weakness in retailers' use of own brand is displayed in their
propensity to switch into branded products when opportnities arose. For instance, Dunnes
Stores share of own brand diminished significantly over the 1987 - 1993 period in response
to the dramatic depreciation of sterling which reduced the relative price of imported brands.
Table 2.13
Private Label Shares in the Irish Grocery Market
Share of Private Label
1987 1993
Dunnes Stores 50 29
Ouinnsworth/Crazy Prices 12 16
Superquinn 15 20
SuperValu NA 17
Total 
1 15.6 14.54
ITotal calculated using share of markets (87, 93) DS 24%, 26%. QW/CP 23%, 26%. SQ 6%,
4%. SV NA, 17%.
Source: AGB Attwood 1993
In its investigation of the grocery trade, the Restrictive Practices Commission (1987) noted
the rapid growth in private label sales in the multiples, symbol and wholesale sectors. It
acknowledged that private label enabled the larger grocers to engage in the practice of "loss
leaders" with relative ease and impunity under the existing legislation. The likelihood of a
private label manufacturer withholding supplies was extremely remote, highlighting the flaws
in the existing Groceries Order. However, the Commission also acknowledged that private
label had proven to be of considerable benefit to a number of manufacturers entering the
grocery trade. This was due to the negligible costs of brand development (RPC 1987). The
Commission also noted that a certain degree of stability and loyalty existed between the
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private label supplier and its retail customer.
However, as the nature of competition changed after the abolition of below cost selling, the
use of private label also appeared to undergo a considerable strategic shift. Table 2.12
indicated that private label strategy tended to be volatile with large swings in individual
grocer's share. It appears that Dunnes Stores availed of opportnities emerging from the 1992
currency crisis and the devaluation of sterling. This reduced the price of branded products
relative to domestically produced private labels, resulting in a significant reduction in private
label participation from 50% in 1987 to 29% in 1993 (AGB Attwood 1993). This suggests
that the use of private label as a means of achieving a competitive price position was one of
its major roles and, when conditions suited, private label could be removed or scaled down.
However, more recent events suggest that Dunnes Stores management have become more
ambitious in their goals for their private label and attempted to reposition their St. Bernard
label through high profie and well-advertised relaunches. Power Supermarkets on the other
hand expressed a commitment to branded products in their Quinnsworth and Crazy Prices
trading fascias, despite the development of two generic labels Yellow Pack and K. V.1. over
the years (Pratt 1994). Indeed, the development of private label within this company could
be described as haphazard at best, with up to three generic lines occupying the shelves at any
one time. Despite stated assurances and commitments to brands, Power Supermarkets
nevertheless launched a new range of own brand products in 1996 labelled Premium Choice.
In April 1997, Tesco Stores plc purchased the grocery arm of Power Supermarkets. The move
took both the grocery and food manufacturing sectors by surprise. The implications for the
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dynamics of internal competition within the grocery sector were considerable. First, the
largest grocer in the country was now an international arm of the largest British food grocer
with sales in the region of £14 billon sterling. This was approximately 14 times the size of
the nearest competitor on the Irish market. Second, the company had at its disposal a
sophisticated supplier base with a highly developed range of own brand products. Third, in
addition to a range of value added own brand products, the company also had a range of price
orientated generic products.
The impact on the manufacturing base was expected to be significant. The parent company's
heavy reliance on own brand as a keystone of its overall retail strategy raised immediate
concerns among indigenous branded manufacturers. The possibility of increasing own brand
imports from UK based suppliers, displacing both Irish branded and own brand manufacturers,
also raised concern and soon took a political dimension. After considerable dialogue and
consultation with the government, Tesco made assurances to increase the supply of Irish
produced goods and to increase trade with Irish suppliers by 40% by the year 2002 (O'Keeffe
1998). In 1998, goods supplied by Irish firms accounted for 40% ofTesco Ireland sales. This
was comparable to Power Supermarkets in 1997 but was substantially lower than Superquinn
(62%) and Musgraves (80%)(Humphries 1998).
2.2.6 Technology and the Irish Grocery Sector
One surprising feature of the evolution of the Irish grocery market has been its marked lack
of investment in information technology. Investment in technology has been one of the major
features of the development of the British market during the 1980's with significant impact
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on retail manufacturer relationships (Hogarth-Scott and Parkinson 1993; Smith and Sparks
1993, Lynch 1990). Early attempts to introduce information technology to the grocery sector
appear to have failed as evidenced by Musgraves' decision to dispose of its cash & carr
computer systems in 1981 and return to manual accounting procedures (Business & Finance
1981). L&N was the first of the multiple grocers to trial scanning technology as far back as
1983 (O'Toole 1983). However, it is clear that the new technology failed to diffuse quickly
throughout the industry. In its "IT Budget's Survey", Price Waterhouse estimated that the
retail sector invested a mere 0.35% of total turnover in information technology compared with
an industry average of 2.06% (Price Waterhouse 1992). Nevertheless, by the mid 1990's
investment had begun to taken place, as the number of scanning outlets increased from 136
in 1991 to 192 in 1993 (Nielsen 1994). However, the strategic commitment to the use of
technology has varied across the main multiples. Power Supermarkets and Superquinn were
the first of the major multiples to invest while Dunnes Stores were latecomers commencing
their rollout of scanners as late as 1994.
The Nielsen survey indicates that the independent sector has almost completely ignored
investments in new technology. This was confirmed by Goodbody Stockbrokers (1995) who
suggested that the lack of investment was based on a failure to grasp the benefits and potential
that technology has to offer. However, the symbol sector, and Super Valu in particular,
appeared to have readily embraced the new technology. By the end of 1995,80% of members
had introduced scanning technology. The close link between Musgraves and the Super Valu
members enabled them to enjoy many benefits including access to price fies, which may be
amended at outlet level, and a recently introduced sales-based ordering system (Crowe 1996).
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2.2.7 Summary
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the Irish grocery trade has undergone significant
structural change since the abolition of resale price maintenance. The independent sector has
declined dramatically in response to competition from the large multiple grocers but more
recently emerging vertical relations between some retailers and wholesalers have led to
growing stability in the marketplace. The nature of retail-manufacturer relationships has also
evolved as competitive pressures increased and as regulatory authorities imposed their policies
on the sector. The modes of competition within the retail sector have also evolved, reflected
in periods of intense price competition but more recently in an apparent shift to non-price
competition. The strategic use of own brand and retailers' use of information technology as
potential sources of competitive advantage have tended to be ignored. This, as we shall see,
is in marked contrast to the evolution of the British retail market.
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2.3 The Food Manufacturing Sector
Having reviewed the grocery sector, it is now appropriate to examine the structure of the food
manufacturing industry. The purpose of this section is to ascertain the importance of the
industry to the Irish economy, its strctural characteristics, its level of dependency on both the
domestic and export markets and its relationship with the grocery trade.
2.3.1 An Overview of the Food Manufacturing Sector
The food manufacturing sector's contribution to the performance of the Irish economy is
highlighted in table 2.14. Until the early 1990's, the sector's contribution to industrial
production and employment was relatively stable accounting for approximately 20% of both
manufacturing employment and net output generated within the country. While both these
shares declined during the 1980's, some commentators have argued that a substantial
proportion of the reduction may be accounted for by rationalisation with various functions
contracted out to the services sector (NESC 1993). One example is the widespread
contracting out of the milk collection function within the dairy sector. Another factor
underlying its diminishing share are the various production constraints, e.g. milk quotas,
imposed on agrculture and limiting the amount of raw material available to the manufacturing
sector. However, the mid 1990's saw a dramatic shift in the balance of production with non
food manufacturing growth exceeding food growth to a considerable degree.
47
Table 2.14
The Importance of the Food Manufacturing Sector
Year Food Sector Total Manufacturing Food Share %
Net Output Employment Net Output Employment Net Output Employment
£'000 £'000
1973 158.20 46,195 701.60 207,568 22.6 22.3
1980 614.10 47,647 2,771.80 226,800 22.2 21.0
1987 1,466.00 37,466 6,496.60 183,516 22.6 2004
1990 1,828.30 36,861 8,911.60 194,177 20.5 19.0
1996 3,140,692 40,540 19,483,250 244,585 16.12 16.6
Source: Census ofIndustrial Production. Various
However, despite these downward trends, its contribution to the balance of payments ensures
that food production played and continues to play an integral role in the development of the
Irish economy. More importantly, the vertical relationships that exist between the agricultural
and food processing sectors adds to its strategic importance. The high utilisation of
indigenous resources and propensity to import is demonstrated in table 2.15.
Table 2.15
Usage of Irish Produced Materials in the Production of Gross Output
Industrial Sector Materials Used % Irish
£'000
Meat 2,059,081 96.5
Dairy 1,733,046 92.4
Fruit & Vegetables 77,881 57.3
Fish Products 134,627 85.6
Other Food 635,897 63.0
Total Food 5,116,795 89.1
Total Manufacturing 15,858,303 53.0
Source: Census ofIndustrial Production (1990)
Note from the Census: These figures may contain some degree of imprecision due to the
varying interpretation of interyention sales made by respondents
It indicates that almost 90% of all materials used in the production of the food manufacturing
sector are Irish produced, which is significantly higher than the 53% average for the
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manufacturing industry as a whole.
Industrial policy throughout the 1970's and 1980's failed in many instances to single out the
food industry for particular attention. Instead, governent actions favoured to exert political
pressure at European level ensuring that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) maintained
farm incomes through the price and income support mechanisms at its disposal (Kennedy et
al 1989). Nevertheless, the food sector did manage to obtain approximately one third of all
of grant aid to indigenous industry through the various incentive programmes in operation
during the 1970's and early 1980's (NESC 1982).
While this may appear substantial, it must be taken in the context where funds approved for
indigenous industry accounted for only one third of all funds approved over the period.
Moreover, much of the grant aid was directed towards fixed assets and low risk investments
compared with the more risk laden aspects of market development. Finally, it is clear that
during the 1970's and 1980's, governent policy towards the food sector failed to address the
strategic need for greater co-ordination between the primary producer and the processing
sector. Over time, much of the countr's agrcultural output was produced in response to CAP
pricing regimes and failed to reflect the needs of the processing sector, the long term
competitiveness of which would be dependent on its ability to meet real market needs.
Prior to entering the EEC, indigenous Irish manufacturing had failed to establish a competitive
position in internationally traded value-added product markets. Having joined the EEC in
1973 along with the United Kingdom, it is surprising that a review of the period immediately
after entry does not indicate as fast a growing food sector as might be expected as the initial
benefits of EEC membership and the CAP were exploited. While net output grew at a
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satisfactory rate, employment growth failed to reflect this buoyancy. Indeed, total
manufacturing annual growth rate exceeded that of the food sector in 1976 and continued to
do so unti11982. This is surprising given the substantial restructuring and job losses in other
traditional manufacturing sectors such as textiles and footwear as a result of more liberal
trading conditions (Ruane 1987). A brief digression may serve to highlight some of the
structural diffculties that faced the food processing sector and acted as inhibitors to
accelerated growth.
Climatic conditions and the relatively long grOWIng season favours grass-based food
production systems and underpins the dominant positions of both the Irish dairy and beef
sectors within the Irish food industry. However, such production systems being tied to the
growing season impose significant constraints on the processing sector. To achieve minimum
production costs at farm level, output distribution must reflect the availability of cheap grass.
Milk production and beef slaughtering have historically tended to follow a strong seasonal
pattern with peak milk production during the summer and peak slaughtering during the
autumn and early winter months. To process this peak in supply, significant investments in
capital equipment have been made by both sectors. In effect, the less capital intensive farm
operation is compensated for by a relatively highly capital intensive but under-utilised
processing sector. In the case of milk, its short shelf life means that it requires immediate
processing. Thus, the product portfolio favours long-life products such as butter and skimmed
milk powder, the prices of which are supported by the CAP. The seasonal supply pattern is
not conducive to the production of short life products required on a year round basis, imposing
stringent constraints on the marketing function. In turn, the CAP has historically tended to
encourage this seasonal production pattern through its guaranteed markets, resulting in a
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limited dairy product portfolio and a high degree of dependency on CAP support mechanisms
(PA Consulting 1992; NESC 1982). Moreover, the ownership structure of the sector through
the co-operatives, generated a short term orientation whereby immediate returns to farm level
were sought through the milk price. Thus, the processing sector rarely managed to obtain
either the necessary financial resources or balanced supply of raw materials to achieve the
longer terni aspiration of a competitive industry with reduced dependency on the EEC.
Similar problems are experienced by the beef sector with highly seasonal slaughtering patterns
and sub-optimal capacity utilisation at each stage of the beef supply chain. Second, the
operation of the CAP through some of its support mechanisms has had the effect of increasing
the cost of raw materials to the processing sector, thereby increasing the incentive to export
unprocessed and commodity type products. The diffculties of developing non CAP
dependant markets were also compounded by the quality of raw material produced at farm
leveL. There is evidence to suggest that only 10% of beef processed in the early 1980's was
of a suffcient quality standard to meet UK supermarket requirements and that many
processors found themselves unable to source sufficient quantities of suitable raw material to
utilise their vacuum packing capacity (NESC 1982). This inability to develop new
autonomous markets resulted in a particularly heavy reliance on the CAP with an estimated
29% of all processed beef going into intervention over the 1974 - 1984 period (NESC 1982)
in addition to extensive use of highly subsidised third country exports.
During the 1980's the sector concentrated with a small number of large operators dominating
the industry and achieving suffcient size to enjoy economies of scale. This concentration
process also assisted the formation of relationships with key buyers. This probably provided
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the foundation for the industry's one notable success, the development of its vacuum packed
beef, achieving 10% of the UK beef market through the main supermarket multiples by 1992
(P A Consulting 1992).
Many commentators argued that the most important components of the food sector, dairy and
meat, failed to achieve growth due to their failure to upgrade their product mix away from
standard low value added bulk commodities produced subject to seasonality constraints
(Kennedy et al 1988; NESC 1992). However, other factors, such as the limiting size of the
domestic market, lack of marketing expertise, peripherality, logistics expenses, domestic
packaging and energy costs, have all contributed to the failure of indigenous industry to
achieve growth through the development of value-added export markets. The inability to
develop successful brands and achieve brand premia, particularly in the UK market, suggested
that branding, with its associated risks, was not the most appropriate development route for
much ofthe processing sector (NSC 1982). Thus, the Irish export portfolio tended to consist
of either bulk, commodity type products produced by indigenous companies or more value-
added type products produced by Irish located multinational companies with greater logistical
and marketing expertise.
Given the limited size of the domestic market relative to its production capabilities, the Irish
food manufacturing sector has, by necessity, adopted an export orientation, albeit underpinned
by the CAP. An immediate implication is that much of the processing sector has been less
dependent on domestic marketing channels and domestic grocers than might be imagined.
The sectoral level of dependency on the domestic market has already been highlighted in table
2.15. Certain sectors such as bread and bread confectionery exhibit a much greater degree of
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dependency on the domestic market and a higher degree of import penetration.
However, components within sectors display wide variation in dependency. For instance, the
poultr component of the meat sector is highly dependent on the domestic market, accounting
for 80% of its sales in 1991. Poultry processing is highly concentrated with six companies
accounting for 90% of the industry's sales but competition is intense, heightened by the
development of own label (P A Consulting 1992). The pork processing sector experienced
rapid growth during the late 1980's with three of the large dairy co-operatives diversifying
into the area. An interesting feature of this product area is its more balanced portfolio, sellng
substantial quantities of product into the British market under own label while adopting a
branded strategy on the domestic market.
An analysis of export destination indicates that Great Britain! is of particular importance to
the Irish food manufacturing sector (Table 2.16). While Britain's share of exports has
declined it remains the single most important market for food exports. In 1980, it accounted
for 38.4% of all Irish food exports fallng to 30.2% in 1994. This reduction in share has
largely been the result of concerted efforts to develop new export markets with other EU
member states. We also see that dependency on the British market varies by product category.
Although the fruit and vegetable sector accounts for a small proportion of total food exports,
it is particularly dependent on the British market. This reflects the recent emergence of the
mushroom industry which has strong markets with the large multiple grocers. In 1990, the
mushroom industry sold 76% of its exported produce into the British market accounting for
i Great Britain consists of England, Scotland and Wales while the UK consists of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Where possible trade data with Great Britain is used due to the primary
interest in the interaction between Irish food manufacturers and the major British grocery multiples. Given
that the period reviewed does not include trading periods by these companies in Northern Ireland, reference
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48% of all fruit and vegetable exports. By 1994 mushroom exports had increased by 35% in
sales value, 99.5% of which were destined for the British market, accounting for 50% of
exported frit and vegetables (CSO Trade Statistics). Another small component of the export
trade, coffee, tea, cocoa also relies heavily on the British market. The main products in this
category are chocolate and chocolate products produced by multinational companies situated
in Ireland.
Table 2.16
Irish Food Exports and the British Market
Breakdown ofIrish Food Exports % GB Share ofIrish Food Exports (%)
SITC 1980 1990 1994 1980 1990 1994
01 Live Animals 13.06 7.05 4.37 22.7 22.9 20.6
02 Meat 42.09 28.78 28.35 44.6 29.3 27.6
03 Dairy & Eggs 20.35 18.04 17.85 42.2 36.1 32.9
04 Fish 2.82 5.33 4.30 19.4 6.4 8.2
05 Cereals 3.01 3.40 2.50 21.4 24.1 64.8
06 Fruit & Vegetables 1.75 2.47 2.14 49.8 54.4 77.2
07 Sugar Products 2.68 2.27 1.56 30.9 35.2 28.3
08 Coffee, Tea. 3.21 5.26 3.49 83.1 88.8 90.8
09 Animal Feed 2.14 1.65 1.51 64.4 39.8 46.1
10 Misc Food Preps. 8.89 25.78 33.95 12.7 22.2 22.5
Total 100.0 100.00 100.00 38.4 30.9 30.2
Source: CSO Trade Statistics various years
Given that their absolute size accounted for 46% of all Irish food exports in 1994, the dairy
and meat sectors' dependency on the British market assumes particular importance.
Furthermore, British acquisitions by many of the dairy and beef companies underpins the
strategic importance of the British market to the Irish food manufacturing sector and
establishes particularly strong linkages between the markets.
In 1994, the dairy and meat sectors accounted for 45% of all food exports to Britain in terms
to Great Britain is deemed more appropriate
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of value. The meat sector's dependency on the UK market varies considerably across species.
Britain is the most important commercial market for beef products. In 1990, Irish beef
exports were estimated at 370,000 tonnes of which 25% went into the British market. Closer
links with the British multiples is suggested by the fact that 45% of these exports were in the
form of value-added vacuum packed sales (CBF 1991). By 1994, export volumes had
increased to 600,000 tonnes of which 150,000 tonnes were from intervention stocks.
Approximately 25% of these exports or 37.5% of commercial exports went to the UK market
(An Bord Bia, 1995).
The Irish sheepmeat trade has traditionally been heavily dependent on the export market and
France in particular. In 1990, for example, the French market accounted for 68% of
sheepmeat produced and 90% of exported product (CBF 1991). By 1994, France accounted
for 75% of exported sheepmeat sales or 61 % of sheep output (An Bord Bia 1995). On the
other hand, the Irish pigmeat sector displayed a high degree of dependency on the domestic
market until very recently. In 1988, for instance, 70% ofIrish pig production was destined
for the Irish market. However, rapid expansion of the sector, from a herd size of less than
100,000 head in 1988 to in excess of 1.5 milion in 1993, required substantial development
of export markets. While new markets were developed for much of this additional output
Britain continues to be the most important export market, accounting for 50% export tonnage
during 1994 (An Bord Bia 1995).
As discussed earlier, the dairy sector's product portfolio has traditionally been highly
dependent on commodity tye products supported by the common agrcultural policy and with
commercial market returns broadly following returns on the world dairy market. The sector's
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continued dependency is indicated by the fact that in 1992, 60% of Irish whole milk was
utilised in the manufacture of butter while 43% of skim milk went into milk powder
production (Residual Milk Marketing Board (RMMB), 1995). In 1994, butter accounted for
61.7% of whole milk utilisation, excluding liquid milk, while skim milk powder utilised 44%
of skim milk (Irish Dairy Board (IDB) 1995).
The sector has enjoyed some success with the continual development of its "Kerrgold" brand
on export markets through the efforts of the Irish Dairy Board. The Board has a strong
presence in the British market through the Adams Group, its wholly owned subsidiary, which
packs cheese, manufactures processed cheese and distributes both branded and private label
products to its retail and food service customers (IDB 1995).
Considerable progress has been made by the Kerrgold Company, which has achieved the
status of second largest pre-packed cheese supplier in the UK market with a 10% share of the
processed cheese market (IDB 1994). However, British trading conditions have become
increasingly more difficult over recent years and market returns have failed, on occasion, to
meet intervention equivalents (IDB 1991). Underlying factors were the static consumer
demand for traditional dairy products, the rise in retail concentration, competition generated
by the expansion of private label products and UK milk pricing policies as organised by the
former Milk Marketing Board. Decisions as to the continued support of the Kerrgold brand
in the UK market were regularly reviewed and that support was contingent on the belief of
better times ahead (IDB 1991)(IDB 1992). The Board also operates its own distribution
service, IDB Benelux, on the continent. This gives it a significant presence in the Belgian and
German markets. The importance of the German market is attested to by the fact its is now
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the single largest market for Irish butter sales and has been the Board's largest branded market
since 1991. In 1994, the Kerrgold brand held a 10% share of the German butter market (IDB
1995).
2.3.2. The Structure of the Irish Food Manufacturing Sector
The structure of the Irish food manufacturing industry is presented in table 2.17. The
variables examined are the numbers of establishments, which relate to plants as against
companies, which may operate from a number of plants, engaged in manufacturing. Total
employment, or persons engaged, gross output and net output, defined as the difference
between gross output and industrial input, are also provided. One of the first features to note
is that during the period 1980-1990 the number of establishments engaged in food production
declined by over 12.6% or by 110 plants. Since then the number of plants has remained stable
but micro firms, those employing less than 20 persons, continue to suffer falling plant
numbers. On the other hand, large firms, employing more than 200 persons had the largest
reduction in proportionate terms declining by 32.6% over the 1980-1990 period but have
recovered well since.
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Table 2.17
Size Structure of the Irish Food Manufacturini: Industry
Number of Establishments % Share
Number of % Change
Employees 1980 1985 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1985 1990 1996
0-19 479 435 409 363 -i 1.2 54.7 54.0 53.5 47.7
20-49 181 173 166 184 10.8 20.7 21.5 21.7 24.2
SO-199 169 163 159 172 8.2 19.3 20.2 20.8 22.6
200+ 46 34 31 42 35.5 5.3 4.2 4.1 5.5
Total 875 805 765 761 -0.5 100 100 100 100
Employment % Share
Number of % Change
Employees 1980 1985 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1985 1990 1996
0-19 4,471 4,047 3,819 3,265 -14.5 9.4 10.3 10.4 8.1
20-49 5,826 5,581 5,316 5,686 7.0 12.2 14.2 14.4 14.0
50-199 17,001 16,606 15,574 16,501 6.0 35.6 42.3 42.3 40.7
200+ 20,454 13,013 12,152 15,088 24.2 42.8 33.2 33.0 37.2
Total 47,752 39,247 36.861 40,540 10.0 100 100 100 100
Net Output £'000 % Share
Number of % Change
Employees 1980 1985 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1985 1990 1996
0-19 54,305 72,580 87,203 88,552 1.5 8.9 . 6.5 4.8 2.8
20-49 70,331 134,420 164,425 237,016 44.1 11.5 12.0 9.0 7.5
50-199 265,544 602.189 1.122.135 1,166,568 4.0 43.3 53.8 61.4 37.1
200+ 223,406 310,250 454,520 1,648,556 262.7 36.4 27.7 24.9 52.5
613,586 1,119,439 1,828,283 3,140,692 71.8 ioo 100 ioo ioo
Gross Output £'000 % Share
Number of % Change
Employees 1980 1985 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1985 1990 1996
0-19 242,746 331,537 412,504 367,519 -10.9 8.5 6.9 6.5 4.3
20-49 330,903 677,187 801,606 1,013,189 26.4 11.6 14.1 12.6 11.9
SO-199 1,177,762 2,418,098 3,337,695 3,653,598 9.5 41. 50 52.3 42.8
200+ 1,102,217 1,365,572 1,834,635 3,511,887 91.4 38.6 28.5 28.7 41.
Total 2,853,628 4,792,394 6,386,440 8,546,193 33.8 ioo 100 100 ioo
Gross Margin: Net Output as % of Gross Output
Number of 
Employees 1980 1985 1990 1996
0-19 22.4 21.9 21. 24.1
20-49 21. 19.8 20.5 23.4
SO-199 22.5 24.9 33.6 31.9
200+ 20.3 22.7 24.8 46.9
Average 21.5 23.4 28.6 36.7
Source: Censi of Industrial Production
An examination of employment figures indicates the substantial reduction in employment
throughout the 1980's. However, the reduction in employment in the food sector is probably
overstated. During the 1980's many components of the food industr underwent a substantial
rationalisation process with a series of mergers and take-overs. In addition to closing smaller
and less effcient plants in ever increasing attempts to achieve economies of scale, many
companies refocused their activities and contracted out many peripheral functions. Thus,
some of the reduction in manufacturing employment would be compensated by increases in
the services sector. Despite this the food sector has displayed substantial growth throughout
the 1990's with the larger firms dominating.
The clearest feature to emerge from the above is the decline in the relative importance of
micro firms in terms of establishment numbers, employment, gross output but most notably
net output. Large firms, and those employing in excess of 199 persons, despite experiencing
considerable diffculties throughout the 1980's, have recovered well showing substantial
growth in all the variables reviewed.
Table 2.18 outlines the changes in the structure of the meat and dairy sub-sectors over the
period 1980-1996. The key feature to note with respect to the meat sector is the growing
importance of large firms. Despite suffering considerable rationalisation during the 1980' s,
the number of large plants has increased throughout the 1990's generating substantial
increases in the numbers employed, net output and net output per person employed.
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Table 2.18
Size Structure of the Irish Food Industry by Sector: Meat
Number of Establishments Employment
Number of 
Employees % Change % Change
1980 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1990 1996 1990/96
0-19 42 38 47 19.15 354 391 426 8.22
20-49 27 34 43 20.93 873 1,220 1400 12.86
50-99 20 22 27 18.52 1,473 1,637 2030 19.36
100-199 25 27 28 3.57 3,507 3,716 3878 4.18
200+ 16 12 19 36.84 5,234 3,733 6111 38.91
Total 130 133 164 18.90 11,441 10,697 13,845 22.74
Net Output £'000 Net Output Per Person Engaged £'000
Number of
Employees % Change % Change
1980 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1990 1996 1990/96
0-19 8,497 10,844 12,864 15.70 24.0 27.7 30.2 8.16
20-49 9,649 32,959 40,913 19.44 1 i. 27.0 29.2 7.56
50-99 18,155 44,578 64,043 30.39 12.3 27.2 31. 13.68
100-199 38,320 109,542 153,267 28.53 10.9 29.5 39.5 25.41
200+ 51,022 84,741 191,657 55.79 9.7 22.7 31.4 27.62
Total 125,643 282,664 462,744 38.92 11.0 26.4 33.4 20.94
Size Structure of the Irish Food Industry by Sector: Dairy
Number of Number of Establishments Emplovment
Employees % Change % Change
1980 1990 1996 1990/96 1980 1990 1996 1990/96
0-19 26 29 39 25.64 273 245 349 29.80
20-49 26 25 20 -25.00 981 805 671 -19.97
50-99 15 25 28 10.71 1,060 1,777 1911 7.01
100-199 19 10 12 16.67 2,452 1,373 1630 15.77
200+ 10 8 10 20.00 5,397 3,440 3546 2.99
Total 96 97 109 11.01 10,163 7,640 8,107 5.76
Net Output £'000 Net Output Per Person Engaged £' 000
Number of % Change % Change
Employees 1990/96 1990/96
1980 1990 1996 1980 1990 1996
0-19 3,580 8,638 9,045 4.50 13.1 35.3 25.9 -36.04
20-49 13,553 32,793 38,496 14.81 13.8 40.7 57.4 28.99
50-99 11,751 57,394 80,754 28.93 1 i. 32.3 42.3 23.57
100-199 38,152 73,321 118,533 38.14 15.6 53.4 727 26.56
200+ 66,808 196,639 215,071 8.57 12.4 57.2 60.7 5.75
Total 133,844 368,785 461,899 20.16 13.2 48.3 57.0 15.28
Source: Census of Industrial Production
The dairy sector underwent substantial restructuring during the 1980's with a large reduction
in the number of plants employing more than 100 persons. This rationalisation, achieved
largely through merger activity, paid immediate returns resulting in a very substantial increase
in net output per person employed over the decade. The rationalisation also had a profound
impact on the distrbution of employment. In 1980,23% of those employed in the dairy sector
worked in plants with less than 100 employees, while by 1990 these plants accounted for 37%
of persons employed by the sector. Since 1990, the micro firms have continued to increase
both in terms of establishment numbers and employment. However net output has failed to
keep pace. An examination of net output performance indicates that firms in the 50-199
employee categories currently display most growth.
The bread, biscuits and flour confectionery sub-sector endured the most radical restructuring
of all during the 1980' s. One of the principal agents underlying the process was the grocery
sector. The primary reason for this was the bakery sector's dependence on a very limited
product portfolio. Approximately 42% of sales were accounted for by basic white bread
products. The sector also relied heavily on government support in the form of the bread
subsidy paid on bread production. Estimates suggest that the subsidy exceeded total wage
costs during the early 1980's (Sectoral Development Committee 1990). The subsidy was
removed over the 1984-1986 period removing the substantial crutch to less effcient operators
in the industry. However, advances in baking technology in the early 1980's, gave new
entrants to the sector, lured in part by the bread subsidy, considerable cost advantages over
existing but less effcient operators. This was particularly so in the large-scale production of
standard white bread.
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One of the new entrants, Nevile (Bros) of Dublin and Macroom, is of particular interest in
that it represented backward integration by the Dunnes Stores organisation into the bakery
sector. In light of existing legislation, control of its own baking facilities gave Dunnes Stores
a considerable advantage in stimulating intense price competition. Consequently, the bread
price war among the main grocers during the late 1980's focused primarily on the standard
while loaf of bread, with substantial repercussions for the sector. Although bread volumes
failed to increase, the share of private label bread rose to 97% in Dunnes Stores, 52% in
Quinnsworth and 45% in other chains in 1989 (Sectoral Development Committee 1990). The
growing leverage of the multiples and Dunnes Stores' production capacity resulted in rapidly
reduced producer margins. Over the 1980-1990 period, the number of establishments declined
by 94 plants representing a decrease of 29%. However, employment was more severely
affected fallng by almost 42%, the vast majority of which came from the larger plants,
particularly those employing more than 200 persons. While bread consumption in general is
expected to continue to decline throughout the 1990' s, there are a number of speciality areas
such as morning goods and fresh dough products which are forecast to increase (P A
Consulting 1993). These product areas have developed rapidly in line with the introduction
of instore bakeries in retail outlets and the more recent innovation of bake-off products.
The biscuit segment of the industry, accounting for approximately 40% of the Irish market,
is evenly divided between domestically produced output and imports. The high exposure to
and penetration of imports, particularly the strong brands from Britain, makes the sector a
particularly difficult market (Sectoral Development Committee 1990). Furthermore, its poor
track record in the export market and the increasing participation of the retail sector in the
production of baked products suggests that the prospects for the bakery and flour
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confectionery sector are rather grim with further rationalisation expected.
Thus it is clear that the food industry experienced considerable restructuring during the
1980's, with a notable decrease in the importance of large establishments in favour of
medium-sized plants. The substantial amounts of grant aid made available to the sector over
the period for fixed asset investment would also have encouraged the substitution of capital
for labour. The importance of the micro and small food establishment also increased in line
with its rising share of manufacturing employment. However since the beginning of the
1990's, large plants have made a resurgence suggesting that scale issues have again come to
dominate the structure of the industry. Nevertheless, the industry continues to suffer from
scale-related diffculties. The large number of small and medium-sized enterprises inhibits
cost competitiveness and access to markets. It is also a barrier to investment in
product/process innovation and in the development of human resources (Department of
Agriculture and Food 1998a).
2.4 Manufacturer Dependency and the Grocery Market
At this stage it is appropriate to explore the dependency relationships that exist between the
Irish food manufacturing sector and its customers in both the domestic and foreign grocery
industries. Limited data exist on these relationships. However, given the nature of the
research question, one of the first issues to be addressed is whether or not the Irish food
manufacturing industry can serve as an appropriate sampling frame for the analysis. In the
next chapter it wil be shown that the determinants of power and dependency relations are
closely aligned. Consequently, to explore power relations, some preliminary insights must
be gained into the factors that are likely to either promote or inhibit Irish food manufacturers'
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dependency relations with their retail customers. To redress this limitation in the existing
body of research, much of the following analysis is based on empirical research carried out
over the course of the initial stages of this research (Collins and Burt 1999).
It is interesting to note that the 1984 White Paper on industrial policy singled out the
indigenous grocery trade as occupying a crucial position in the food chain (Government
Publications 1984). Its immediate proximity to the customer and its access to market
information could prove invaluable to the food manufacturing sector, which was struggling
in its attempts to develop a product portfolio less dependent on commodity type products.
Furthermore, the presence of foreign-owned grocers in the Irish market also offered the
opportnity of developing export markets based on trade relationships developed initially in
Ireland but expanding over time to embrace the foreign-based head offices.
In its 1987 review of the grocery market, the Restrictive Practices Commission noted that the
Irish food manufacturing sector was weak and not suffciently profitable. Furthermore, it
noted that the scale of purchases by the Irish multiples ensured that the loss of a major
customer could prove disastrous to the wellbeing of an individual firm (RPC 1987). In its
analysis of the market, the Commission obtained a set of data from manufacturers and
suppliers to the grocery trade ilustrating their dependency on the various multiple operators.
The data is given in table 2.19.
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Table 2.19
Manufacturers' Dependency on the Indigenous Multiple Sector: % Sales (1986)
Manufactuer Dunnes Quinnsworth H.Wiliams Superquiinn L&N/Roches Multiples
ITesco Total
Market1 22.0 22.0 9.0 6.0 N/A 652
1 7 8 5 3 3 26
2 28 13 8 5 - 54
3 26 16 8 7 5 62
4 1 15 4 4 3 27
5 15 25 12 8 6 66
6 16 15 9 2 3 45
7 3 5 3 2 1 14
8 14 9 4 2 5 34
9 26 15 3 2 5 51
10 4 8 3 2 3 20
11 14 21 6 7 6 54
12 17 18 1 6 4 46
13 20 26 6 9 5 66
14 17 21 9 6 4 57
15 12 22 9 7 6 56
16 18 19 9 7 5 58
17 9 20 8 5 5 47
18 24 18 4 6 4 56
19 14 9 4 5 3 35
20 14 18 16 10 . 4 62
21 22 23 8 5 4 62
22 12 18 6 5 4 45
Source: RPC 1987 (Table 11)
i Grocery market shares taken form Taylor Nelson AGB.
2 Overall market share as reported in table 2.7
While we have no information on the how representative the data is, a number of interesting
features emerge. First, the level of dependency on a given multiple operator does not appear
to be particularly high. In general, dependency on a given retailer appears to be lower than
the grocer's share of the packaged goods sector as measured in row one. This is most notable
with respect to Dunnes Stores and Quinnsworth. Second, there is no evidence of vertical
restraints. With only one exception, all the manufacturers in the sample trade with each of the
multiple operators.
However, with the exception of manufacturers 4, 7 and 10, all remaining manufacturers
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display a considerable exposure to either Quinnsworth or Dunnes Stores. In other words, if
any of these firms were to lose one of these customers it would be unlikely to find a suffcient
outlet to compensate for loss in sales in the multiple sector. Thus, for instance, if
manufacturer number 13 were to lose its account with Quinnsworth, it would have to either
increase it trade with Tesco and H. Wiliams fourfold or double its trade with Dunnes Stores.
It is plausible to assume that the price reductions necessary to generate such a new
distribution of sales would be prohibitive. However, the impact of a lost account of this scale
is critically dependent on the capital intensity of the manufacturing firm. A manufacturer,
with high fixed costs and dependent on marginal sales for contribution, would be more
exposed than a company with a high proportion of variable costs to fixed costs. The
manufacturer, with a greater proportion of variable costs, might be in a position to reduce
output and variable costs accordingly thereby maintaining viability.
Similar data but for a larger sample size is available for 1990 (Table A2.1 in appendix A2).
The manufacturing firms surveyed accounted for total grocery sales in the region of £1.3
bilion, a very substantial share of the grocery market. One of the features to emerge here is
the prominence ofthe Musgrave group. Although the 1986 survey focused explicitly on the
multiples and did not report on the wholesale operators, developments over the period would
have necessitated that the 1990 survey fill this particular gap in its coverage. The limited like-
for-like data suggests that those companies trading with Quinnsworth in 1986 and continuing
to trade with them in 1990 had increased their dependency on the grocer. Those trading with
Dunnes Stores on the other hand show a broadly similar if not lower level of dependency than
earlier. Another feature worth noting is that a few manufacturers appear to have specialised
in serving the largest two multiples almost exclusively. Firms numbers 39 and 50 in table
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A2.1 serve Quinnsworth and Dunnes Stores almost exclusively, although the differential in
shares suggest that one or both of the grocers may source their product from more than one
company. In contrast to these manufacturers, there are others who serve one but not both of
the big two. Manufacturer 44 for instance carries out 40% of its business with Dunnes Stores
but none with any of the remaining multiples while firm 57 does 53% of its business with
Quinnsworth. It is possible that these companies were engaged in private label production.
However, as in the earlier sample, the level of dependency does not appear unduly high.
Nevertheless, the Commission's survey focused on the largest suppliers to the trade and as
such may have failed to represent private label manufacturers, which are likely to be
considerably smaller than those reported. The other possibility is that private label products
are imported, in which case the level of dependency reported stands (FTC 1991).
In its review in 1991, the Commission reports that suppliers and manufacturers attributed the
removal of discriminatory practices to the ban on below cost selling (FTC 1991). The
frequency of delisting, the grocer's ultimate weapon, had fallen considerably. More space was
allocated to branded products with secondary and small manufacturers' brands obtaining
shelf-space in place of private label (FTC 1991). This provides some evidence to suggest a
reduction in conflict in the relationship between the manufacturing and the indigenous grocery
sector.
We have already seen that a substantial share of the Irish food manufacturing sector is
dependent on Britain as an outlet for its food production. Given the increasing level of retail
concentration in this market it would not be unexpected if many Irish food manufacturers
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display a similar if not even greater level of dependency on British grocers than on domestic
grocers. This assumption is supported by the considerable number of acquisitions of British
operations made by Irish food manufacturers, particularly in the meat and dairy sectors.
Indeed in its analysis of the food sector, the industrial policy review group suggested that the
British market "should be considered as the home market with subsequent development into
Europe" (P A Consulting 1992:16). Furthermore, as the effects of the reform of the CAP and
GATT agreement are felt, reliance on community support measures wil decline, thereby
increasing the dependency on alternative marketing channels.
The inexorable rise in retail concentration among the top four retailers in the British Market
is given in table 2.20 displaying a 11 percentage point increase over the 1987-1995 period.
Furthermore, the multiples' strong market share is reflected at product level in a number of
categories where Irish dependency on the British market is particularly high. The more
notable of these include cheese, oils and fats, including butter, in addition to a substantial
share ofthe meat, fruit and vegetable markets (Table 2.21).
Table 2.20
Concentration in the British Grocery Market
Dec'1987 Dec'1990 Dec'1993 Dec'1995
Tesco 8.4 10.2 10.7 13.7
Sainsbury 10.0 11. 12.4 12.5
Asda 4.9 7.0 6.7 7.4
Safeway 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.5
Big4 30.1 35.8 37.5 41.
Morrisons 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.5
Sommerfie1d 7.6 5.2 4.4 4.3
Source: Institute of Grocery Distribution as reported in the Grocer, Feb lt 1997.
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Table 2.21
Multiple Grocers Concentration of Selected Product Categories: % Sales
1991/92 1993/94 1996 1998
Meat-Beef 44 44 73 75
1991/92 1993/94 1995 1997
Milk 18 18 42 47
Oils and Fats 71 71 NA NA
Cheese 73 77 NA NA
Source: Mintel
The high penetration of own brands within the multiple sector increases the manufacturer's
dependency on the grocer and the degree to which the manufacturer is subject to the grocer's
marketing strategy (Table 2.22). The nature of the Irish export portfolio with its imbalance
towards commodity type products, produced at minimum cost yet with the appeal of quality
production, is ideally suited to the multiple grocer's private label requirements. Indeed, it
could be argued that the production of private label is a 10gical alternative to production for
intervention or subsidised exports given the low level of risk and financial resources required
when compared with branding. It also promises substantial and rapid potential for market
penetration.
Table 2.22
Own Brand Penetration by Retailer
1993 1995 1997
Tesco 44 45 47
Sainsbury 53 53 50
Asda 30 39 46
Safeway 38 41 42
Somerfield 33 38 37
Source: Minte1
The importance of the private label market was highlighted in the expert group report on the
food industry, which argued that the competencies and scale developed by Irish companies
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in the manufacture of private label was central to the future development of the Irish food
industry (Expert Group 1993). However, recent industrial policy as it pertains to the food
industry has placed increasing emphasis on adding value to indigenous raw materials. One
segment identified for development was consumer ready foods achieved by the "exploitation
of development opportties for strategic allances such as those conducive to co-packing and
private label supply" (Expert Group 1993:26). Moreover, this recommendation was given
subject to the understanding of the "need to focus first on being competitive in the UK before
tackling the distinct and fragmented European system" (Expert Group 1993:26). Indeed, it
appears that growth has already been achieved in this particular market, reflected in the
considerable success in supplying major British food groups. By 1998, the UK accounted for
over 70% of exports in the fast-growing prepared food sector (Department of Agrculture and
Food 1998b). However, such success has resulted in increasing dependency on the large
British retailers.
More detailed analysis of Irish food manufacturers' customer portfolios in the Irish and UK
markets is provided by Collns and Burt (1999). This provides a clearer insight into the series
of dependencies and interdependencies that existed between the sectors in 1997.
Table 2.23
Distribution of Trading Accounts (%)
Trading pattern Total
Irish Grocers only 52
British Grocers only! 7
Irish and British Grocers 41
Total ioo
ITesco, Sainsbury, Asda, Safeway, Somerfe1d and "Other British" represent the British
market
Source: Collns and Burt (1999)
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The distribution of customer portfolios across the Irish and British markets is given in Table
2.23 above. It demonstrates that 52% of the sample have trading accounts with Irish grocers
only, 7% with British grocers only and that 41 % trade with both Irish and UK grocers.
The importance of the major Irish supermarket chains to Irish food manufacturers is given in
table 2.24. It indicates that Power Supermarkets (PSL), which was purchased by Tesco, had
the broadest supplier base, estimated at over 70% of Irish food manufacturers. About 42%
of these state Power Supermarkets to be their most important account while 88% indicate that
it ranks among their top three customers. Among those manufacturers who gave PSL as their
most important account, 64% supplied branded products only, while 56% of these believed
their brand to be market leader in the Irish market.
Table 2.24
Irish Retail Accounts by Importance
Companies trading Companies stating Companies stating Grocer in
with Grocer Grocer as top account Top 3 Accounts
Count % Count % Count %
PSL 60 71 25 42 53 88
Dunnes Stores 52 61 17 33 42 81
Musgraves 57 67 14 25 46 81
SuperQuinn 50 59 11 22 30 60
Spar 34 40 2 6 8 24
Roches Stores 45 53 4 9 15 33
Other Id 39 46 9 23 16 41
Total IRL Grocers 79 93 64 81 76 96
llftwo accounts were of equal importnce the same rank was assigned. Thus the sum of 
the counts may exceed 
the column total.
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
Manufacturers were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that the loss of the
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PSL account would increase their unit costs substantially due to lost economies of scale (from
1, strongly disagree to 7, strongly agree). The results are given in table 2.25.
Table 2.25
Agreement with the statement that loss of the PSL account would increase their unit
costs substantially due to lost economies of scale.
Importance of the PSL 95% Confidence Interyal for the Mean
trading account Mean Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Most Important 5.64 4.87 6.41
2nd 5.58 4.77 6.39
3rd 3.40 1.78 5.02
Total 5.20 4.64 5.76
Scale: 1, Strongly Disagree to 7, Strongly Agree
Source: Coli ins and Burt (1999)
These show a significant increase in agreement between those manufacturers who consider
PSL as either their most or second most important customer and those for whom PSL is
ranked third. The risk here is that lost economies of scale may threaten manufacturers'
horizontal competitiveness which, in the longer term, may undermine manufacturers'
viability. It may also influence other Irish grocers' ability to source competitively priced
merchandise in Ireland, thereby increasing the likelihood of imports being substituted for
domestically produced products.
The importnce of British grocers in Irish manufacturers' customer portfolios is given in table
2.26. The first feature to note is that over 47% ofIrish manufacturers trade with at least one
British grocer. The results also suggest that there is considerable variation in trading patterns
with 20% of manufacturers dealing with Sainsbury but only 12% with Asda. The prominence
of Somerfield at 15.3 % is also notable. Another feature is that both Tesco, and particularly,
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Sainsbury are likely to be very significant accounts with those companies with whom they do
business. The results show that 41 % of those companies trading with Sainsbury indicate that
the company is their most important account and over 76% rank it within their top three
customers.
Table 2.26.
British Retail Account by Importance
Companies trading Companies stating Companies stating Grocer in
with Grocer Grocer as top account Top 3 Accounts
Count % Count % Count 0/0
Tesco 14 16 6 43 7 50
Sainsbury 17 20 7 41 13 76
Asda 10 12 1 10 4 40
Safeway 11 13 0 0 6 55
Somerfield 13 15 3 23 7 54
Other British 27 32 4 15 13 48
Total British Grocers! 40 47 20 50 26 65
Ilf two accounts were of equal importance the same rank was assigned.
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
Table 2.27 gives Irish manufacturers' brand portfolios with the three largest Irish grocers and
wholesaler. As noted earlier, few Irish manufacturers have specialized in selling own brand
products to Irish outlets. It is likely that the limited size of the Irish market constrains such
development and that few products actually enjoy sufficient market penetration to justify such
a limited portfolio.
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Table 2.27
Irish Manufacturers' Brand Portfolios by Grocer (%)
Grocer Brands only Own Brands only Both Brands and Own Total
Brands
PSL 59.0 9.0 32.0 100.0
Dunnes Stores 43.0 12.0 45.0 100.0
Superquinn 65.0 2.0 33.0 100.0
Musgraves 55.0 13.0 33.0 100.0
Total (Irl) 42.0 11.0 47.0 100.0
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
The results indicate that while 43% of Dunnes Stores' suppliers supply branded products
alone, 45% supply a mixed portfolio of both branded and own branded products. While shares
contrast considerably with other Irish retail organisations, the application of a chi-square test
failed to support any significant relationship between grocer and customer brand portfolio.
Table 2.28
Irish Manufacturers' Brand Portfolios by Market (%)
Market Brands only Own Brands only Both Brands and Own Total
(n=39) (n=23) Brands
(n=46)
Irish Market 31 (42%) 8 (11%) 35 (47%) 74 (100%)
British Market 8 (24%) 15 (44.%) 11 (32%) 34 (100%)
P-value~.OOl
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
Table 2.28 above examines brand portfolio by market where Dunnes, PSL, Musgraves and
Superquinn represent the Irish market and where Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda, Safeway,
Somerfield and "Other British" represent the British market. The results indicate that 74 firms
sold products to Irish grocers. Of these, about 11 % supply only own brand products to all
their Irish retail customers. Approximately 44% of those who trade on the British market
supply only own brand to all their British customers. The data demonstrate that Irish
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manufacturers are more likely to specialize in the production of own brand products for the
British market than for the Irish market (X2=15.53, DF=2, P':.OOI). The results also show that
approximately 76% of companies trading into the British produce own brand products for at
least one British retailer.
Producing own brand products, by avoiding many of the marketing costs and risks associated
with brands and consequently avoiding substantial barrers to entry, has frequently been seen
as a viable entry strategy. This strategy is supported by the evidence provided in table 2.29
which indicates (X2=18.07, DF=4, P=.OOI) that newer firms less than 6 years old are more
likely to specialize in either brands or own brands than their older counterparts.
Table 2.29
Firms' Brand Portfolios by Age
Age Brands onll Both Brands and Own Brands2 Own Brands Only3 Total
1-5 Years 11 (79%) o (0.0%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%)
6-10 Years 6 (43%) 6 (43%) 2 (14%) 14 (100%)
:;10 Years 15 (33%) 29 (63%) 2 (4%) 46 (100%)
Total 32 (43%) 35 (47%) 7 (10%) 74 (100%)
P-value =.001
Notes:
1 Indicates that the firm supplies only brands to all its customers
2 Indicates that the firm supplies a mixed portfolio to all its customers
3 Indicates that the firm supplies only own brand to all its customers
Source: Collns and Burt (1999)
Table 2.30 examines the relationship between the type of brand sold and the pattern of trade
with both Irish and British grocers. Restricting our analysis to the top 3 Irish grocers and
Musgraves together with all British grocers, yields information on 297 trading relationships.
Specifically, we have details on whether or not firms supply each grocer with branded and/or
own brand products. For instance, the relatively small number of firms who have specialized
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on servIng the British market alone provide us with 20 observations on exchange
relationships. Of these, 70% transacted own brands only, 10% brands only and 20% a
combination of branded and own brand products. The sample also included firms who traded
solely with Irish grocers. These provide us with details on 119 exchange relationships. The
data supports a relationship between brand tye and a firm's brand portfolio within its trading
accounts (X2=56.73, DF=4, P':.OOI). Firms trading with Irish retail customers only are more
likely to supply branded products alone while firms trading to British grocers are more likely
to supply own brands to their customers.
Table 2.30
Brand Portfolio and Trading Pattern
Brand Portfolio
Trading Distribution of Brands Own Brands Both Brands and Total
Company Onlyl Only Own Brands
n=139 n=59 n=99 n=297
British Grocers Only 2 (10.0 %) 14 (70.0) 4 (20.0%) 20 (100%)
Irish Grocers Only 78 (65.5%) 10 (8.4%) 31 (26.1%) 119 (100%)
Both Irish and British 5 (37.3%) 35 (22.2%) 64 (40.5%) 158 (100%)
Grocers
Total 139(46.8%) 59 (19.9%) 99 (33.3%) 297(1000%)
1 139 of the 297 trading accounts analysed involved branded products only.
P-value~.OOl
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
The analysis extends to examine the relationship between brand portfolio and manufacturer
size (Table 2.31). These results support a relationship between size and the propensity to
produce branded versus own brand products for a given retail account (X2=43.02, DF=8,
P':.OOl.) They indicate that small firms, employing less than 10 persons, are more likely to
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specialize in branded products than their larger counterparts. They are highly unlikely to
adopt a dual branding strategy and supply both brands and own brands to a given grocer. As
firm size increases, the propensity to pursue a dual branding policy rises. This is particularly
evident in the case of firms employing over 100 persons. From a policy perspective, one
important implication is that reduction in the space allocated to brands is likely to affect small
firms disproportionately.
Table 2.31
Customer Brand Portfolio by Firm Size
Brand Portfolio
Firm Size Brands Own Brands Both Brands and Total
(Employee Numbers) Only Only Own Brands
1-9 38 (74.5%) 11 (21.6%) 2 (3.9%) 51 (100%)
10-19 16 (61.%) 5 (19.2%) 5 (19.2%) 26 (100%)
20-49 30 (51.%) 9 (15.5%) 19 (32.8%) 58 (100%)
50-100 8 (22.9%) 12 (34.3%) 15 (42.9%) 35 (100%)
:;100 47 (37.0%) 22 (17.3%) 58 (45.7%) 127 (100%)
Total 139 (46.8%) 59 (19.9%) 99 (33.3%) 297 (100%)
P-Value 0:.001
Source: Collins and Burt (1999)
In line with the previous results, table 2.32 supports a relationship between the age of the
manufacturer and the brand portfolio with its customers (X2=34.l4, DF = 4, P-:.OOL). On the
one hand, new firms are most likely to supply branded products. Additionally, a larger than
expected share specialize in own brand products. Large firms, on the other hand, are more
likely to supply a portfolio of branded and own brand products for their customers rather than
restrict themselves to a branded product portfolio. Thus, the evidence suggests that dual
branding strategies, where the manufacturer supplies both brands and own brands to a retail
account, are extremely unlikely during the early stages of a firm's development. These dual
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branding strategies are more likely to emerge as the manufacturer matures.
Table 2.32
Brand Portfolio by Firm Age
Brand Portfolio
Age of Firm Brands Own Brands Both Brands and Total
Only Only Own Brands 
n=139 n=59 n=95
1-5 Years 32 (74.4%) 11 (25.6%) o (0.0%) 43 (100%)
6-10 Years 27 (54.0%) 13 (26.0%) 10 (16.2%) 50 (100%)
::10 Years 80 (40.0%) 25 (17.5%) 85 (42.5%) 200 (100%)
Total 139 (47.4%) 59(20.1%) 95 (32.4%) 293 (100%)
P-Value 0:.001
Source: Coli ins and Burt (1999)
The above has identified the significant variations that exist in the interdependencies between
Irish food manufacturers and their retail customers. The extent of manufacturer dependency
on the Irish and British markets and the specific roles played by individual retailers were also
highlighted. Our analysis has demonstrated the importance of economies of scale in food
manufacturing and the impact that the loss of a major retail customer's business would have
on a manufacturer's business. Finally, Irish food manufacturers' propensity to engage in own
brand production for both the domestic and British markets was identified and some
characteristics of brand and own brand suppliers were also uncovered.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter traced the evolution of the Irish grocery market. It identified the key formative
influences shaping the grocery channel in Ireland, the changing natue of competition and the
role of the regulator in influencing retailer-manufacturer relations. The chapter highlighted
the increasing concentration, particularly on the buying side, and examined the role of private
label as a strategic and tactical tool within the Irish grocery market.
The chapter then proceeded to examine the structure of the food manufacturing sector and
assessed its dependency on the domestic retail market. The analysis pointed to both the
commoditization and export orientation of the sector, which reduces dependency on the
domestic grocery market. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that firms may be more
dependent on the home market during the earlier stages of their development after which
penetration of foreign markets becomes necessary for further growth. The analysis also
investigated certain, as of yet non-traded, sub-sectors of the food industry, which exhibited
considerable dependency on domestic grocers.
The high export share of Irish food production ensures that a broad range of retail markets
with varying structural features and trading conditions are serviced. Thus, for instance, the
dairy industry's experience ofthe British retail market is rather different to that experienced
in Germany. Recent trends in Britain, in particular, with the rapid growth in both retail
concentration and private label participation, has on the one hand, seriously impeded the Irish
industry's ability to develop a strong branded presence, while on the other, posed a number
of opportnities in relation to own brand production.
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The chapter uncovered the dependencies and interdependencies that exist between Irish food
manufacturers and their retail customers on both the Irish and British markets. The extent of
the trading relationships between food manufacturers and Irish and the large British grocers
has been demonstrated. More importantly, the findings on the brand portfolios traded
highlights the diversity of trading relationships experienced by Irish food manufacturers. In
doing so it supports the view that the Irish food manufacturing base can act as an appropriate
sampling frame for our study. We propose that the diversity of trading relationships emerging
from the sample used by Collns and Burt (1999) justifies the sample's use as the basis for our
investigation of the determinants of retail power.
80
Chapter Three
The Organisation of Economic Activity
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of retail power within their
relationships with food manufacturers. Clearly, these relationships and the balance of power
within them have significant implications for both the consumer, in terms of choice and price,
and for the effcient àllocation of resources throughout the economy. A considerable body of
literature has emerged recently examining these specific relationships. As a prelude, it is
initially instructive to nest our primary area of concern within the broader question of the
organization of economic activity within vertical marketing systems, the nature of economic
relationships within marketing channels and the implications for channel performance. The
chapter has two main aims. First, it seeks to provide the theoretical bases for the hypotheses
that will be developed in chapter six. Second, through its review of both the traditional
marketing channels and the transaction cost literatures it wil attempt to identify those
constructs and measures appropriate to our subsequent analysis.
3.2 The Marketing Channel Literature
The investigation commences with a review of the marketing channel literature. This wil be
subdivided into sections. First a review of the various perspectives adopted throughout the
study of marketing channels wil be carried out. Then the development of the concepts of
power and dependency wil be traced throughout the literature culminating in an examination
of the relationships between power, conflict and leadership.
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3.2.1 Perspectives
Throughout its literature, traditional marketing channel theory defines its focus of study as the
structured networks of vertically aligned firms involved in the process of transferring
ownership of outputs from the point of production to the ultimate point of consumption.
Marketing channels are viewed as sets of interdependent organisations participating in the
process of delivering a product or service to its point of final consumption (Stern and El-
Ansary 1982). While there is some variation in the breadth of definition, there appears to be
a broad consensus on the importance of ownership and the sequential transfer of title
(McKinnon 1989, Bowersox et al 1980). Ownership confers decision-making status while
imposing specific risks on the title holder, thereby compelling those with title to engage in
particular channel decisions especially those related to channel relationships. This is not to
deny or underestimate the role of specialists or facilitators in the channel but to suggest that
their participation is dependent on particular decisions made by those holding title. Thus, for
instance, a firm holding title may decide to either absorb or contract out a specific function
depending on the given circumstances and market conditions. The specialist's involvement
is contingent on those with title perceiving some contribution over and above that which
primary agents could achieve with their own resources. In this respect, specialists may be
viewed as lubricants within the channel enhancing its performance. Indeed the existence of
such specialists is dependent on the improvements in performance that they bring to the
channel as they hold no monopoly on the functions they carr out.
The emergence of marketing channels is largely explained by the separation of production and
consumption in terms of time and space. Temporal separation requires that manufacturers
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usually produce output in the expectation of demand resulting in risk bearing and
stockholding. The existence of economies of scale requires goods to be produced in large
homogenous bundles, while the unit of consumption tends to be small heterogeneous baskets
of goods. Attainment of economies of scale also requires the consolidation of production
despite the dispersion of consumers imposing distribution costs on the producer and search
costs on the consumer. Furthermore, the assortment demands of consumers, at odds with the
productive specialisation of manufacturers, results in complex and numerous transaction
relations. The solution to these conundrums is the use of intermediaries to bridge the gap
between production and consumption. Intermediaries emerge within this exchange process
by providing space, time and form utilities. They engage in the process of sorting, allocation
and assorting, thereby assisting in the alignment of consumption bundles with manufactured
output. Intermediaries enhance efficiency in exchange by reducing the number of transactions
and, in the process, offer the opportnity of routinization and reduced search costs. The shape
and form of a given channel are governed by the opportnities for achieving costs effciencies
as a product moves from its place of manufacture to its place of final consumption in
conjunction with the output required by the final consumer.
Central to the marketing channel literature is the notion of effciency and performance in the
provision of output. The traditional functions carried out within the marketing channel,
possession, ownership, promotion, negotiation, finance, risk-taking, marketing information,
ordering and payment (Stern et al 1989) may be carred out by all, some or most agents within
the channel depending on the degree of specialisation. Clearly, the precise distribution of
these functions wil have cost bearing consequences in addition to the performance criteria and
measures applied to each agent (Rosenbloom 1979:39). Channels compete by interchanging
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these core functions among channel members, thereby attempting to achieve lower costs
associated with the provision of channel output. While output wil vary according to channel,
it wil be dimensioned by spatial convenience, lot size, delivery time and assortment variety.
Given the multiplicity of forms which channels may take, it is not surprising, that one feature
emerging from the literature is the range of different perspectives and assumptions employed
in relation to the study of marketing channels, channel co-ordination and channel
performance. While varying in terms of scope and focus, the appropriateness of each
perspective is largely governed by the specific channel under review in conjunction with the
aims of the study at hand. El Ansary (1979) outlines a four-way classification: the structural,
behavioural, environmental and managerial perspectives. The structural or functional
perspective (Higby and Smykay 1979) perceives the performance of the channel as
determined by its structure, which is composed of institutions producing outputs through the
transformation of inputs subject to the given state of technology. The approach largely
follows neoclassical economic analysis, where cost economies and market demand for output
determine the level of specialisation and the firm's functional activities (Heide 1994). Thus,
the framework is concerned with both the identification of functions and the measurement of
inputs and outputs at each stage in the channel and the effciency with which outputs flow
through the channeL. The relative effciency of channels is measured in terms of cost
associated with meeting market demand.
The behavioural perspective is based on the assumption that structure alone fails to account
for channel and channel member performance. However, while it incorporates a number of
behavioural variables believed to be significant determinants of performance, structural
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variables are held to be important determinants of each channel member's behavioural
characteristics. Thus, for instance, the number of distribution levels within a channel and the
number of agents within a level would play an important role in determining channel member
behaviour and performance. In this respect, the perspective incorporates some of the notions
underlying the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial economics.
This perspective views marketing channels as behavioural systems, where groups of
individual but interdependent firms, interact, establish relations and engage in exchange.
Interdependencies exist because few firms can satisfy consumer needs alone. They may
emerge on the supply side where inputs are purchased or on the demand side where outputs
are sold and, in most instances, interdependencies exist on both sides. The interdependencies
reflect the boundaries of the firm and the degree to which the firm has chosen to specialise in
particular functional activities. The very existence of these interdependencies gives rise to
power relations among firms within the channel and these relations offer useful insights into
the functioning of the channel and interorganisational interactions (Reve and Stern 1979).
Assuming that consumption is the sole reason for economic activity within the channel and
that consumption is the domain of the consumer, some form of role congruence is required
among firms constituting the channeL. Given the centrality of interdependence, the potential
for conflct and the need for co-operation is substantiaL. Consequently, role specifications and
performance expectations need to be negotiated and communicated throughout the channeL.
Indeed role negotiation and bargaining, together with effective communication of goals and
expectations, are central to the effective workings of channel relationships. Behavioural
literature identifies leadership as the primary means of achieving such congruence acting as
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organiser of the resources within the channel (Reve and Stern 1979). These leaders act as
power centres through the exercise of control. Channel control is a function of a leader's
power base, its resources, dependence, power, its desire to influence and leadership
effectiveness together with other channel members' tolerance for control (Robicheaux and El-
Ansary 1975). The effective application of channel power and the resultant outcome in terms
of channel satisfaction is a major determinant of channel performance. The prerequisites for
the emergence of clear leadership are specified by EI-Ansary (1979:50):
1) a channel member must possess suffcient power over other agents in the channel
2) the channel member must be capable and wiling to exercise this power
3) other channel members must be wiling to submit to the exercise of power, which
wil be dependent on channel member satisfaction resulting from outcomes of channel
relations.
The environmental approach views the structural, behavioural and policy parameters
governing channel performance as being largely determined by the environment within which
channel tasks are completed. Channel member behaviour, channel structure and channel
policies are embedded in the task environment which is beyond the direct influence of these
channel characteristics. However, the interplay of channel behaviour, policies and structure
has a substantial impact on channel member performance in terms of efficiency, which in turn,
through a feedback process, has indirect consequences for the makeup of the task
environment.
The managerial perspective views the marketing channel as a superorganisation and the
relationship between its constituent firms resembles the internals of an organisation.
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Emphasis is placed on "measures of planning, organisation, communication, decision-making
and control similar to those found in an intraorganisational setting" (El-Ansary 1979:52).
Channel system performance is perceived as dependent on the effectiveness of channel
management. The management variables determining performance may be classified
according to technical variables, of which channel structure, policies and information flows
are the more significant, and behavioural variables comprised of communication,
role/position, conflict/co-operation and power/control. In this respect, the managerial
approach incorporates much of the behavioural and environmental contributions to the study
of marketing channels. Information flows and communication provide the cementing agent
between the technical and behavioural dimensions.
The foregoing suggests that the traditional marketing channel literature may be decomposed
into two broad strands, a microeconomic/structuralist perspective and a broad
manageriallbehaviourist approach. However, one of the more important debates to emerge
from the manageriallbehaviourist approach is the issue of power and its relationship with
dependency, conflct and control. As the concepts of power and dependency are central to our
analysis, it is appropriate to examine their evolution in the literature.
3.2.2 Power in the Marketing Channel
One of the first features emerging from a review of the literature is that power is considered
as a characteristic inherent to a social relation and not perceived as an attribute of a particular
agent (Emerson 1962). Power is a phenomenon that resides within social relations, existing
between social parties, and may be viewed from two perspectives, that is, from either of the
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protagonists. French and Raven (1959) provide a systematic definition of power, which is
particularly relevant to our case. Power is viewed from the recipient's perspective, that is, the
agent over whom power is exerted, and is defined in terms of influence brought to bear
resulting in change on the part of the recipient. This element of influence emerges elsewhere
in the literature. Cartright (1965) argues that "if 0 has the capability of influencing P we
say that 0 has power over P". A more explicit definition in the context of marketing channels
is provided by Wilemon (1972:71), where "power refers to the ability of one channel member
to change its behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member exerting the
influence". EI-Ansary and Stern (1972:47), define a channel member's power "as his ability
to control the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in a given
channel at a different level of distribution". Thus, while there is some variation within the
literature, the common elements are the ability to institute change in another agent's behaviour
in a direction which it would not freely tend and in a direction favouring the influencer's
utility function. In this respect, it is common for the terms power, influence and control to be
used almost interchangeably (Wilemon 1972). This introduces some degree of confusion in
that, as we shall argue, it is possible to have an influence relation with a part yet fail to have
control over that part. Moreover, power within a channel context is viewed vertically across
levels of distribution as against horizontally within a leveL.
French and Raven (1959) identify five bases of power: reward; coercive; legitimate; referent;
and expert power. Reward, coercive, expert and legitimate sources are the more important for
the study of power relations in the grocery channeL. Reward and coercive power sources
emanate from agent P's perception that agent 0 can dispense either rewards or punishments.
The strength of these sanctions, and hence the dependent change, is a function of both the
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probability that 0 can and wil dispense them which in turn wil depend on the degree to
which 0 can observe P's behaviour. The importance of observability as a determinant of the
strength of both reward and coercive power sources is stressed.
According to French and Raven, while the distinction between reward and coercive power
may not be entirely clear in terms of application, their dynamics are quite different (French
and Raven 1959). Reward power tends to attract agents P and 0 together while coercive
power tends to lead to polarisation. Indeed the utilisation of coercive power may present
diffculties in that polarisation might result in agent P leaving 0' s sphere of influence through
a divorce process and resulting in relationship termination. Thus, other restraining forces may.
be required to maintain relationships in face of coercive power. The notion of polarisation
emerges elsewhere. "With a personal rejection of the source of power the influencee also
increases his desire to retaliate and to avoid influence whenever possible" (Raven and
Krganski 1970:73). This is in contrast to the exercise of reward power, which appears to
enjoy a self-reinforcing effect in that its effective use increases the perceived probability of
future rewards for appropriate behaviour.
The strength of expert power depends on the extent to which agent P evaluates O's degree of
expertness within a given sphere. Expert power is effective through PIs cognitive structure
and in this fashion institutes change. It is evaluated on two dimensions. First, it is appraised
relative to agent P's own knowledge and second, it is assessed against some absolute standard
external to the relationship. Expert power also possesses a temporal dimension. The power
of new information may be decomposed into two parts; the primary change, which is largely
governed by the credibility of the messenger, and informational power based, on the
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information content of the message which is independent of the messenger's identity.
Consequently, the impact of expert power is different to that of either reward or coercive
power. These forms of power generated dependent change, suggesting that once the perceived
threat or benefit of sanction was removed, the new state of affairs tended to revert to its
original condition. Expert power, on the other hand, generates independent change based on
this informational power, which is not a function of identity. The importance of expert power
within the grocery channel is attested to by the fact that retailers have access to information
channels unavailable to food manufacturers. Through their access to electronic point of sale
data (EPOS) and various measures of supplier performance, they possess information that has
the capability of directing actions throughout the supply chain.
The final source of power to be considered is that of legitimate power. French and Raven
(1959) proposed three bases for legitimate power; cultural values, acceptance of the social
structure and designation by a legitimizing agent. It is this third base that may be of direct
relevance to retailer-manufacturer relations. The development of private label brands by
retailers could be expected to legitimise increased retail involvement in their manufacturers'
operations and production processes. Indeed, the introduction of the food safety act in the UK
and its requirement that retailers demonstrate due diligence is likely to have increased and
justified such retail participation (Hobbs and Kerr 1992).
A dominant feature of French and Raven's (1959) assortment of power sources is the central
role of perceptions in determining power. Gaski (1986:63) proposes an additional
manifestation of power that is independent of perceptions but depends on the power agent's
ability to "modify the influencee's environment". This "manipulative or ecological" power
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might, for instance, be based on control of information and the restriction of alternatives.
However, to the extent that it is independent of perceptions, appropriate units of measure are
diffcult to conceptualise, never mind operationalise.
The difficulty of differentiating among non-coercive sources of power as above led Hunt and
Nevin (1974) to conclude that the appropriate classification was between coercive and non-
coercive sources. However, even the distinction among non-coercive and coercive power
sources is unclear. This difficulty was alluded to by French and Raven in their original article.
"Is the withholding of a reward really equivalent to a punishment? Is the withdrawal of a
punishment equivalent to a reward?" (French and Raven 1959: 158). Thus, the distinction
between coercive and reward sources of power are defined in terms of the influencee's
psychological interpretation of the stimulus. However, while conceptually appealing, the
distinction is clearly diffcult to operationalise. Gaski enters this debate and proffers the
distinction among coercive and reward sources of power in terms of "latitude for deviation
in a favourable or unfavourable direction" (Gaski 1984:23). Coercive power sources can be
defined as those "potential actions with a natural limit in the positive or favourable direction
but great latitude for deviation in the negative direction" (Gaski 1984:23). Thus, the
withholding of payment is perceived as a coercive power source because one could withhold
well into the future (large latitude for deviation on the negative) while immediate payment
displays little latitude deviation on the positive side.
Not surprisingly given the conceptual diffculties, the measurement of power has proven
elusive. French and Raven (1959: 152) define the strength of power of agent 0 on agent P,
OIP, as "the maximum potential ability of 0 to influence P in A", where A is some system in
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P's life space. The power relation between 0 and P can vary across systems but it is assumed
that this can be aggregated providing a magnitude of power ofO/P. Power is not an objective
ability to influence a given agent in that the appropriate measure must entertain the notion that
it is power perceived by the recipient that induces change. EI-Ansary and Stern (1972) in one
of the first attempts to develop a model of power, conceptualised power as:
1) a function of dependence,
2) a function of power sources and
3) a function of both power sources and dependence.
In this instance, self perceptions and attributions of power were measured using a Likert-type
scale and correlated with attributed power measures. Dependency, on the other hand, was
measured in terms of share of business accounted for by an agent, the cost and diffculty of
replacing the agent and the importance of the agent's marketing policies to the target's
business. However, the study failed to support any relationship between power and the
independent variables, dependence and power sources. The authors argued that "lack of
agreement between self perceptions and attributions of power represents evidence of diffused
power" (EI-Ansary and Stern 1972:48). However some of the specifications employed, where
both power sources and dependency are utilised as independent variables, suggest possible
multicollnearity. This point, the possible separability of dependency and power sources is
argued by Gaski (1984).
Hunt and Nevin (1974) examined the relationship between power sources and channel power
in their study of a franchiser/franchisee channeL. The selection of this particular channel
promised to circumvent the diffusion problem argued by El-Ansary and Stern (1972). The
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relationship was estimated using "an index of power" based on franchisee scoring of their
perceptions of franchiser control on a number of decision variables. Sources of power were
reduced to coercive and non-coercive categories with non-coercive sources identified by
agents' "wilingness to yield power to another" (Hunt and Nevin 1974: 188). This distinction
is also alluded to by Lusch (1976) who argues that coercive sources involve an agent
begrudgingly yielding power to another while non-coercive sources, in contrast, encourage
a wilingness to yield to power. This notion of wilingness is rather reminiscent of French and
Raven's (1959) opposing force. Conceptually, this opposing force could be measured on a
continuum from zero, where there is no opposition at all and total wilingness to cede to
power, to one where opposition is of such a scale that there is no change. Indeed French and
Raven (1959) include the possibility of negative power. As to whether or not these later cases
reflect power situations is questioned by Gaski (1984:24) who argues that "there is no such
thing as an unsuccessful attempt to exercise power when power is present. Power means the
ability, not the inability to alter behaviour".
While influencee perceptions are deemed central to the measurement of power, there does not
appear to be similar importance attached to influencee classification of power sources. One
could argue that this issue features in Hunt and Nevin's (1974) results where they reject the
finding that as the quality of reward attempts increases perceived power decreases as being
spurious. Similar findings were made by Brown et al (1983) where they rejected the
hypothesis that non-economic power bases held by a supplier determined retailers' perceptions
of the supplier's power. Could it be that as the quality of reward-attempts increasee, the
influencee is less likely to perceive the non-coercive attempts as power attempts and more
likely to interpret them as the addition of negotiation variables to the exchange relation?
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Gaski (1986:66) proceeds along these lines and suggests that "as the use of reward increases,
its recipient may interpret it as obsequious behaviour, a sign of weakness, and the expert,
referent and legitimate power may wane". This raises the possibility that the relationship
between power and power sources is non linear. While many of the arguments underlying the
powerlbasis of power debate have referred to the possibility of diminishing returns in terms
of contribution to power, none have explicitly tested whether or not a non-linear relationship
exists.
Despite these shortcomings Hunt and Nevin (1974) argued that their results substantiate a
significant relationship between the power of a channel agent and the sources of power
available. Of more importance was their finding of a negative relationship between the use
of coercive power instruments and franchisee satisfaction and a positive relationship between
the use of non-coercive instruments and influencee satisfaction. Brown and Frazier (1978)
argued that their findings support the view that the more manufacturer power is perceived by
dealers, the less those power sources need to be used. As Gaski (1984: 10) suggests, "it may
be more correct to regard the perception itself as the source of power".
A further feature which emerges from the earlier utilisation of French and Raven's (1959)
taxonomy of power sources was the failure to extend empirical investigation to the possibility
of causal interdependencies among the power sources. This remained beyond study while
empirical investigation restricted itselfto perceived power sources. Gaski (1986) attempts to
redress this issue focusing on the exercise of power sources, particularly coercive and reward,
and the consequences for referent, legitimate and expert power sources. In his review of a
heavy industrial machinery channel, Gaski (1986) finds some weak evidence to support the
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hypothesis that the use of reward sources of power has a positive effect on referent, legitimate
and expert power sources, while the exercise of coercive sources has a negative effect. In an
attempt to investigate the possibility of these compound effects, Gaski (1986) introduces a
new taxonomy of power sources based on quality/capability. Capability power sources are
defined as "the perceived abilities to impose punishments and grant rewards" while quality
sources refer to the "perceived intrinsic qualities of the power holder: expertness,
attractiveness or legitimacy" (Gaski 1986:74). With the use of this constrct, he establishes
a positive relationship between the exercise of reward sources and "quality" sources of power,
while coercive power sources have a negative effect on these sources. Thus, having identified
such compound effects, Gaski finds suffcient evidence to reject the view that the total effects
of reward and power sources on power and dealer satisfaction are the same as the direct
effects.
3.2.3 Dependency
The conceptual link between power and dependency is clearly established in the literature.
"We assume that any change 
i in the state ofa system is produced by a change in some factor
upon which it is functionally dependent" (French and Raven 1957:153). Emerson (1962: 32)
is more emphatic arguing that "power resides implicitly in the other's dependency" and that
"the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence ofB upon A". Thus,
power over another agent is both function of and equivalent to the degree of dependence
among the protagonists. Emerson (1962:33) proceeds to present the underpinnings of
dependence as being "(1) directly proportional to B's motivational investment in goals
1 French and Raven (1959) define power in terms of influence which is in turn defined in terms of
psychological change.
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mediated by A and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to B outside
that A-B relation". In this regard the power relations emerge from, and are governed by, the
interdependency between actors and the alternatives available to them. It also suggests that
motivational investments and available alternatives, with due consideration of the costs of
pursuing them, are the key variables in determining the level of dependency. Frazier (1983)
develops Emmerson's notion of dependency as a function of alternatives arguing that the
perceived level of an agent's role performance wil be an important explanatory variable in
determining a target agent's level of dependence within an exchange relation. The degree to
which an agent's role performance exceeds others in terms of outcomes will largely govern
the domain of realistic alternatives.
Much of the foregoing analysis suggests that there is an interrelationship between dependency
and power sources. Thus, explanations of power cannot reside solely in an understanding of
either power sources or dependency alone. The effect of power sources on dependency must
also be incorporated. Brown et al (1983) suggest that the more attractive the resources an
agent has, the more likely that its target views that relationship as essentiaL. Thus, dependency
is perceived as a function of sources of power. They found, in their examination of retailer-
supplier relations, evidence to support the hypothesis that retailers' dependence is determined
by their perceptions of suppliers' power sources. They also found support for the hypothesis
that economic power bases, perceived to be held by the supplier, determined the extent of
perceived supplier power.
In his review of much ofthe earlier investigations, Gaski (1984) concludes that there is very
little evidence to support a strong relationship between power and dependency in the
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marketing channel, possibly perhaps because power and dependency are conceptually
inseparable. He argues that "any valid content selection of channel member A's power
sources, especially reward sources, should adequately cover the domain of what channel
member B is dependent upon for ultimate success" (Gaski 1984:23). Indeed his review of the
empirical data led him to agree with the sentiments as "to whether we really know anything
about power and conflict in distribution" (Gaski 1984: 21).
Etgar (1976) found that dependence, while significant, did not have the same explanatory
power as power sources. This suggests that the measures of dependency did not capture as
much of the underlying relationship as did the measures of power sources. Brown et al (1983)
found a significant relationship between retail dependence ai:d perceptions of supplier power.
Supplier power, in turn, was a function of economic power bases. Other instances of
separability problems occur in studies where both power sources and dependency are specified
as independent variables in the format
p¡j = F i (PSij , Dj)
Where Pij refers to the power of channel member¡ over member j
PSij refers to member ¡'s sources of power used to control member j
Dj¡ refers to member j , s dependency on ¡
Such a hypothesis was tested by EI-Ansary and Stern (1972:51) where they proposed that "the
power of one channel member over the other can be viewed as a function of: (1) the extent to
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which the latter is dependent on the former and (2) the sources of power possessed by the
former".
Etgar (1976:255), by incorporating the notion of countervailing power, avoids this separability
problem. Thus the specification tested is given as:
Pij F2 (Vij, Cj¡)
Where p¡j refers to the power of channel member¡ over member j
V¡j refers to member ¡'s sources of power used to control member j
Cj¡ refers to member j' s countervailing power sources which allow member j to resist member
¡'s control attempts.
These countervailing powers, reflect member ¡' s dependency on member J and were shown to
be negatively related to member ¡'s power to control memberj.
Gaski's (1984) primary challenge to existing empirical findings rested on lack of construct
validity and informant bias. He argues that measures of power are inherently diffcult to
operationalise, particularly that element which deals with "the ability to alter behaviour" and
suggests that many of the measures applied failed to capture that which they sought to
measure (Gaski 1984:19). Indeed, most of the earlier instruments reviewed measured
exercised power (EI-Ansary and Stern 1972; Hunt and Nevin 19742; Etgar 1976). Also,
assuming content validity is assured, it has been shown that the perceptions can vary widely
2 Hunt and Nevin's research instrment measuring power utilised a six point scale "I have almost complete
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throughout an organisation (Philips 1981; Seidler 1974). These perceptions may be situation
specific, as informants at different levels of an organisation can elicit substantially different
responses to the same research instrument. Clearly, this accusation places substantial doubts
over the validity of earlier results. It questions the extent to which a social relation between
agents in a distribution channel can be captured by taking recourse to individual informant
perceptions. However, as we shall see, the use of multiple informants has its own inherent
shortcomings. Consequently, one of the key issues facing this study wil be key informant
selection.
3.2.4 Dependency Balancing
Following Emerson (1962) the next critical advance in the dependency literature was made
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). They propose that "interdependence can create problems
of uncertainty or unpredictability for the organisation... which is typically troublesome to
organisations and derives from the lack of co-ordination of activities among social units".
Consequently "organisations facing uncertainty attempt to cope with it on occasion by
restructuring their exchange relationships" Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:42).
In a useful contribution to the debate, Buchanan (1992) examines the role of dependence and
symmetry in vertical trade relationships. Dependence is defined as the "extent to which a
trade partner provides important and critical resources for which there are few alternative
sources of supply". Thus the exchange relation is central in that ifboth parties' resources are
equally valued there wil be symmetry within the relationship, while if there is a differential
responsibility for this" ...to ... " My franchisor has almost complete responsibility for this".
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in valuations the relationship wil be asymmetric. Valuations of resources are based on the
perceived contribution to channel member performance. Put in this way, dependence is no
longer perceived purely as a liability, in that the less dependent firm may use its influence to
achieve its own goals at its partners expense, but as a motivation to establish stronger inter-
firm ties and relationship norms required to govern the relationships.
This is supported by Feldman (1998:288) who, drawing on the transaction cost framework,
argues that, "mutual interdependency between buyer-suppliers can yield economic transaction
gains. However, an exchange partner which perceives that it is too dependent on the other can
be expected to reduce this perception of over-dependency". This can undermine the workings
of the relationship and consequently "it is important that the exchange partner understands
what it can do to prevent the partner firm acting to reduce this dependency" (Feldman
1998:289).
Thus, the focus is not on reducing one's own dependency, but of managing the relationship.
The problem faced by the more dependent firm is the extent to which it is wiling to invest
in the relationship. A firm wil continue to invest in the relationship and assist its partner to
achieve its goals as long as the expected benefits in terms of its own goal achievements exceed
the benefits that would be enjoyed from alternative arrangements. For example, a supplier in
seeking shelf space for its products would invest its resources, thereby assisting the retailer
meet its goals, up to the point where further investment would reduce the value of the
relationship below that of some other alternative. On the other hand a retailer, requiring
additional scarce product might reduce its demands on its partner, thereby increasing the
partner's satisfaction, up to the point where a further reduction in demands would make
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alternatives preferable. Buchanan's (1992) empirical results indicated that retail buyers'
performance was enhanced by increasing dependency on suppliers in departments where there
was a symmetric relationship but that asymmetric relationships with dominant suppliers
resulted in poorer performance when subjected to increasingly uncertain trading conditions.
3.2.5 Conflct
However, despite considerable debate on the measurement of power and its relationship with
sources of power and dependency, there is broad agreement on conflct. Underlying almost
all of the empirical investigations of channel power and sources of power is the implicit
assumption that the sources and exercise of power have implications for the level and nature
of conflct. Furthermore, there is a general consensus that the "causal sequence of power and
conflct can and does proceed in either direction" (Gaski 1984:12). Thus, the exercise of
power may result in conflct or that conflict may itself necessitate the use of power.
Raven and Krganski define conflct as "tension between two or more social entities
(individuals, groups or larger organisations) which arises from incompatibility of actual and
desired responses" (1970:70). Reve and Stern (1984:11) define conflict as "the perception on
the part of a channel member that its goal attainment is being impeded by another with stress
or tension the result". Thus, there is a strong relationship between conflict and channel
member dissatisfaction. Conflct is seen as unavoidable in an interorganisational context.
Reve and Stern (1979:407) suggest that dependency within the marketing system "brings
seeds of conflct". Specialisation within the marketing channel increases functional
interdependency as the attainment of one firm's goals becomes increasingly related to other
firms' performance. Inherent to this interdependence are both conflct and co-operation
101
(Robicheaux and El-Ansary i 975). Causes of conflct are differing role prescriptions, issue
differences, differences in perceptions of reality and goal incongruence. Moreover, role
prescriptions and performance standards become increasingly more stringent as
interdependency increases, resulting in the greater likelihood of performance failure, stress
and conflict. Furthermore, increasing dissatisfaction with a channel partner's performance
results in higher levels of conflict (Rosenberg and Stern 1971).
The link between conflct and power sources is not as strong as one might have expected. For
instance, Lusch (1976:383) argues that" if A is likely to use coercive sources of power when
B does not co-operate with him, then B wil have more frequent and intense conflcts with A".
Non-coercive sources of power on the other hand are hypothesised to reduce conflict. Lusch
(1976:387) finds very weak evidence to support this. Although the strength of evidence varies
from study to study and from channel to channel, it broadly substantiates a positive
relationship between channel member satisfaction and non-coercive power sources and a
negative relationship with respect to coercive sources (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976;
Gaski 1986). Gaski (1986) suggests that many of the weaker and inconsistent results may be
due to their failure to consider the indirect effects of coercive and non-coercive sources
through "quality" sources.
While conflct is unavoidable within a channel context, much effort has been given to a deeper
understanding of the relationship between sources of power and conflct and the consequences
of employing varying power sources (Lusch 1976; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Gaski 1986). Given
that conflct emerges from the perception that attainment of one's goals is being impeded, it
is closely linked to channel member satisfaction. Therefore, the consequences of power
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sources on channel member satisfaction must also be considered when investigating channel
conflct. Indeed, it could be argued that channel member satisfaction is in part governed by
the degree to which performance expectations are believed likely to be realised.
Consequently, the processes underlying the formation of these expectations could play an
important role underlying channel conflct.
3.2.6 Conflct, Control and Channel Performance
Underlying the channel literature is the clear notion of channels competing with each other
for supremacy. Channel performance is a result of the effectiveness of channel control and
the degree of satisfaction of channel members with channel relationships (Robicheaux and EI-
Ansary 1975). One manifestation of channel competition is conflct between channel
members ensuring change and adaptation to new conditions over time. In this regard, conflict
is viewed positively and contributes to channel performance. However, while vertical conflct
is unavoidable within a channel, minimisation of dysfunctional conflct and the promotion of
channel co-operation is seen as imperative to both the effective operation and continued
existence ofthe channeL. Conflct containment is subject to two necessary conditions. First,
each channel member's role and expected performance must be clearly specified. Role
prescriptions, associated with each position in the channel, implicitly specify certain levels
of co-operation and co-ordination by ensuring expectations congruency, thus enhancing
channel effciency (Robicheaux and EI-Ansary 1975). Second, the level of inter channel co-
operation, which by itself may be dysfunctional if taken to extremes (Brown 1979), and the
minimisation of dysfunctional conflct is also achieved by control exercised by channel
leaders over key decision variables of other firms (El-Ansary 1979).
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However, control is a double-edged sword. As each firm strves to maintain its autonomy and
independence, the exercise of inter-firm control runs the risk of reducing channel member
satisfaction and increasing channel conflict. However, increased performance resulting from
control is likely to increase tolerance of control, and in that fashion, enhance co-ordination and
channel performance. Thus, Anand and Stern (1985) found a significant relationship between
channel members' wilingness to relinquish control over key variables when they perceived
that enhanced performance resulted from channel leadership. However the issue of leadership
calls into question the fashion in which leadership is exercised.
Price (1993) suggested that the most effective leadership behaviours may vary according to
the degree of task interdependency within the channeL. Two styles of co-ordination are
identified. Participative leadership is based on inter-firm communication and informational
flows. Channel members' opinions are sought and considered in advance of decision-making.
Directive leadership is based on the communication of clear commands throughout the
channeL. In this way channel members' functions and activities are planned and
communications established to assist in co-ordination. Prices' (1993) results indicate that
channel members facing low levels of interdependency achieve higher levels of satisfaction
under directive leadership than do those members facing high levels of interdependency. The
reasoning behind this is that in such low interdependency situations the channel member is
spared the costs associated with decision making and can take the directive or leave it.
Conversely, however, directive leadership appears to increase conflct significantly in high
interdependency contexts. Participative leadership is positively related to channel member
satisfaction and is independent of the level of interdependency (Price 1993).
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3.3 An Economic Perspective of Vertical Relations
The marketing channel literatue provides a number of frameworks and constructs which may
be usefully applied to the study of vertical relations. However, the study of vertical relations
has also occupied much of the economic literature. This body of work, encapsulated largely
in the neoclassical model, provides an alternative view of vertical relations. In doing so it
yields a series of constructs, which complement those from the marketing channel literature,
and adds to the understanding of the organisation of economic activity from the point of initial
production to ultimate consumption. By and large, this study shall focus on relatively recent
developments within the neoclassical model and the contributions leading to the emergence
of the transaction cost framework. Central to this framework are the concepts of specific
assets and bounded rationality and the role they play in the organisation of vertical relations.
The framework focuses attention on the importance of monitoring within vertical relations
and, in doing so, picks up on a line of argument highlighted by French and Raven (1959) but
ignored by much of the subsequent power literature. We have seen that the study of power
takes the relation as its basic unit of analysis. Wiliamson's (1975;1979) development of the
transaction cost framework is based on the transaction as the basic unit of analysis. It is
proposed here that, in coupling these two literatures, a richer insight into the balance of power
within vertical relations may be realised.
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3.3.1 The Neoclassical Model
One of economists' more important contributions to the understanding of economic co-
ordination is embodied in the neoclassical modeL. Essentially, the model is composed of two
agents, consumers who are assumed to maximise utility derived from the consumption of
goods and firms who maximise profits. While there are clear interrelationships between the
two, for example, consumers providing their labour services to firms in return for wages in
addition to receiving firm's residual as income in the form of profit dividends, the need for
abstraction rendering the focus of study manageable necessitates that such overlaps are
ignored. Firms maximise their profits by transforming inputs into outputs that ultimately
satisfy consumer needs. "Consumption - to repeat the obvious - is the sole end and object of
economic activity" (Keynes 1936). However, the co-ordination of such activity, together with
the effcient allocation and utilisation of scare resources, presents the organisation problem
which is ultimately solved by the use of prices within the context of competitive markets.
All prices are assumed to be freely known and it is the system of prices that brings buyers and
sellers together directing resources to their most effcient use. Prices direct entrepreneurs,
pursuing their own self interest through the attainment of profit, to produce those goods that
consumers would be wiling to purchase in order to maximise their utilty. Adjustments, both
in consumption and production, are instigated by changes in relative prices. The effciency
of markets is couched in terms of the optimal allocation of resources such that no alternative
allocation of the given resources would make at least one consumer better off without
reducing the utilty of another. Indeed the neoclassical model ensures that the costs of co-
ordinating the effcient allocation of resources are minimised in that all necessary information
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resides with the relevant parties. Consumers know their preferences and relevant market
prices while entrepreneurs know relevant prices in addition to their production function.
Furthermore, the model can incorporate uncertainty in a fashion through the use of a
theoretical device that Arrow (1974:34) refers to as "contingent commodities" traded under
conditional contracts with associated prices. Thus, "umbrellas when it is raining are
distinguished from umbrellas when its sunny" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992:68).
Under such assumptions, all economic activity takes place within markets. Markets ensure
effciency. However, such a system does not approximate to reality where non-market forms
of economic activity are frequently observed striving to enhance effciency. Thus, non-market
organisation of economic activity would be expected to replace market organisation when and
where markets faiL. The study of economic organisation under conditions of market failure
lead us to the transaction cost framework.
3.3.2 The Transaction Cost Framework: Antecedents
Much of the recent literature on organisational form has adopted the transaction cost paradigm
as developed by Oliver Wiliamson (1975; 1979; 1985; 1991). However, before examining
Wiliamson's contribution, a brief digression is made to explore some of its antecedents and
the genesis of its core concepts. The basis for the market failures approach to the study of
economic organisation has its origins in Ronald Coase's seminal 1937 article. Coase's central
question was if the price mechanism carries out the effective co-ordination of economic
activity, why do firms exist? If movements in relative prices are sufficient to ensure the
effcient allocation of resources why do firms, where co-ordination is based on entrepreneurial
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directives, emerge? Coase's argument is essentially that markets and firms are alternative
modes of organising production and allocating resources.
Coase proposes that "the main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism" (Coase 1937:23). Coase identifies these
costs as those associated with discovering relevant prices, the negotiation of contracts and
uncertainty. Coase proceeds to focus on a more interesting issue, that being the boundary of
the firm. How does the firm decide its range of activities, how does it decide what functions
to internalise and for what activities it can rely on the market? The answer he argues is that
"the firm wil tend to expand until the cost of organising an extra transaction within the firm
become equal to the costs of carring out the same transaction by means of an exchange on
the open market" (Coase 1937:24). Thus the firm suffers increasing marginal costs of
organising transactions thereby constraining the activities of the firm and determining the
choice of mode of governance.
The importance of market failures as an explanation for the existence of firms was highlighted
by Arrow (1974). He argues that "organisations are means of achieving the benefits of
collective action in situations where the price system fails". One reason for the price system's
failure is its inability to deal with uncertainty and effciently allocate risk bearing.
"Uncertainty means that we do not have a complete description ofthe world which we fully
believe to be true" (Arow 1974:33). Such failure may result from problems posed by moral
hazard or adverse selection with the existence of informational asymmetres among the parties
to a transaction. Adverse selection exists as a pre-contractual phenomenon where the
existence of asymmetrc information, where a part has information relevant to the transaction
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that is unavailable to the other, makes it probable that an effcient market wil not emerge if
it emerges at alL. Classic examples include the markets for second hand cars and health care.
In the case of the former, poor quality cars drive out good quality cars. In the case of health
care, as the price of health premiums increase only the worst risks purchase them. "The
insured may know his risks better than the insurer" (Arrow 1974:36). Effcient pricing is
impossible, as the attainment of all relevant information to the particular transaction requires
incurring costs. Moral hazard, on the other hand, is a post-contractual phenomenon. Here,
behaviour changes after the contract, with the tendency to cheat in the absence of costly
monitoring.
The extent of the asymmetric distribution of information wil be dependent on the structure
of information channels available to a given agent. These information channels reflect both
existing information and the possibility of accessing relevant information when needed. Thus,
the attractiveness of non-market organisation is partly governed by the characteristics of these
information channels and the distribution of relevant information to the participants of a
transaction. However, a given economic agent may invest in the creation of information
channels. Such investments wil depend on that part's evaluation of expected costs and
benefits. Arow (1974) argues that there are a number of characteristics of information costs
shaping such an investment decision. First, the individual's capability to absorb, process and
utilise information is fixed, rendering information sources subject to diminishing returns.
Second, information costs are, in part, sunk costs in that they cannot be reversed. Costs of
varying degrees are incurred during the initial attempts to interpret new signals. Signals
themselves provide no information until suffcient resource is invested in developing an
apparatus to interpret them. Once investment has been made in a given channel it wil be
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cheaper to continue to use that channel than to acquire other channels. This is because, on the
one hand, the diminishing capacity of the agent to assimilate the new information and, on the
other hand, thereduction in the value of the existing channel once supplanted by the new one.
Third, the costs, and therefore an agent's effective choice amongst different information
channels, is in part determined by previously employed information channels in that
economies of learning are enjoyed.
Arrow's contribution is that of linking the organisation of economic activity to the existence
of uncertainty and the unequal distribution of information. Such uncertainty arises because
of bounded rationality emanating from "the individual's very limited capacity for acquiring
and using information" (Arrow 1974:39) while the unequal distribution of information
imposes costs which may be reduced through the use of hierarchy as the preferred mode of
governance.
Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) central question is whether or not the benefits of specialisation
and co-operative production may be best realised through organisation within the firm or .
across markets. They argue that the problems of metering productivity and rewards underlie
economic organisation. Rewards dispensed in line with productivity generate a more effcient
allocation of inputs while rewards dispensed disproportionately promote shirking3. Team
production or organisation within the firm, would be preferred if the joint production of its
members were to exceed the sum of outputs that would be produced by the individual entities'
producing in isolation by more than the costs of organising and monitoring team members.
3 This is very similar to the arguments made by French and Raven (1959:156) who propose that "P's new rate
of production wil be dependent on the subjective probability that 0 wil reward him for conformity minus his
subjective probability that 0 wil reward him even ifhe returns to his old leveL. Both probabilities wil be greatly
affected by the level of obseryability ofP's behaviour"
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Team production is where a number of different inputs are employed, where the output is not
a sum of the separable outputs of each input and where all the inputs are not owned by one
individuaL. To ensure that productivity is duly rewarded requires appropriate monitoring of
the team production process. However, the monitor also has an incentive to shirk unless such
a specialist is the claimant of the residual generated in part through the reduction of shirking
activities by other team members. Thus, the monitor becomes the manager of co-operative
inputs (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The characteristics of the monitor are that it is a residual
claimant, it observes input behaviour, it is the part common to all contracts with inputs, and
it has the capacity to alter the composition of the team unilaterally. In this respect, the firm
is perceived as a policing device, observing, monitoring and rewarding joint production.
The contribution here is threefold. First, we have the emphasis on observability and the
metering problem, the costs they impose and the implications for organisational form.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that opportnism is not simply an inter-firm phenomenon but
may exist within firms in the form of shirking. Second, the authors propose a link between
organisational costs and modes of policing and contractual form. Third, the link between
evolving organisational form and variations in the scope of economic activity is made. Thus,
the change in organisational form from the putting out system in the weaving industry to that
of the factory system as a result of the development of power sources resulted not from the
reduction in transaction costs but rather from the increased ease of managing input behaviour.
Here the role of technology assumes particular importance in that "sometimes a technological
development wil lower the cost of market transactions while at the same time it expands the
role of the firm" (Alchian and Demsetz 1972:784).
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Klein et al (1978) develop on another aspect of market failure, that of post contractual
opportnism. They highlight the importance of quasi-rent seeking as an explanatory factor
underlying organisational form. Economic rent is payment to a factor over and above what
is required to keep it in its current employment. While economic rent applies to a factor, the
supply of which, is fixed in the long run, for example land, quasi-rent refers to payments to
a factor that is fixed in the short run. It is given as the difference between total revenue less
total variable costs, that is, the payment to the fixed factor. Once a specific investment4 is
made, there is an incentive for the purchaser of the output of that investment to reduce price
such that it tends towards the marginal cost of production thereby reducing the contribution
to the fixed asset.
While contractual arrangements may afford some protection to parties, the costs of negotiating
and specifying contracts to include all possible contingencies, in addition to the costs of
litigation, may be prohibitive. Moreover, the nature of quasi-rent seeking is such that it may
act in either direction. For example, assume we have an ingredients supplier producing a
particular food component using highly specialised equipment for a branded manufacturer.
On the one hand, once the supplier has invested in the specific asset the manufacturer may
attempt to approQriate quasi-rents by reneging on the original contract and reducing price until
it approximates the next best price available on the market to the supplier. On the other hand
the supplier may attempt to appropriate additional quasi-rents by increasing the price of
ingredients. The manufacturer may have recourse to litigation but by the time it runs its
course the potential loss of market share may cause that route to be ineffectual (Rubin and
Dezhbakhsh 1995).
4 Specific investments are investments that cannot be costless1y redeployed to be used in another business
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Attempts to appropriate such quasi-rents may be more diffcult to detect as they may not
always be price orientated. The supplier may fail to maintain equipment thus producing
product of an inferior quality imposing policing costs on the buyer. Another example of a
highly specific asset is a brand name. A strong brand is likely to represent a significant
proportion of company's investment in its relationship with its customers. While brand names
can be sold, they are likely to be diffcult to redeploy. For example, it is debatable whether
or not the Heinz brand would have any value outside the food sector. One could portray own
brand producers as renters of a brand name. However, incentives exist for a given renter to
attempt to appropriate as much of the quasi-rents possible partly through the production of
poor quality product. Indeed, improving own brand franchise increases the appropriable
quasi-rents resulting in greater contracting and policing costs. Clearly, the potential for one
agent to engage in opportnistic behaviour is dependent on the alternatives available to the
other part. Indeed, the greater the degree of asset specificity the greater the amount of quasi-
rents ceteris paribus.
Specific investments, by natue, present considerable and possibly insurmountable contracting
problems in that all contingencies are unlikely to be catered for in a cost efficient manner.
However "even if terms could be reached, there is stil the problem of policing the agreement"
(Wiliamson 1976:95). These implicit contracts may be underpinned by the provision of a
premium to the agent likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour. This is set such that the
present discounted value of the future stream of premia exceeds the gains from cheating.
relationship.
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Thus, the size of the premia is positively related to the opportnistic gains from a once off 5
theft, assuming one doesn't get a second chance, and negatively related to expected length of
the relationship6. An importnt feature to note is that the premia does not necessarily take the
form of a price-average variable cost differential but might consist of other business related
benefits. Indeed, there might be reasons to avoid such use of price in that "for one thing price
adjustments have an unfortnate zero sum quality, whereas proposals to increase/decrease or
delay delivery do not" (Wiliamson 1979:251). Nevertheless, the size of the premia would be
expected to be negatively related to expected growth as the opportnity cost of cheating when
expected growth is positive is the loss of subsequent, increasing sales.
Thus "a crucial determinant of economic organisation is therefore the anticipated demand
growth compared to the actual demand growth" (Klein et al 1978:318)J. If anticipated growth
is less than actual growth, the premia paid to partners wil be less than that required to prevent
opportunistic behaviour, thereby increasing policing costs. In effect, what one has in this
context is a contract embedded in a framework of premia that provides the incentive to avoid
reneging. Thus, the "premium stream may be usefully thought of as insurance payments made
by the firm to prevent cheating" (Klein et al 1978:305). This "insurance payment" may be
considered as an alternative to policing or monitoring costs. The greater the appropriable
quasi-rents, the greater both the explicit contract specification costs and, consequently the
premia required to support the contract, the more likely the firms are to vertically integrate.
The lower the appropriable quasi-rents the more likely the firms are to use contractual
5 Once off here refers to the length of time over which opportnistic behaviour occurs which would include the
period where the behaviour was undetected, or detected but unpreventab1e and until the relationship was
terminated possibly by finding another supplier or customer.
6Indeed, if there is a known final period, one part wil have an incentive to cheat on the last transaction.
Given that both parties know this, there wil be an incentive to cheat in the N_1 period. Thus, the whole
system collapses as the reason to forego opportnistic behaviour is determined by the discounted value of
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arrangements (Klein et al 1978).
In addition to highlighting the particular problems posed by the existence of specific assets
and the possibility of post-contractual opportnistic behaviour, the above forwards some ideas
of how agents part to such transactions may resolve the propensity to cheat and attempt to
appropriate quasi-rents. It highlights the conditions under which the problems may assume
greater magnitudes and the cost implications for the transaction. The high costs and relative
inflexibility of explicitly stated long-term contracts enhance the merits of market-orientated
implicit contracts. The sanctions here are not of a litigious nature but rather the withdrawal
of future business and the loss of associated goodwil. It is proposed here that the
effectiveness ofthese sanctions wil be a function of dependency.
The above also draws our attention to information flows and monitoring costs. Where scope
for opportnistic behaviour exists, parties have a number of options to reduce the cost of such
activity. First, they can engage in monitoring activities to ensure that the terms and conditions
laid down in the contract are being fulfilled. However, the costs of such monitoring activities
wil in part be dependent on the distribution of information among the parties and the cost of
acquiring new information. It may be necessary to establish new information channels. The
expected benefits of the new information wil be weighed against the costs of obtaining it.
Alternatively, rather than invest in new information channels or engage in monitoring
activities the firm may decide to provide incentives to reduce cheating by a stream of premia
payments. Clearly, a combination of monitoring activities and premia may be used to promote
the desired behaviour. Monitoring activities are likely to display diminishing returns.
expected future premia.
115
Consequently, after a certain stage, premia may be substituted for these activities to minimise
the total cost of ensuring compliance.
3.3.3 Markets and Hierarchies: Wiliamson
The review of the marketing channel literature earlier highlighted the significance of power
and dependency relationships in organising the channeL. Power, dependency and satisfaction
within the exchange process are the units of analysis. The transaction cost approach takes the
transaction as the unit of analysis. Power is not considered unimportant but "power
considerations wil usually give way to effciency - at least in profit making enterprises"
(Wiliamson and Ouchi 1982:363). Thus, the concern here is the effciency of the transaction.
Concern for the organisation of the transaction and its governance mode are paramount.
"Indeed if transaction costs are negligible, the organisation of economic activity is irrelevant"
(Wiliamson 1979:233). Underlying the transaction cost paradigm is the assumption that
"transactors choose the organisational arrangements to minimise the expected costs of
governing the transaction over the life of the relationship" (Masten et al 1991 :2). Mode of
governance is defined as "the institutional framework in which contracts are initiated,
negotiated, monitored, adapted and terminated" (Palay 1984:265). The optimisation problem
facing transactors is broad in that there exists a "continuum of potential governance strcture
for vertical relationships" (Joskow 1985:36).
Underlying the transaction cost approach to the organisation of economic activity are the
behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportnism. The constraints on
rationality, the propensity for the entrepreneur to make mistakes and the subsequent impact
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on firm size had already been pointed out by Coase (1937). The limitation on rationality in
conjunction with the propensity to seek self-interest through guile impose costs on the
exchange act in addition to those costs usually considered in neoclassical economics. "What
is crucial is that some agents behave in this fashion (opportnistic ally) and that it is costly to
sort out those who are opportnistic from those who are not" (Wiliamson and Ouchi
1982:351). Examining the market for component supply Wiliamson (1975:91) argues that
"bounded rationality makes it impossible, or prohibitively costly, to attempt to write the
comprehensive contracting which the contingent supply claims are exhaustively stipulated".
Thus, the problem facing the firm is to organise its transactions such that it minimises the
constraints associated with bounded rationality while simultaneously minimising the potential
costs associated with partners behaving opportnistically. The choice of governance structure
partly resolves the dichotomy here. "Governance structures, however, are properly regarded
as part of the optimisation problem" (Wiliamson 1979:246).
Central to the transaction approach is the proposition that transaction costs differ on the basis
of three critical dimensions (Wiliamson 1979). Also, these dimensions govern the
economising effectiveness and the appropriateness of alternative institutional modes.
Wiliamson identifies these as uncertainty, frequency and idiosyncratic investments. It is
propose that, given the nature of the grocery business, both frequency of transactions and
uncertainty may be ignored as means of differentiating among transactions at minimal loss to
our analysis. Idiosyncratic investments are those which are specific to a particular relationship
and where the identity of the parties "has cost bearing consequences"(Wiliamson 1979:240).
To these, Joskow (1985) adds the extent to which the transaction in question is subject to
economies of scale or scope, which might not be realised in a purely vertical integrated
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institution. Wiliamson identifies six kinds of asset specificity: site; physical asset; human
asset; brand name capital; dedicated and temporal specificity (Wiliamson 1991 :281).
There are many interesting implications emanating from the existence of these specific
investments under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, where complete contract
specification is prohibitively costly. First, the decision to make such transaction specific
investments is likely to be based on the expectation that the relationship wil continue into the
future as the cost of these investments wil have to be amortised across all future transactions
within the relationship. Second, when assets are highly specific they transform the
relationship between both parties into a bilateral monopoly. Third, the more specific the asset,
the lower its value in its next best alternative use. Given the propensity to behave
opportnistically, and once the specific investment is made the transaction is subject to quasi-
rent hazards, it is not surprising then that the governance structure underlying these
relationships assumes critical importance. Fourth, the risks associated with specific assets are
positively related to the measurement of post contractual events7. For instance, a retailer may
have a contract with a manufacturer relating the price of output to certain conditions. Under
condition A, when the retailer's market share is less than or equal to 10%, the retailer pays a
price X for each unit of output. Under condition B, where it is greater than 10%, the retailer
pays a price Y which is 10% lower than A. The problem here is that it may be diffcult to
ascertain which condition actually exists. Finally, specific assets present risks when there is
either diffculty in monitoring one's partner's performance or enforcing actual terms and
conditions.
7This has its parallel in marketing channel literature where differing perceptions of reality is one of the chief
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Without opportistic behaviour, bounded rationality or specific assets, transaction costs wil
not exist and governance mode wil be irrelevant. In situations of complete knowledge,
perfect contracting is possible and costless. The protagonists may resolve limitations in
contracts satisfactorily as neither wil attempt to gain undue advantage. A transaction without
specific assets wil take place in contestable markets where they do not require long term
relationships (Dietrich 1994). However, the risk of expropriation of quasi-rents provides an
incentive to allocate more resources to governance mechanisms to protect those specific
assets. Moreover, "such added specificity is warranted only if these governance costs are
more than offset by production savings and/or increased revenues" (Wiliamson 1991:282).
In examining governance structure, Wiliamson considers three alternatives (1979). The first,
market governance, is based on classical law and contingent claim contracting. Frequency is
unimportant and the transaction is discrete and standardised while the costs of changing
exchange partners are small. The risk of falling prey to opportnistic behaviour is limited as
personal judgement is usually suffcient to complete the sale.
Trilateral governance is based on neoclassical contracting and is of relevance in situations
where occasional or recurrent idiosyncratic investments are made, thus providing both parties
with an incentive to complete the contract. Parties maintain their autonomy but are
"bilaterally dependent to a non trivial degree" Wiliamson (1991:271). Moreover, because
they cannot foresee all future events and the costs of contracting are positively related to the
scope of contingencies catered for, all contingencies are not accounted for in the contract.
Thus" the contract is mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism" (Wiliamson 1994:5)
causes of conflict (Robicheaux and EI-Ansary 1975:23)(Stem, EI-Ansary and Brown 1989:363).
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facilitating flexibility. To compensate, both transactors have recourse to a third party for
arbitration purposes, reducing the risk of opportnism and enhancing the life-span of the
relationship. Classical contingent claim contracting and direct moves to litigation are
considered inappropriate under these conditions due to the associated costs and the negative
impact they might have on the continuing relationship.
The final governance structure is that of relational contracting. Here, the extent of specific
investments and the frequency of transaction encourage the establishment of an administrative
order and routinization processes, where adjustments in contractual terms required for
unanticipated contingencies may be resolved. "Transactions, by contrast, where the parties
bear a strong bilateral dependency relation to each other are the ones for which co-ordinated
adaptation yields real gains" (Wiliamson 1996:51). Within this governance mode two
structures may emerge. In the absence of excessive idiosyncratic investments and where the
buyer's demand for a product is insuffcient to reap the benefits of economies of scale, a
bilateral governance structure may emerge where the firm's requirements are purchased from
a trading partner. When economies of scale may be realised through internal production
and/or where the transaction becomes increasingly more idiosyncratic, exchange with a
second party becomes less likely and vertical integration may become preferable.
However, the central question is not simply one of "make or buy" as set out by Coase (1937)
but takes a more detailed perspective on the various contractual forms that underlie the "buy"
decision. Thus as Masten (1984:74) argues, "production is organised administratively within
firms as well as contractually between them and given the practical limitations of bureaucratic
organisation, the relevant question can be seen to be not merely whether contractual
120
diffculties exist but how severe such deficiencies may be relative to the alternative costs of
organising production internally. The importnt issue from an institutional choice perspective
thus becomes how the particular details of a transaction affect the differential effciency of
alternative organisational forms". He later comments on existing theoretical work, "In
particular, the choice between internal and external organisation and in the event of the latter,
the choice of contract terms have been related to several critical parameters of the
transaction" .
Clearly, the cost of governance structure varies significantly along the continuum from market
to vertically integrated modes. These costs include co-ordination costs, information costs and
imperfect commitment (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). However, in a world where contracts
are typically incomplete, parties to a relationship involving a high level of uncertainty in
relation to future contingencies and highly specific assets are subject to opportnistic and
quasi-rent seeking behaviour. The ability of governance structures to protect relationships
from the destructive nature of these behaviours, together with their costs, wil determine the
governance structure employed to monitor the contractual relation by determining the most
effcient means of organising the exchange relation. Thus, economic organisation attempts
to "align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures that differ
in their costs and competencies in a discriminating way" (Wiliamson 1991 :79).
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3.3.4 Mode of Governance and Adaptabilty
Emphasis thus far has been placed on the dimensions of the transaction, with particular
emphasis on asset specificity, as determinants of the most appropriate mode of governance.
However, the next issue to be resolved is to identify the key characteristics of the alternative
governance modes that enable such discriminating alignment to take place. Arguments so far
suggest that governance modes differed on the basis of contract law. "But there is more to
governance than contract law. Crucial differences in adaptability and in the use of incentive
and control instruments are also germane" (Willamson 1991:277). Williamson (1991; 1994)
points to two forms of adaptations: price (market) and non-price (authority).
In the introduction to the organisation of economic activity it was argued that neoclassical
analysis held that the price system, through changes in relative prices, provided suffcient
information to ensure that producer and consumer actions adjusted optimally. The basis for
these adjustments was optimising behaviour. Producers adjusted their production decisions
such that profit would be maximised while consumers adjusted their consumption decisions
such that their utility would be maximised under the new conditions. Autonomous goal
optimisation was suffcient to ensure appropriate adaptation. Autonomous optimisation was
ensured because the optimising agent had sole rights to the benefits from adaptive behaviour.
High powered incentives are said to exist when consequences are clearly linked to actions in
this way (Wiliamson 1991). Thus the first, adaptation (A), is where market prices are
suffcient to ensure that the parties make the optimal decisions independent of each other.
The second, adaptation (B), is where price statistics are insuffcient to ensure the optimal co-
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ordination. This is more likely to be the case where parties "bear a long-term bilateral
dependency relation to one another" (Wiliamson 1994: 15). Where specific investments are
in place and where contracts are incomplete, adaptations of form (A) are inappropriate. Under
such circumstances, changing conditions give rise to self-interested bargaining and costly
delays. The associated renegotiations, bargaining costs and the costs of maladapted
transactions due to delays increase transaction costs. Indeed, the possibility of renegotiations
after the fact, raises the likelihood of "buying in" and benefiting from first mover advantages.
In such cases, the existence of bilateral dependency creates the need for a more co-ordinated
approach to adaptations. "As compared with the market, the use of formal organisation to
orchestrate co-ordinated adaptation to unanticipated disturbances enjoys adaptive advantages
as the condition of bilateral dependency progressively builds up" (Wiliamson 1991 :279).
This is partly due to the avoidance of the renegotiation and bargaining costs alluded to above.
However, while these are avoided, the level of incentive intensity assured by benefit
appropriation is diminished. To the extent that incentive intensity is reduced, other
administrative structures and control methods are required.
Table 3.1
Distinguishing Attributes of Market, Hybrid and Hierarchy Governance Structures
Attributes Market Hybrid Hierarchy
Incentive Intensity ++ + 0
Administrative controls 0 + ++
Adaptation (A) ++ + 0
Adaptation (B) 0 + ++
Contract law ++ + 0
Note: ++ = strong; + = semistrong; 0= weak
Source: Wiliamson (1994)
Given that the market and hierarchy are positioned at the extremes of the governance
continuum, Wiliamson positions the hybrid as an intermediate (table 3.1). The characteristics
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of the hybrid are such that independent ownership ensures autonomy, providing more
incentive intensity than the hierarchy. Thus, it is well equipped to adapt to market changes
of a non-bilateral nature. Also, because ofthe varying degree of bilateral dependency, other
forms of adaptive machinery, such as long-term but incomplete contracts, underpin these
particular transactions. However, participation in bilateral transactions necessitates the
diminution of incentive intensity. A comparison between the two extremes, market and
hierarchy, highlights the trade-offs between incentive intensity and administrative controls.
"If added incentive intensity gets in the way of bilateral adaptability, then weaker incentive
intensity supported by added administrative controls (monitoring and career rewards and
penalties) can be optimal" (Wiliamson 1994: 16).
3.3.5 Applications of the Transaction Cost Framework
In their assessment of the existing body of empirical work using the transaction cost
framework, Shelanski and Klein (1995) classify studies according to qualitative case studies,
quantitative case studies and some cross sectional analysis. Of these, the most prevalent are
case studies (Wiliamson 1976) (Palay 1984). The primary reason for the application ofa case
approach is that the main independent variables are difficult to operationalize across industries
or even firms. Examples of qualitative case studies include Wiliamson's (1976) study of the
franchising scheme for Oakland's CATV. This study highlighted the problems posed by the
failure to specify contracts to the optimum level of detail when drawing up award criteria.
Such failure permitted "buying in" and subsequent post contractual renegotiation where the
benefits of first mover advantage facilitated a move towards monopoly pricing.
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Quantitative analysis carred out by Masten (1984) examined input purchases by the aerospace
industry. The hypothesis tested was that the make or buy decision would be made based on
the differential between the cost of internal production versus the cost of market exchange.
The independent variables incorporated were the transaction attributes, specificity and
complexity. Specificity was subdivided into two categories. Item specificity, which related
to the design of a particular item and the degree to which it was tailored to a specific user, had
three possible values: highly specialised where the item was unique to the customer in
question, slightly specialised where the item could be relatively easily adapted to meet other
customer's needs, and standardised. Site specificity was also considered. This was to capture
the possible effect of location in determining the degree of specificity and the alternative use
of assets once in place. Item complexity in production was used as a proxy for uncertainty but
no appropriate measure was available for uncertainty on the demand side. A three point scale,
A-C, was used to capture the degree of item complexity. The dependent variable, the
probability that a given input would be produced internally, was measured using the observed
make or buy decisions for the selected items. The model specification is given below.
L¡ * = B + b . W i + U i
L¡= a . Ài+ c. Wi + VI
Where L¡* is the cost of internalizing the production of item ¡.;
B represents administrative costs;
W i represents item complexity;
L¡ is the cost of market contracting;
Ài represents item specificity;
and where U i and v i are normally distributed error terms.
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Given the above, the probability of witnessing internal production may be specified as:
Pr (L¡* 0: Li)
The results derived from maximum likelihood estimates yielded highly significant and
positive coeffcients for both complexity and specificity, indicating that the probability of
internalisation increased with both these factors. The combination of complexity and
specificity, by increasing the risks of incomplete complete contracts resulted in a 92 %
probability that a product is produced in-house. The results also highlighted a substantial
predisposition by management towards external purchases resulting from the additional
administrative burden associated with internalisation.
Monteverde and Teece (1982) tested the transaction cost explanations of vertical integration
with their study of the US automobile industry. In particular, they wished to test whether or
not transaction specific know-how, as against transaction specific capital assets, played an
important role in determining the probability of internal versus external organisation of
transactions. The existence of such specific know-how, emerging from first mover advantage,
raises switching costs to the buyer, thereby increasing the likelihood of expropriation of rents
as a result of opportnistic re-contracting. Specifically, their hypothesis tested the relationship
between engineering effort, the source of first mover advantage considered to be positively
related to quasi-rents, and the likelihood of vertical integration. A Likert scale, attempting to
measure the cost of producing components, was employed as a proxy for engineering effort
and investment. A second variable captured the company specificity of a component. This
identified those components where make and model information was required for purchasing
126
purposes. The final variable was a systems component that grouped individual components
into subsystems. This captured the interrelationships that existed between components. Thus,
for instance, the design of the chassis wil have substantial impacts on the design of other
components, therefore requiring more co-ordination and control and increasing the likelihood
of internalisation. The findings of the study indicated a strong relationship between
transaction specific skills and the probability of vertical integration suggesting, that the
potential for achieving substantial first mover advantage has important implications for the
degree of vertical integration.
The central thesis underlying the transaction cost framework, that organisational form is
determined by the relative efficiency of transacting under alternative modes, is difficult to
refute. This is due to the fact that the costs of alternative modes are not observable for a given
institution. While the costs of internalising a function by a particular firm may be observable,
the costs of alternative arrangements by reason of the integration decision are not (Masten et
aI1991). A second problem is that the transaction cost framework focuses almost exclusively
on the market alternatives, that is, it is concerned with asset specificity, uncertainty and the
costs of contracting to reduce the risks of post-contractual opportnism. It neglects those
factors that affect the internal costs of the firm which play an equally important role in
determining the mode of governance for a particular transaction. For instance, the cost of
opportnistic behaviour within firms is not explicitly considered. A third issue of concern is
that the costs associated with the purchase of inputs, themselves market transactions, are not
considered when a particular stage of the production process is internalised. In this respect,
the characterisation of the transaction cost framework as "make or buy" is not strictly correct.
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In the above, focus has been placed on the make or buy dichotomy. However, as mentioned
earlier, there is considerable scope in terms of contractual form to cater for the nature of the
"buy" transaction in question. Consistent with our earlier analysis, the transaction cost
framework provides considerable insights into the factors underpinning the nature of such
contracts. It proposes that contracts wil be established in such as way to minimise transaction
costs. Palay (1984:266), in his study of rail freight contracting, argues that as "investment
characteristics become more transaction specific, the associated institutional structure
becomes increasingly unique to the parties and transaction it supports". This is demonstrated
clearly in Table 3.2. It shows the association between governance structure and the nature of
investment characteristic.
Table 3.2
Governance Structure and Investment Characteristics
Governance Structure
Investment Characteristics Market Mixed Relational Total
Non Specific 13 7 1 21
Moderately Idiosyncratic 0 10 8 18
Highly Idiosyncratic 0 2 10 12
Total 13 19 19 5 i
Source: Pa1ay (1984)
Palay (1984) identifies five aspects of governance structure which were expected to vary as
investment specificity increased; method of enforcement, adaptations to changing
circumstances, tyes of adjustments implemented, exchange of information to assist long term
planning and whether or not strctural planning was attempted. In cases characterised by low
levels of asset specificity, market enforcement and the threat of the potential use of substitutes
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was suffcient to ensure the completion of transactions. Such threats were likely to be made
possible by the existence of various substitutes. In situations of increasing levels of
specificity, the likelihood of opportnistic behaviour was constrained by the perceived need
to retain one's reputation intact. Moreover, relations were frequently underpinned by
commitments reflecting mutuality of interest, which although legally unenforceable, served
to convey commitment to less trusting members of one's trading partner's firm. This element
was of particular note in that relations could exist at individual and/or firm leveL.
Attitudes towards adjustments varied considerably with the level of asset specificity (Palay
1984). The less specific the investment, the less wiling parties were to accommodate
adjustments in contractual arrangements. Growing flexibility accompanied increasing degrees
of specificity. However, at lower levels of specificity, flexibility was achieved only through
renegotiation accompanied by some compensations that improved the accommodator's
position. Attitudes towards adjustments in situations of greater degrees of specificity were
more favourable. They deemed the need to accommodate change within the relationship
essential to the preservation of both parties' investments.
The implementation of adjustment also varied on the basis of specificity with unilateral
amendments in a contract more likely in situations of non-specific investments. Other
possibilities included negotiated agreement on the revised terms. Under these conditions,
parties with non-specific investments were more likely to request immediate compensation
as part of the new contract, while transactions characterised by more specific investments
were more likely to agree to future compensatory gains for current accommodating behaviour.
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The need for long term planning and structural planning is a necessity for the continued
success of any given firm. However, the provision of proprietary information, especially that
of an impacted nature, to the transactor may be expected to vary considerably with the nature
of the mode of governance. As expected, Palay (1984:285) identifies some evidence showing
that "parties to idiosyncratic transactions were more likely to be involved in exchanges in
information for long-term forecasting". The provision of information to outside parties for
structural planning purposes represents a much deeper relationship. Such information would
form the basis for the development of "rules or procedures for dealing with long-term
problems or unforeseen contingencies" (Palay 1984:286). Once again, the propensity to
engage in such activities was positively related to the level of idiosyncratic investments
supporting the transaction.
3.3.6 Specific Investments and Dependency Balancing
Both the marketing channel literature and the transaction cost literature view dependency as
a critical ingredient in the formation of inter-firm relations. Much of the earlier marketing
channel literature, by virte of its approach to the study of relationship dyads, tended to view
power as a symmetric phenomenon. Power is seen as closely related to, if not inseparable
from, dependency and may be exercised over another agent. The transaction cost literature,
on the other hand, focuses on bilateral dependency and the implications for the mode of
governance. The transaction cost literature argues that the existence of transaction specific
assets generates bilateral dependency. However, the framework implicitly assumes that the
dependence is balanced partly through the use of credible commitments that emerge to support
the exchange process (Wiliamson 1983). Thus, dependency balance is relationship specific.
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Work by Buchanan (1992) and Fein and Anderson (1997) suggests the same. Dependency
balancing is relationship specific and as such strengthens the particular inter-organisational
relationship.
Work by Heide and John (1988) also investigates the link between specific investments and
dependency. They argue for dependence balancing where specific investments exist.
However they suggests that dependence balancing is viewed as external to the immediate
relationship. A firm that has made significant specific investments with a principal wil seek
to establish balancing relationships with other customers. This view does not support the
premise that dependency balancing promotes the exchange process. It merely increases the
principal's substitutability. Feldman (1998) argues that dependency balancing across
relationships is a possible outcome if the over dependent part perceives itself vulnerable in
the relationship. Consequently, credible commitments are required to maintain the
"equilibrium of interdependency between buyer-supplier" and "whether buyer-seller economic
exchanges wil yield successful outcomes" (Feldman 1998:290).
3.4 Conclusion
The foregoing has reviewed much of the channel literature as it pertains to power and the
organisation of marketing channels. The contrbution made by French and Raven (1959) was
that, in devising their taxonomy of power sources, they provided a framework within which
to examine the power relation. The merits of the framework are established in the substantial
body ofliterature which takes it as its starting point in assessing the use of power sources and
the implications for channel conflct, member satisfaction and channel performance. The
framework presents a means for investigating the likely "terms of trade" that emerge from
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within a trading relationship. This is in marked contrast to much economic analysis, which
frequently points to a range of possible "equilibria" within an exchange relation. Here the
final outcome depends on the parties' relative bargaining power and their initial endowment
of resources. The above provides some means of opening this particular "black box".
However, much of the empirical work operationalizing French and Raven's (1959) conceptual
framework has certain shortcomings. First, as pointed out by many commentators, the
distinctions among power bases is unclear despite substantial effort and investment in defining
new taxonomies. In the original seminal article, reward, coercive and expert power sources
were defined in terms of the influencee's perceptions (French and Raven 1959). For instance,
reward power is based on the perceived power to dispense rewards. However, in all the
reviewed literature, no attempts were made to elicit influencee's classifications. Instead,
researchers imposed their own constraints and categorisations in a rather unsystematic fashion.
This is of particular importance when considering that the same researchers constructed the
units utilised to measure and assess the relationship between the strength of power and power
sources. While Gaski (1984) places considerable emphasis on construct validity, it is unclear
whether or not correlations and factor loadings as in Lusch (1976) are suffcient to construct
appropriate power constructs8. Thus it is argued here that much of the earlier work lacks
clarity because one cannot be confident that they measure that which they set out to quantify.
What is proposed here is that sanctions must be differentiated from some baseline
expectation. Thus, it is the influencee who must differentiate and categorise sanctions. "Is
8In Lusch (1976), factor analysis is carred out on a series of 
power sources. One of the loaded factors is entitled
financial assistance, which is then classified as a non-coercive power source. This final classification is based
on the author's assessment. However, it is possible that the existing level of receipts were simply incorporated
into the expected terms of trade and the potential loss of these assistances represented a substantial negative
sanction.
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the withdrawal of punishment equivalent to a reward? The answer must be a psychological
one - it depends on the situation as it exists for P" (French and Raven 1959: 158).
French and Raven (1959) argued strongly that the strength of both coercive and reward power
and the extent of dependent change was governed by the degree to which an agent's
conformity was observed. This critical dimension was neglected in all later empirical
research. Furthermore "the level of observability wil in turn depend on both the nature of the
system and on the environmental barriers to observation" (French and Raven 1959: 155). The
importance of and diffculties presented by the observability and the metering problem was
highlighted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The awarding of rewards disproportionate to
productivity resulted in shirking and opportnistic behaviour. Second, the ability to hide
under-performance resulted in cheating. Arow (1974), in his discussion on information costs,
presented an insight into some of the environmental barriers to observation and the possible
means of overcoming them. These have important implications for both channel member and
channel performance. Thus, it is proposed that some measure of observability be incorporated
into the measurement problem.
The final point in relation to the marketing channel literature is its contribution to the study
of interdependency. While marketing channels are viewed as sets of interdependent
organisations participating in the delivery of a product or service to the point of ultimate
consumption, much of the empirical work focused solely on asymmetric power relations.
Indeed, this was the case until the introduction of countervailing power by Gaski (1986)
broadened the potential uses of the framework.
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While the marketing channel literature focused on the relation as its unit of analysis, the
contribution of the transaction cost framework is that in viewing governance mode as "part
of the optimisation problem", it focuses attention on the transaction. In doing so, it points to
those characteristics that determine the choice of governance mode and focuses on the way
transactions are negotiated, initiated, monitored, adapted and terminated. Its focus of study
is the area within which power relations emerge. The framework highlights the components
of the trade-off, the need to protect the transaction from contracting hazards and the costs of
governance modes in terms of both incentive intensity and adaptability and the trade-offs that
exist between these elements under conditions of bilateral dependency. These are the factors
that govern relative effciency amongst alternative governance modes.
What then do these approaches have to contribute? Much of the marketing channel literature
holds that channel co-ordination is a function of channel leadership, which in turn is a function
of channel member power. Power resides in all relations including transactionaL. The
transaction cost framework argues that co-ordination is governed by effciency and the need
to minimise transaction costs, which are determined by the characteristics, asset specificity,
frequency and uncertainty. Thus, the nature of relationships varies depending on the
characteristics of the transaction. It is proposed that both viewpoints are not incompatible.
The review suggests that, while measuring sources of power is problematic, appropriate
methodologies exist to measure exercised power. Differentiation amongst governance modes
on the basis of transaction characteristics is also possible. This raises the question as to what
happens to the level, the distribution and sources of power under different modes of
governance.
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It is noteworthy that many of the questions posed by Gaski (1984), and particularly those
relating to the distinction among power sources, stil remain. For instance, recent work
(Katsikeas et al 2000) stil fails to redress the problem of differentiation among power sources
i.e. is withholding rewards any different from applying sanctions. However, in arguing for
the inseparability of power sources and dependency, Gaski (1984) points to an alternative.
This is to follow the dependency literature (Emerson 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978,
Buchanan 1992) which may be more rewarding.
The second contribution emergIng from our review of both literatures is the role of
observability. As argued above, French and Raven (1959) point to observability as a key
determinant of power. The transaction cost framework approaches observability through
administrative controls and performance monitoring. Under conditions of bilateral
dependency, monitoring costs play a significant role within the economising problem. They
are viewed as a means of supporting incentive intensity in the absence of the benefits of high-
powered incentives resulting from appropriability provided by market contracting. The trade-
off between incentive intensity and administrative controls has been highlighted. Monitoring
activities act as a means of protecting against low levels of incentive intensity (Wiliamson
1991; 1994) in part by acting as a means ensuring agreement compliance (Klein et al 1978).
However compliance, where the agreement is a type of implicit long-term agreement, may
also be supported through "insurance premia" (Klein at al 1978).
The review highlighted the relevance of dependency within the organisation of vertical
relations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) view dependency as related to uncertainty which can
be managed by better co-ordination of activities by trading partners. The transaction cost
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literature (Wiliamson 1985) provides a broader view on the implications of uncertainty by
pointing to the potential costs of opportnistic behaviour and the means by which these costs
may be minimised through the adoption of appropriate governance structures.
The review also establishes clear linkages between power and dependency, dependency and
specific investments, and specific investments and the mode of governance. However, the
role of specific investments in the determination of power has not been explicitly examined.
This represents a serious omission within the current literature for both theoretical and
practical purposes. On the theoretical side it may be that specific investments provide a
further bridge between the power and transaction cost literatures.
These theoretical linkages wil become more evident in practise in the course of the next
chapter. Within the retail environment one hears of increasing retailer power over
manufacturers. As shall be seen in the next chapter, there is a growing body of evidence to
suggest that the level of asset specificity is increasing on both sides, raising the level of
interdependency, with substantial implications for the both the distribution of power and the
appropriate mode of governance. The development of the retail brand, partly through
improving the quality of private label products represents a considerable sunk investment by
certain retailers. The greater level of sophistication required of manufacturers and the
substantial first mover advantages accruing to an existing supplier base increase the risks of
expropriated quasi-rent seeking as manufactuers take advantage of increasing switching costs.
Similar threats exist on the manufacturers' side where specific investments are made and
retail dedicated supply chains emerge.
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However, not all retailer-manufacturer relationships are subject to such contracting hazards.
Differences wil exist both within and across product categories. The argument presented
here is that these differences are reflected in the level of power exercised together with mode
of governance used to organise the transaction.
Given the growing evidence of increasing specific investments made by both parties and the
risk of opportnistic behaviour within these business relationships, one would have considered
the transaction cost framework as offering the researcher a potent means of analysis. As shall
be seen in the next chapter, many authors draw on the transaction cost framework for
conceptual tools such as specific investments and switching costs but while some have
examined the impact on relationship stability (Dawson and Shaw 1989; Fearne 1996) none
have considered the implications for retail power. This state of affairs may have emerged for
two reasons. First, the sources of power literature emerged largely in the US where retail
development and strategies have been notably different from that experienced in the UK
(Hughes, 1996). In the US, the extent of specific investments and the applicability of the
transaction cost framework may not be immediately obvious. Second, it is proposed that
Gaski's (1984) paper highlighted that the power literature, based purely on French and
Raven's (1959) taxonomy of power sources, had gone as far as it could and may have indeed
gone further than was possible. Thus the topic became largely ignored and the
complementarity between the transaction cost and power literatures never arose.
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Chapter Four
A Review of Retailer-Manufacturer Relationships
4.1 Introduction
At this stage it is appropriate to review the existing literature pertaining to retailer-
manufacturer relationships. The goal of the review is to gain a deeper understanding of these
relationships and the factors that govern the balance of power within them. For the purpose
of clarity, the review sets out the main arguments and findings concerning the evolution of
power relations within the retailer-manufacturer dyad rather than presenting a detailed analysis
of each of the many contributions. The discussion presents the argument that variations in
retailer-manufacturer relations are evident across three distinct sets of characteristics and that
these act as determinants of the balance of power within these relationships:
. At the most aggregated level one observes variations in market structures. Examples
of such variations include the importance of economies of scale in manufacturing, the
concentration of the manufacturing and retailing sectors and own brand penetration.
These structural characteristics may be expected to vary both across product
categories (manufacturing industries) and indeed markets;
. One witnesses variations at firm level, where both retailer and manufacturer
characteristics differ. Product characteristics and the relative importance of different
products to the retailer may also be expected to vary;
. Finally, one observes variations in relationship characteristics among food retailers
and their suppliers. One example is the degree of inter-firm integration among
trading partners with new modes of governance emerging to support differing
transactions.
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Much of the power literature reviewed earlier, with the exception of Etgar (1977), assumed
that the chief determinants of the balance of power were, in effect, endogenous to the
relationships. Little attempt was made to identify "extra-dyadic variables that could increase
our understanding of channel members' power positions" (Butaney and Wortzel 1988:52).
The purpose of dividing our analysis into the components above is to ensure that we capture
the richness of the subject under review and identify the relevant extra-dyadic variables
necessary for a more complete understanding of retail power. It is hoped that by adopting this
framework we may derive a more complete model of power within retailer-manufacturer
relations.
It should be noted that there are considerable inter-relations among our three sets of
characteristics. For instance, we witness certain retailers internalising functions formerly
carried out by manufacturers. Some retailers have adopted brand strategies with clear
implications for the way they manage their relationships with their suppliers. Physical
distribution is another case in point. Retail integration into this function may be expected to
influence monitoring costs, which in turn, may be expected to have implications for the mode
of governance between the trading parties. Consequently much of our analysis wil seek to
assess the importance of these interactions, and in doing so, identify first order causal
relationships.
To complement our earlier analysis of the Irish market, this review focuses on the experience
of the UK grocery sector. This serves three purposes. First, as we have seen, the UK is Irish
food manufacturers' single-most important export market. Second, the UK grocery market
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has formed the basis for much of the study of retailer-manufacturer relations, highlighting
many of the power interactions with which this study is concerned. Third, the UK market
provides the opportnity to consider retailer-manufacturer relationships in the context of
greater strategic use of own brand products. The strategic use of own brand products is one
of the features which currently distinguishes the UK market from other markets such as the
US and France. Nevertheless, some have predicted the convergence of own brand strategies
in time (Hughes 1996; Fernie and Pierrel 1996). The chapter wil proceed first by examining
changes in structure. Then it wil review the literature that points to firm and product
characteristics as determinants of retail power. Finally, it wil assess the literature that
examines variations in trading relationships.
4.2 Structural Change
This section examines three components of structural change that the literature suggests
influence the nature of retailer-manufacturer interaction. These are the changing consumer,
relative concentration in the retailing and manufacturing sectors, and product differentiation
including own brand.
4. 2.1 The Changing Consumer
The most appropriate starting point for the review of structural change is the consumer and
the sets of needs and wants that ultimately drive the entire food supply chain, determining the
roles, interactions and ultimate distribution of both power and rewards among the various
channel participants. There is considerable evidence of the growing sophistication and,
indeed, fragmentation of consumer requirements over the last 50 years. Burt and Sparks
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(1994), in their review of the British grocery market, sketch out changing consumer needs
through periods of rising incomes and emerging shopping patterns during the 1960' s, through
the increasing price focus of the 1970's to the consumption revolution of the 1980's. WaIters
(1980) portrays the consumer market as ageing, fragmenting in terms of household tye, more
leisure orientated and more sophisticated in terms of accessories used and foods eaten. More
exposure to foreign cuisine, through greater ethnic diversity within the UK population and
more access to foreign travel, widened the range of products demanded. Indeed, one of the
more dramatic features of the change in consumption patterns has been the explosion in
products available to consumers increasing from an average of 600 products in the typical
corner shop of the 1950's to over 18,000 in the multiples today (Hughes 1994:10).
WaIters (1980) highlights the interaction between these changing consumer circumstances,
and both the retail and manufacturing environments. The fragmentation of the consumer
market resulted in continual growth in the demand for new products. According to WaIters
(1980), the rate of new product introductions increased throughout the 1960's and was
maintained throughout the 1970's. It and peaked during the 1980's (Hughes 1994). However,
a growing proportion of these products fell into the "me too" category and lacked a real
innovative content. Consequently, up to 85 %, of products failed to have a retail presence one
year after launch (Hughes 1994:23). Nevertheless, the impact of this rate of introduction was
likely to have been significant, as the constant flow of new products would have increased
demand for retailer controlled shelf space.
Changes in lifestyles were also reflected in changes in purchase criteria. Environmental,
health and animal welfare concerns assumed greater importance. The move to healthy eating
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was quickly reflected in the strategies employed by the major multiple retailers! who "regard
their fresh produce displays as traffc generators" (Knox and White 1990:40). Many of these
trends have continued. There is also substantial evidence to support other changes in
lifestyles, particularly among women as more took to market employment. The implications
for grocery requirements are clear as "the working woman is short of time to prepare meals,
seeks convenience when shopping for food products and is wiling to buy time" (Hughes
1994: 16). This incentive to buy time was reflected in the consolidation of the shopping
activity through the use of large shopping outlets facilitated by greater access to cars and
freezers (Walters 1980).
The consolidation of shopping activities was also encouraged by changes in retail advertising
where "advertising of market baskets has a cumulative effect over time, ~oncentrating
consumer preferences on one-stop shopping and emphasising the disutility of moving between
competing stores" (Akehurst 1984: 107). Akehurst (1984) argues that better consumer access
to price information during the 1970's removed the potency of deep but selective price
reductions and enhanced the aggregate low pricing policies of companies such as Asda and
Kwik Save. These aggregate low pricing policies were, in part, facilitated by the relative size
of retailers. Grant (1987) argues that retailer power lay in the ability of large retailers to
generate price discriminatory policies on the part of manufacturers. The Office of Fair
Trading (1985) proposed that the lower prices obtained by larger multiples were indeed being
passed on to consumers2. The continuation of discriminatory pricing by manufacturers
! Other examples include the extensive range of "Healthy Eating" own brand products developed by Tesco.
2 In this respect there is a clear distinction between market (monopoly) power and retailer power where
the former refers to the abilty to raise prices above marginal cost. For recent studies in the area of
retailer monopoly power see (Messinger and Narasimhan 1995;Ailwadi et al 1995; Collns and
Oustapassidis 1997).
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throughout the 1980's is confirmed by Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1996:402) who, drawing on
the Economist Intelligence Unit, point to a 10-12 percent differential in the price paid by
independent retailers and their large multiple counterparts. These discriminatory discounts
are likely to have helped fuel the concentration process.
More fundamentally however, the shift in emphasis from deep price cuts at product level to
basket competitiveness "leads not so much to brand loyalty outside the shopping environment
but to firm loyalty, so that in effect there is product differentiation within stores but store
differentiation at market level" (Akehurst 1984:116). This shift in loyalty from brands to
outlets was to have a significant influence on retailer power. This is pointed out by Steiner
(1984: 179) who argues that "the relative market power of manufacturers and their retailers is
governed by whether or not shoppers are disposed to switching stores within brand or brand
within stores. In the case of the former, manufacturers wil dominate while in the case of the
latter, retailers wil hold sway".
4.2.2 Relative Concentration in the Grocery and Food Manufacturing Sectors
The consolidation of shopping activity played an important part in the concentration process
within the grocery market by inducing a convergence between consumer requirements and
retailer needs for operational effciencies (Akehurst 1983, 1984). Population growth and
grocery volumes stagnated during the early 1970's. Furthermore, growing inflationary
pressures were quickly transmitted to wage inflation with a substantial impact on the labour
intensive grocery sector. Depressed demand prevented effciency gains through market
growth placing increased emphasis on market share gains (Institute of Grocery Distribution
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1990, hereafter IGD). Retail diversification into new product areas provided some means of
achieving economies in the absence of volume growth in the market for staples (Akehurst
1983) but risked the danger of diverting resources into non-core business areas (Leahy 1987;
1994). However, the attainment of a low pricing position also required substantial volume
gains and productivity improvements to provide suffcient economies of scale to finance such
a policy. In this regard, "Operation Checkout" marked the emergence of the large-scale retail
outlet as the dominant retail format for the foreseeable future. These factors which led to the
dominance of the superstore are presented in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
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According to McGee (1987), the continual growth in the market share of the large grocers and
the substitution of large trading units for small outlets provides a clear indication of the
potential for cost efficiencies. The need for improved cost efficiencies had become clear
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during the mid 1970's. High rates of inflation had permitted retailers to pass cost increases
directly to consumers. However, it was becoming evident that such a solution could not
continue indefinitely (Davies et al 1985). The intense price discounting of branded products
by retailers durng the late 1970's was largely financed by cost economies resulting from scale
and distribution in addition to margin contributions from own brand products (Davies et al
1985).
Wrigley (1993:44)proposes that an integral part of the concentration process was "the new
store development process" which had become "the critical arena of competition". Scale
economies, in terms of replication, provided one of the more important drivers towards
increasing concentration in the grocery market (Shaw et aI, 1989). Additional sources of retail
cost economies in the form of economies of scale, at outlet and firm level, and economies of
scope were to play a growing influence in structural change and retailer-supplier relations
(Dawson and Shaw 1989b).
The concentration process had begun during the 1970's with the multiple share of the
packaged goods market increasing from 50% in 1974 to 72% by the end of 1982. This
amounted to approximately 40% of the total grocery market in 1982 (Davies et al 1985:8).
Furthermore, a number of retailers had entered the decade committed to increasing market
share by passing on the benefits3 of volume discounts and efficiency gains to their customers.
The subsequent increase in concentration resulted in oligopsonistic power on the retail side
of the market "which conditioned all aspects of food manufacturer-retailer relations" (Wrig1ey
1993:45).
3 Davies et a1 (1985: 12) argue that there is no evidence to suggest that all the benefits were indeed passed
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The food manufacturing industry entered the 1980's in a fragmented and ineffcient state
(Wrigley 1993; Davies et al 1985). Nevertheless, while fragmented, the top 10 companies
accounted for approximately 33% of sales. Over 60% of product markets had five firm
concentration ratios in excess of 70% (Davies et al 1985:4). While concentration levels
appeared high they masked declining profitability as net margins declined throughout the
1970s from a peak of over 6% to less than 4% by the end ofthe decade. Much of this decline
was attributed to increasing inter-retailer and inter-manufacturer competition resulting from
static market demand and chronic excess capacity (Davies et al 1985). However, the problem
of over-capacity was partly resolved by the shake out during the recession in the early 1980's
(Keynote 1995). During this period, the food manufacturing sector in turn began the
concentration process. By 1988, just 7 companies accounted for almost half of total food
turnover through grocery outlets (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1998).
The growing concentration in both manufacturing and retailing meant that competition was
increasingly between large entities. More importantly, growing horizontal competition among
larger retailers intensified the level of vertical competition that frequently resulted in
temporary breakdowns in trading relationships (Davies et al 1985). These were reflected in
the aggressive exploitation of own label development, greater control of shelf space and the
reduction in space allocated to branded manufacturers. This, in turn, facilitated the
appropriation of additional discriminatory discounts from manufacturers and the imposition
of more stringent supply conditions (Wrigley 1993). However, there was a beliefthat growing
retailer power, by reducing the number of product lines, was itself contributing to
on to consumers.
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manufacturer concentration (Davies et al 1985).
Nevertheless, despite growing manufacturer concentration, retailer dominance stil continued
and was reflected in subtle shifts in manufacturer strategy. Instead of the former adversarial
relationships, manufacturers now sought "stability and communication in their relationships
with the major food retailers, relationships in which they could develop effective and
profitable strategies for anticipating and responding to retailer demand" (Wrigley 1993:46).
However, the most notable change was that marketing to the retailer had become the key to
success for many manufacturers (Segal-Horn and McGee 1989; Davies 1991).
The nature of retail competition in the grocery sector continued to change throughout the
1980's as increasing concentration resulted in even greater importnce of economies of scale
(Dawson and Shaw 1989; Shaw et alI994). Greater sales volumes through more widely
dispersed outlets promoted the use of technology, facilitating the centralisation of control
within multiple retail operations. Centralised buying practices were adopted to maximise
leverage in negotiations with manufacturers. Retail investments were made in new central
distribution systems providing additional volume-related efficiency gains and increasing the
pool of potential own brand suppliers (Burt 1992). The increase in the absolute size of the
larger multiple operations together with more sophisticated consumer demand encouraged
and, indeed in many cases, necessitated that greater emphasis be placed on global sourcing,
further increasing inter-manufacturer competition.
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4.2.3 Product Differentiation and Own Brands
The shift in consumers' concerns from product pricing to basket pricing had the impact of
repositioning the locus of product competition from the market-place to retailer-controlled
shelf with subsequent implications for vertical relationships. However, the basis for
substituting store loyalty for product loyalty was not price alone. Davies et al (1985) argue
that the nature of competition changed durng the early 1980's with the emergence of the retail
brand supported by growing levels of advertising by the major multiples. A shift in
advertising expenditures had commenced during the 1970's (Fulop 1983; Grant 1987; Segal-
Horne and McGee 1989). While grocers' advertising was increasing in real terms,
manufacturers' below the line expenditure was assuming a greater share of total manufacturer
promotional spend (WaIters 1980). Advertising allowances, bonuses, over-riders and trade
deals represented some of the means whereby retailers appropriated manufacturers'
promotional spend (Fulop 1988). Grocers' advertising increased almost six-fold over the
1972-1981 period, while that of manufacturers had merely doubled (Alexander 1988; Fulop
1988). In 1980, 10 of the top 20 advertisers in the UK were retailers (McGoldrick 1984).
Fulop (1983) noted that retailers were becoming more sophisticated with three distinct types
of advertising emerging. These were price focused, own brand product focused and variety
focused. Also, new advertising objectives were evolving whereby "some food retailers seek
to reinforce the distinctive character of the particular retail firm as perceived by shoppers"
(Fulop 1983:370). Consequently, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the increasing
importance of price as a result of the economic crises of the early 1970's and the support of
growing retailer brand advertising, provided the platform for the future strength of own brand
products and generic labels (Alexander 1988; Davies et al 1985; McGoldrick 1984).
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The significance of branding and consumer franchise is highlighted by Steiner (1984). He
argues that "the most importnt adversarial fuctions concern the provision of product-specific
information and brand reassurance - whether it is the manufacturer's or the retailer's reputation
that counts with the consumer...to the parties that control these functions goes the market
power and the monopoly profits"(Steiner 1984:200). Porter (1974) had followed similar
thoughts. He argued that the retailer's contribution to product differentiation is not fully
appreciated but can be considered as "the influence he exerts on the purchase decision of the
consumer" (Porter 1974:220). The potential sources of retailer influence on the purchase
decision are broad and may emanate, for example, from the retailer's reputation for quality,
the store ambience amongst other retail controlled variables. Recent work highlights the
relationship between retailers' organisation of shelf displays and the impact on manufacturer
brand equity (Buchanan et al 1999). The aggregate return from the differentiation process is
a function of the effectiveness of differentiation at both the manufacturing and retailing stages
in the channel (Segal-Horne and McGee 1989). However, as "the retailer's influence on
product differentiation increases, the bargaining power of the retail stage vis-à-vis the
manufacturer increases" (Porter 1974:421).
The strategic opportnities presented by the grOWIng retail contribution to product
differentiation were slowly embraced through the development of own brands. In addition to
providing a point of differentiation among retailers, own brand products established an
additional source of increased retailer bargaining power. As store loyalty increases relative
to manufacturer brand loyalty, own brands may be more easily substituted for manufacturers'
branded products (Galizzi et al1997; Dawson and Shaw 1989b). Also, retailers can switch
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suppliers more easily as the manufacturer is no longer identifiable at consumer level (Dawson
and Shaw 1989b).
Davies (1992) suggests, in a useful discussion of the ways in which retailers can be brands,
that there are two potential aspects of the retail brand. These are retail product brand and
process brand. The contribution made by own brand products in positioning the retail brand
is also stressed by Leahy (1994). The successful retail product brand has at least five
attributes (Davies 1992:32);
. it is differentiated from other brands;
. there is suffcient retail control to guarantee quality;
. sells at a premium to other products;
. product name is capable of beneficial transfer to other products/services;
. and that the purchase enhances the self image of customers.
However, the evolution of own brands, to a stage where they represented true brands in their
own right, was a relatively slow and cautious affair. Initially, own brands were introduced to
provide a cheaper, value for money alternative to manufacturer brands (Leahy 1987; 1994).
While own label had existed in the UK market in some form for many years, its appears that
Tesco's "Operation Checkout" in 1977 was a critical juncture. The immediate effect of this
price war was to reduce the price of branded products and own brand products' share of sales
(Burt 1992). However, the promotion severely reduced margins on branded lines enhancing
the position of own branded products as a substantial contributor to profits. Also, intense
inter-retailer competition and reduced retailer margins on branded products placed ever-
increasing demands on manufacturers' advertising budgets which were being reallocated to
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trade promotion. The consequence was reduced support for secondary and tertiary brands
(Davies et al 1985; de Chernatony 1989). The necessity of maintaining consistent advertising
to develop successful brands is highlighted by de Chernatony (1989a). However, reductions
in advertising expenditures suggest a polarisation within manufacturers' brand portfolios with
some well supported brands that would continue to flourish but others which, devoid of
consumer franchise, would ultimately give way to own brand products.
Over time, the relationship between own brand quality and consumers' patronage decision was
realised, resulting in concerted efforts to reposition own brand products by focusing on their
intrinsic branding potential (de Chernatony 1989; Leahy 1987; 1994; Burt 1992; Burt and
Davis 1998). Grocers' growing awareness of the relationship between their image and
customer loyalty, resulted in continuing advertising support throughout the 1990's to build
their own brands and enhance their image (Fernie and Pierrel 1996).
Shaw et al (1992) argue that the evolution of the retail brand and the successful positioning
of these brands by major UK retailers had substantial implications for supplier relations.
Retailers wil seek manufacturers who are capable of producing products congruent with the
positioning and specification of the retail brand (Hughes 1996). Retail buyers wil seek the
bundle of product attributes, composed of taste, quality, consistency, packaging and design
amongst others, which fit the their market positioning, because "retailers develop a total
market rather than individual brand markets...market planning becomes their responsibility"
(Shaw et al 1992:132). This has two important implications. First, it requires greater retail
control of processes formerly considered the remit of manufacturers. Second, the motivation
for retailer involvement and control increases with the quality positioning of own brand
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products (Davies 1992). Variations in product quality risk undermining the brand's
positioning and the horizontal competitiveness of the retailer.
The development and repositioning of own brand caused a substantial redistribution of
marketing functions throughout the marketing channel with retailers becoming more active
participants. Howe (1990:24) proposes that manufacturers' "almost exclusive power over
product design and development, advertising, physical distribution, distributor stocking and
display, retail price setting and distributor's trading margin has been either reduced or
abolished". This is supported by Segal-Horn and McGee (1989) who argue that retailers have
taken over many of the functions formerly carried out by suppliers, including pricing,
advertising, branding, physical distribution, and new product design and development. The
extent to which retailers have seized the strategic initiative is attested to by Shaw et aI's
(1992) finding that 87% of retail brand new product development initiatives were instigated
by the retail buyer rather than the supplying firm. The implication for manufacturers is that,
as a consequence, retailer branding and innovation have been established in the food market
and the role of brand guarantor has shifted from manufacturer to retailer (Segal-Horn and
McGee 1989).
The adversarial position between retailers and manufacturers is intensified as retailers attempt
to achieve economies of scope and extend their own brands into new product categories
competing directly with branded substitutes and indirectly through greater pressure on
available space. Manufacturers' "muscle" on the other hand is dependent on its product's
appeal to the customer (Davies 1995: 14). Where economies of scale are important, the
dilemma facing branded manufacturers is whether or not to embark upon a dual branding
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strategy as the share of own brand products increase. Such a strategy has considerable
attendant risks. First, the decision of branded manufacturers to produce own brand products
may result in the diffusion of operational details such as costs and specifications to the retailer.
Second, the growing wilingness of manufacturers to enter own brand markets would be
expected to raise the level of horizontal price competition with existing producers, initially
resulting in reductions in own brand prices and subsequently branded premia. Third,
consumer awareness of the dual branding strategy may result in an "early commoditisation"
of a category. These factors serve to increase retailer power within their relationships with
manufacturers (Galizzi et al 1997).
Steiner (1984) proposes that the market power of a manufacturer or a retailer is a joint
function of its horizontal position relative to firms at the same stage and its vertical bargaining
leverage against firms in the downstream or upstream stage. This has two implications. First,
increasing retail concentration enhances retailer power by increasing the importance of
individual retail accounts. As retail concentration increases, the effect of brand switching has
a greater impact on production costs particularly when manufacturers are subject to economies
of scale. Increasing retail concentration enhanced retailer power by increasing their ability
to deny manufacturers access to the shelf with adverse consequences for costs and horizontal
competitiveness (Davies et al 1985:9). Second, the means whereby retailers can appropriate
additional power is to force manufacturers into more vigorous horizontal competition. The
development of own brand, by availing of excess capacity in manufacturing and increasing
competition on the shelf, intensified inter-manufacturer competition. Nevertheless,Ogbanna
and Wilkinson (1996) argue that retailers' continued dependence on manufacturers' brands,
at least in some sectors, limits retailers' exertion of direct control. However, "as concentration
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increases further, and as own label goods come to dominate more and more grocery sectors,
more direct retailer influence over manufacturers' operations cannot be ruled out" (Ogbanna
and Wilkinson 1998: 82).
For reasons already outlined, manufacturers have traditionally been reticent about own brand
production. Galizzi et al (1997) suggest that early in the development of own brands, large
branded manufacturers could avoid a dual branding strategy and resist retailers' attempts to
coerce them into own brand production. Initially, own brands were produced by small
manufacturers. Retailers' preferences for small firms, technology permitting, was also found
by Omar (1995). However, as the quality (and substitutability for the branded alternatives)
and market volumes of own brand increases, branded manufacturers find themselves in a
prisoner's dilemma. While there is stil an incentive among the branded manufacturers to
refrain from producing own brand, the incentive to cheat, that is to produce own brand,
increases as own brand share increases. This represents a further diminution of manufacturer
power. However, where manufacturer concentration is high, greater opportnity for unspoken
agreements among food manufacturers to refuse own brand production exists (Ogbanna and
Wilkinson 1998).
4.2.4 Structural Change and the Balance of Power
The argument so far suggests that structural features on both the input and output side wil
influence a given agent's power within the channeL. Consequently, one would expect that
variations in strctural features would result in variations in the extent of retailer power across
industries. Burns and Henson (1995) point out that within buyer-seller exchange,
concentration alone is not sufficient to generate bargaining power and that other market and
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competitive elements need to be considered. Manufacturer concentration does not in itself
increase manufacturer power in that certain industres, such as bread, are subject to high fixed
costs and large minimum effcient scales, requiring large shares of the market to maintain
volumes and cost competitiveness (Burns and Henson 1995).
Bowlby and Foord (1995:334) recognise that "retailer or manufacturer power is determined
not only by the internal organisation and resources of the firms involved but also by the
features of the particular product market and industry under consideration". Factors such as
excess capacity, industry technology and the significance of both fixed and sunk costs, the
degree of product differentiation, own label shares, barriers to own brand, and the ease of
switching suppliers wil all partly explain bargaining power. Davies (1994) and Porter (1974)
both argue that retailers have to stock products with strong brand franchise but may be more
fickle with secondary and tertiary lines. Segal-Horne and Mc Gee (1989) argue that high
advertising intensity and strongly differentiated products have prevented retailer power
growing at the same rate across all industries. Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1996) support this,
arguing that manufacturers continue to dominate certin market segments suggesting a balance
of power. These structural features beyond relative concentration wil influence bargaining
power manifested in the terms, both price and non-price, obtained by retailers.
Dawson and Shaw's (1989; 1989b) central hypothesis is that vertical relations are managed
to maximise horizontal competitiveness. They argue that "the extent to which the
management of vertical relationships takes place wil vary with product and may even vary
within a particular product range depending on the relative importance" (Dawson and Shaw
1989:68). The growing importance of the retail brand as a source of competitive advantage,
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together with increasing retail concentration and competitive supply conditions, enabled
retailers to demand competitive prices in addition to other elements in the marketing mix.
Changing cost structures necessitated that retailers place more demanding conditions on their
suppliers while differences in the extent of vertical competition provided the leverage to
impose these new conditions on suppliers.
4.3 Variations in Firm and Product Characteristics
At this stage, it is appropriate to investigate the second set of characteristics. These are
concerned with variations in firm characteristics, both retailer and manufacturer, and product
characteristics. They include the importance of the product to the retailer's market position,
manufacturer innovation, brand franchise, the retailer's control of the supply chain, and the
retailer's strategic use of own brand and its supporting monitoring activities. It shall be shown
that manufacturers may experience considerable variations in the nature of transactions across
different trading accounts. Much of this variation wil depend on retail characteristics which
determine complexity both in production and delivery, the level of monitoring and the use of
new supporting technologies. Product characteristics also vary, for example short shelf-life
versus long shelf-life products. It is proposed that these features may be expected to influence
the balance of power within trading relationships.
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4.3.1 Product Characteristics
The role of product characteristics, as a determinant of interaction strategies between buyers
and sellers, is highlighted by Campbell (1985) in his review of the industrial purchasing
process. He proposes that the product characteristics, frequency of purchase, product
complexity and switching costs all influence interaction strategies employed by trading
partners. Further support is provided by Migchels (1996:244), who argues that "the
architecture of the food chain and the nature of the relations within it will to some extent
depend on the product that is involved".
Not all products are of equal value to the retailer. Some highly branded products wil fall into
a must-stock category, while more retailer discretion is allowed where loyalty to the store
exceeds the product franchise (Porter 1974). Some products and the nature of the vertical
supply conditions provide retailers with greater opportnity for horizontal differentiation than
others (Hobbs 1995). There is also considerable evidence that individual products and
categories make differential contributions to overall store image (Knox and White 1990).
Consequently, the importance of these products to the retailer and the distribution of power
will vary accordingly.
4.3.2 Manufacturer Innovation and Brand Franchise
The strength of the manufacturer's brand franchise has been identified as one of the critical
determinants of the choice of a supplier by a retailer (McGoldrick and Douglas 1983). The
role of brand franchise also emerges as one of the primary sources of manufacturer
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countervailing power. Dawson and Shaw (1989) argue that strongly supported manufacturer
brands impose stability within relationships. The retailer needs to stock these products if
market share is to be maintained and "control over major if not all elements of the marketing
mix is likely to be in the hands ofthe manufacturer" (Dawson and Shaw 1989:67). Ogbanna
and Wilkinson (1998) found that a balance of power of sorts existed between large branded
manufacturers and retailers. Retailers were unable to dictate prices and had very litte
information on the manufacturers' cost structures. The apparent basis for the countervailng
power lay in the retailer's dependence on manufacturers' brand franchise. Hogarth-Scott and
Parkinson (1993a) also found that the relationship between strong branded manufacturers and
a large UK retailer displayed a more symmetric balance of power.
Bandyopadhyay and Divakar (1999) argue that one of manufacturers' key resources is brand
equity based on history, marketing skils and knowledge yet unavailable to retailers. They
argue that strong brands generate primary demand and, in doing so, increase category sales.
Thus, they propose a hybrid strategy between retailers and manufacturers, suggesting a more
symmetric distribution of power. Under these circumstances, retail selected strong brands
would be allowed to pursue independent brand management strategies enhancing product
profitability while retailers pursue category management strategies improving category
profitabilty.
The importance of speed of access to the shelf wil vary for some manufacturers. From a
manufacturer's perspective, rapid access to the shelf may be necessary in product categories
characterised by very short product cycles and rapid rates of product imitation. In this respect,
the product and product category's market characteristics would be expected to have a bearing
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on the balance of power within these relationships. Pellegrini and Zanderighi (1991) argue
that differentiated relationships in transactions are to be seen in the acceptance of new
products. Retailers are more likely to instigate new product development with their own brand
suppliers where the benefits of such collaboration is likely to be dedicated to the participating
retailer alone. This is likely to suit the manufacturer, as products developed under these
circumstances are more likely to meet the retailer's requirements and obtain shelf space. As
Burt and Davis (1998) point out, retailers have a propensity to allocate a disproportionate
amount of space to own brands when compared to manufacturer brands.
However, when branded manufacturers engage in new product development, the likelihood
is quite different. An additional source of retailers' power is located in the fact that "when a
manufacturer launches a new product brand, loyalty is still to be gained. In the consumer's
store selection, the availability of that product does not play a role. The retailers'
discretionary power is at its highest. For most new products, which are not very innovative,
manufacturers can only count on the goodwil established on other products in their portfolio...
or...pressure they can exert on retailers on the basis of an implicit all or nothing proposition"
(Pellegrini and Zanderighi 1991: 164). While advertising support clearly increases the
probability of success, we continue to witness falling advertising intensities due to retailers'
requirements for "additional and specific disbursements" to entice retailers to stock new
products (Pellegrini and Zanderighi 1991: 160). The necessity of providing additional
advertising allowances when introducing new products is also supported by Fulop (1988).
This results in a certain asymmetry4 in the power balance between own brand suppliers,
4 It is clear that branded manufacturers with new products face the risk of hold-ups by retailers. By
theatening to delay access to the shelf, the retailer in effect theatens to reduce the manufacturer's return
on the NPD activity. Thus, the retailer has access to these rents. In the case of the own brand product,
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known branded manufacturers and less well known smaller suppliers. Hogarth-Scott and
Parkinson (1993a) found support for this asymmetry. Small firms perceived themselves to
have no power and could be dropped easily by the retailer. Their strategy to remain on the
shelf was to rely on innovation and sought to produce products that added value and that were
in some way unique.
Davies (1994) argues that the success of a retailer-supplier relationship is strongly influenced
by the retailer's perception of the relationship as either co-operative or business-like and
whether or not there was frequent communication. He proposes that the relationship between
the parties may be thought of as a number of bonds, the importance of which wil depend on
product characteristics. These bonds are given as the commercial transaction, interpersonal
exchange, information exchange and trade marketing support. The commercial transaction
assumes particular importance when the product is branded and has a strong consumer
franchise. Other bonds come into play when the retailer is not dependent on the supplier's
brand.
4.3.3 Retail Characteristics
One of the key retail characteristics that has displayed dramatic change in recent years has
been the application of information technology (IT). Introduced initially to exploit potential
reductions in operating costs concomitant with improved service to stores, LT. increased the
centralisation of retail decision-making with important implications for retail buying power
and the nature of retailer-manufacturer relationships (Smith and Sparks 1993; Hogarth-Scott
joint investments by both the retailer and the manufacturer reduce these risks.
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and Parkinson 1993). Electronic point of sale technology (EPOS) was rapidly adopted by UK
retailers, increasing from 382 outlets in 1986 to 4,864 outlets. This amounted to 82% of
grocery sales by 1994 (Nielsen 1996). Access to EPOS generated information gave retailers
a much more accurate reflection of product performance providing them with the
"ammunition to drive for more responsiveness from their suppliers" (Lynch 1990: 163).
Enhanced control of shelf space was largely as a result of the introduction of scanning
technology and the development of advanced space planning softare. The availability ofthis
new source of information has enabled retailers to understand their customers better and gain
greater power over their manufacturers (Bandyopadhyay and Divakar 1999). Indeed, the
combination of own brand and more strategic use of EPOS data promoted retailer power as
"the provision of selective information enables retailers to influence manufacturer's
production and promotional activity" (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1996:406).
Lynch (1990) points to the growing use of technology as a contributory factor in shaping
retailer-supplier relationships. Bandyopadhyay and Divakar (1999) argue that the shift in
relations between retailers and manufacturers from confrontation to co-operation has occurred
because of new technology, applications and information. IT plays an important role in
extending the enterprise beyond its traditional organisational boundaries facilitating new
forms of marketing and distribution channel services (Konsynski 1993). As such it offers the
potential to achieve internal and external efficiencies through the redesign of both inter and
intra-organisational relations. The development of electronic data interchange (EDI) networks
such as tradanet, provided a seamless information highway between retailers, their distrbution
centres and manufacturers, further improving the relative advantage and performance of
centralised distribution. O'Callaghan et al (1992:45), in their discussion ofEDI, point to the
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growing consensus that "computer based interorganisational systems wil have a significant
impact on the relationships between channel members". They argue that EDI reduces
transaction costs in addition to enhancing one's response to market needs. Drawing on Dwyer
and Welsh (1985), O'Callaghan et al (1992) assert that increased competition in the output
market promotes the formalisation of information processing and assists the attainment of
greater cost control.
The benefits of EDI are well documented and include faster transmission, greater accuracy
and more transaction specific information (Lambert et al 1988; Murphy and Daley 1998). As
such EDI is an enabling technology, facilitating faster response to market and customer
demands by transmitting relevant market information throughout the chain in a timely manner.
However, the pace oftechnological development has been such that Bamfield (1994) argued
that EDI has become best practice and a means, not of achieving competitive advantage, but
of avoiding competitive disadvantage. Despite this however, retailers' use of EDI differs
significantly and it is clear that the quality, quantity, frequency and usefulness of information
transmitted from retailers to their suppliers vary significantly (Collns 1997).
The nature of the data provided to suppliers promotes both supplier responsiveness to their
retail customer's needs and retailers' expected level of performance by their suppliers. The
provision of information wil also reflect both parties' commitment to the relationship to the
extent that it requires idiosyncratic investments. It may also be expected to influence the
distribution of power within the relationship by reducing information asymmetr and limiting
manufacturer opportnism.
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4.3.4 Distribution, Logistics Control and Supply Chain Transparency
From a manufacturer's perspective, retailer integration into and growing control of the
distribution function represents one of the more dramatic shifts in functions across channel
members. From a retailer's perspective, the transformation of distribution, acting as a
facilitator for increasing retail control of the supply chain, underpinned much of the recent
growth in retailer power. Hughes (1994) argues that the centralisation of distribution was a
necessary precondition to the successful repositioning of the Tesco brand during the late
1980's and early 1990's. This study takes the view that it provided the retailer with the most
effcient means of monitoring supplier performance thereby minimising the loss of
appropriable rents through shirking behaviour.
In the late 1960's multiple retailers channelled about 60% of supplies through their own
warehouses. However, during the 1970's, this figure declined due to the increase in store size,
permitting larger drop sizes to outlets and the rapid growth of Tesco and Asda who continued
to operate a direct delivery to store policy. The need for greater control of physical
distribution was highlighted by Tesco's rapid increase in market share after its successful
"Operation Checkout" (Walters 1980). The strains on Tesco's modus operandi were
enormous with market share increasing from 7.9% in May 1977 to 11.8% in July ofthat year
(Akehurst 1984).
Sparks (1994) drawing on Cooper et al (1991) traces some of the key problems that led to
retail innovation with regard to logistics. During the 1970's and 1980's, central distribution
was increasingly substituted for direct store deliveries (DSD). The main reasons for
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internalising the physical distribution function are given by McKinnon (1985:49). These are
better buying terms, minimum order restrictions, product availability, improved service levels
to outlets, stock control, reduction of inventory levels, more efficient use of space in store and
reduced labour costs through the reduction in goods handling.
Prior to the centralisation of distribution, delivery to outlets was primarily on the basis ofDSD
from manufacturers' local warehouses. This had a number of operational and strategic
implications for the retail operator. DSD constrained small manufacturers from supplying
large retailers' needs, thereby limiting the potential supplier base, inter manufacturer
competition and increased retailer dependency. Also, given limited economies of scope,
frequency of delivery was low requiring substantial stockholding at store leveL. Third, the
possibility of establishing strong customer franchise for retail brands was limited given the
lack of retail control and visibility of the supply chain. Such control was necessary to ensure
that product quality and availability reflected the desired positioning of the retail brand
(Davies 1992) while also meeting existing food safety legislation (Smith and Sparks 1993).
Greater control of product at outlet level, in terms of availability and quality, was achieved
by taking title of the product at a central depot where costs of quality assurance were spread
over greater volumes of product. Moreover, the introduction of this intermediary between the
outlets and the manufacturer increased the transparency of the supply chain and assisted the
development, collection and dissemination of supplier performance measures by reducing the
number of direct contact points. Current performance measures used by the main multiple
retailers vary but include delivery accuracy, quality, arrval time, vehicle turnaround time and
invoice matching (Christopher et al 1993; IGD 1995; Collins et al 2000)
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This strategic shift in retail activities was encouraged by a number of factors in addition to
those mentioned earlier. First, data captured at store level by EPOS promised a new source
of competitive advantage. The development of sales based ordering (SBO) systems became
more feasible with the availability of faster computer processors and more effcient data
storage systems. Control of the distribution function enabled retailers to harness this
advantage, developing stock control and inventory planning systems operating on a seamless
interface between the retail outlet and stock location. In this regard, it is noteworthy that most
of the larger British multiple retailers have developed much of their own system requirements
in-house (IGD 1995) thereby retaining the benefits of any innovations.
The retail benefits resulting from the integration of sales based ordering (SBO), inventory
planning and stock control systems were expected to be considerable (Soars and Wolvern
1995). The move towards just in time delivery, facilitated by EDI, reduces stockholding costs
in addition to freeing up valuable sales space which had formerly been allocated to storage
(Sparks 1994). The general principle underlying recent developments in the grocery supply
chain is to achieve greater alignent between customer demand, store demand, depot demand
and ultimately production, thereby reducing the amount of stock and capital tied up
throughout the system. Nevertheless, the means by which retailers are organising their
respective supply chains vary. Some retailers have experimented with vendor managed
inventory. Others provide suppliers with regularly updated forecasts and draw-offs by depot
by day. Finally one particular retailer is intent on establishing consolidation5 centres with the
aim of achieving complete inventory visibility throughout the supply chain. The
5 For the encouragement of non-retail dedicated consolidation centres see Collns (1997). These are
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consequences for manufacturers are similar to some extent, requiring substantial reductions
in order quantities, order lead times and increased frequency of delivery. Nevertheless, one
would expect that the balance of power within such trading arrangements vary considerably.
The second implication of increased transparency is identification of product specific costs.
Over recent years, the introduction of new costing systems such as direct product profitability
(Soars 1994) uncovered many of the hidden product costs associated with the provision of a
product for sale. Initially, the focus of these new systems was restricted to that part of the
supply chain under the direct control of the retailer. Costs within this component of the chain
were identified and internal operational changes were made to adopt best practice procedures
reduced through the use of fiat. Such efficiencies were relatively easily achieved as the level
of inter-firm interdependency and co-operation required to implement them was low.
However, as this component of the chain became more effcient, further comparable cost
reductions were dependent on greater co-operation or power among retailers and their
suppliers.
Indeed, the identification of potential cost reductions itself becomes dependent on greater
awareness of one's partners' modus operandi. Historically, retail suppliers have been paid on
delivered-price as against an ex-factory price. This precluded retail involvement in many
supplier activities. Retailers were concerned only with production and availability capabilities
of their supplier base. However we currently witness greater retail attempts to take a "supplier
to shelf' approach to managing the supply chain (Collins 1997). The forms this approach
takes vary across product categories and particular supplier characteristics. Certin suppliers,
expected to achieve inventory effciencies following Buck1in's (1965) principle of postponement.
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and own brand suppliers in particular, operate on an open book basis where there is complete
transparency in terms of input costs, production effciency and ancilary costs associated with
a particular retail account. Such transparency is of considerable advantage in identifying and
removing costs from retailer specific supply chains and is clearly supported by a number of
retailers. Brookes (1995) comments that retailers expect to investigate their suppliers' cost
structures and are likely to suggest means of cost savings which are then appropriated. In
many instances, one witnesses retailers bringing their size to bear on their suppliers input
costs. Examples include retailers negotiating costs for transportation and distrbution services,
primal meat (these are meat cuts before final processing for consumer packs) and poultry
(Collns 1997).
Brookes (1995: 149) argues that supermarkets "now have the greater strategic marketing
expertise and merchandising programmes, the information technologies and systems, and the
internationally directed buying structures and logistics networks to influence the behaviour
of suppliers". The theme here is that growing control of logistics is extending back from
retailers' operations into their respective supplier bases. Initially, the positioning of retail
controlled intermediaries, such as regional distribution centres, between the retail outlet and
the supplier enhanced retailers' view of the supply chain and promoted the development of
more stringent supplier performance criteria. Currently, one witnesses various retail attempts
to identify and achieve further cost effciencies. Some of these effciencies currently lie
outside retailers' immediate control while others, because of the nature of relations between
partners, do not.
Fearne (1996) found that supplier rationalisation is part of retailers' agendas to improve cost
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effciency within the supply chain. However, it does beg the question as to whether or not
retailers, in reducing the number of suppliers, wil reduce their ability to appropriate the cost
effciencies achieved. Wilson (1996:270), in her review of the vegetable market across
Europe, suggests "that the power of individual retailers in each country is arguably an
indication of the supply chain management practices advocated". In other words, the balance
of power is reflected in the extent to which barriers between each stage in the supply chain
have been broken down to achieve savings and cost effciencies.
4.3.5 Retail Characteristics and Switching Costs
The discussion earlier pointed to the increasing scale of retail operations and the growing
influence of cost economies (Dawson and Shaw 1989). Larger-scale retail activity increased
the capital costs of market entry, which in turn resulted in a greater proportion of fixed to
variable costs. This redistribution of costs increase the opportnity cost of a stockout, to the
extent that it would have made a contribution to fixed costs. Also, the redistribution exposes
the retailer to greater risks of shifts in demand, as the higher proportion of fixed costs
necessitate operating at higher levels of capacity. The problem of fixed costs is compounded
by the nature of retail investments. Davies et al (1985) point to the increased capital
investments made by retailers in out of town sites, highlighting the sunk and irrecoverable
nature of many of these costs given their low alternative use values. This was to become an
even greater problem during the late 1980's and early 1990's due to premium pricing of
grocery retail locations over this period (Wrigley 1992; 1996).
This exposure to potential shifts in demand and the importance of contributions towards fixed
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costs resulted in more stringent demands on suppliers in terms of delivery conditions to
minimise the probability of lost sales and maintain or enhance the retailer's horizontal
competitiveness. The stringency of these demands contributed to relationship stability by
providing the manufacturer with first mover advantages. The source of these advantages
included the initial learning costs during relationship formation and the potential risks of new-
supplier failure faced by the retailer.
Steiner (1984) stresses the existence of both competitive and complementary elements within
retailer-supplier relationships. This is clearly evident with regard to own brand. Leahy (1987)
identifies six principal advantages of own brand. These are the ability to control products and
ranges, participation in innovation rather than imitation, establishment of brand loyalty, and
improvements in market planning and profit. The desired positioning of the retailer as the
brand (Shaw et al 1992; Burt 1992) had substantial implications for the product assortment
decision as own brand products were to play a major role in the positioning the of retail brand.
The retail brand is in part determined by supplier participation with subsequent implications
for retailer-manufacturer relations. Dawson and Shaw (1989b) argue that strong central
organisation enabled retailers to play a greater role in developing the product assortment,
particularly through own brand.
Own brand as a means of achieving competitive advantage is promoted through vertical
linkages with suppliers, which enables retailers develop their own unique proposition
(Wileman and Jary 1997) through the provision of product that is consistent, safe, and
achieves the required quality standards (Palmer 1996). Shaw (1994) posits that more
sophisticated consumer demands in terms of quality, consistency and availability require that
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retailers develop certain tyes of relationships with suppliers to ensure that they maintain their
competitive strengths. Shortening product life-cycles necessitates that, to maintain horizontal
competitiveness, retailers respond rapidly to changing consumer tastes identified through
retail controlled information. In the dynamic market, retailers frequently rely on their
suppliers' specialised competencies, business practices, awareness of technological advances
and innovations to develop own brand products (Doel1996, Sayer and Walker 1992).
Some of the implications of the greater strategic use of own brands for retailer manufacturer
relationships may be identified in table 4.1. It proposes that the nature of the relationship
between the retailer and the manufacturer evolves as the strategic use of own brand increases
and the products' objectives become more image and loyalty focused. While the table
suggests an evolutionary perspective, this is not the case. Greater segmentation by retailers
has ensured that different own brand variants may co-exist, meeting different marketing
objectives. The impact on the supplier base may also vary. It is possible that a given supplier
produces a number of variants for a given retailer. Alternatively, different suppliers may be
used to produce different generations.
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Table 4.1
The Strategic Use of Own Brands
1 sI Generation 2nd Generation 3cd Generation 41h Generation
Type of Brand Generic Quasi brand Own brand Extended own brand
No name Own label - segmented own
Brand free brand
Unbranded
Strategy Generics Cheapest price Me-too Value Added
Objective Increase margin Increase margin Enhance category Increase and retain
Choice in price Reduce margins customer base
manufacturer power Extend product Enhance category
by setting entry range margins
price Build retailer's Improve image
Provide better value image Differentiation
product
Product Basic Staples with large Big category Image forming
volumes products product groups
Niche products
Technology Simple production Technology stil Close to brand Innovative
processes and basic lagging behind leader technology
technology lagging market leader
behind market leader
Quality/Image Lower quality and Medium quality but Comparable to Same or better than
inferior image w.r.t. perceived to be brand leaders brand leader
manufacturers' brands lower than leading Inno,:ative
brands technology
Examples Tesco Value Lines Standard Own Subbrands Tesco Finest
Label Sainsbury Novon M&S Connoisseur
Monitoring Low Low/Medium Medium/igh High
Costs
Specific None Low Medium High
Investments
Mode of Market Market Market!e1ational Relational
Governance contracting contracting
Source: Rows 1-6 adapted from Laaksonen (1994)
Hughes (1996), agreeing with Doel (1996), argues that there are two polar modes of own label
supplier initiation. The first is where there is excess capacity, usually in plants belonging to
weak national brand manufacturers. The second is where the retailer actively seeks and
stimulates the emergence of an entirely new supplier base to develop new own brand products.
This latter mode "epitomises the changing dynamics and shifting balance of power within the
food channel" (Doel 1996:55). Under these circumstances, the retailer may demand product
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exclusivity "because of the time and commitment that we spend with our suppliers, it would
be very unfair if that product were to be given elsewhere" (Doel 1996:61). Thus, as the
strategic role of own brand varies among retailers, and the product portfolio varies among
suppliers, the extent of monitoring activities, specific investments and the relationship with
suppliers are likely to differ.
Stability within these relationships enhances the probability that "retail needs for specific
quality, consistent offerings and timely delivery are most likely to be met by partners familiar
with the trading methods and requirements of the retailer" Shaw (1994:394). Stability within
relationships is increased by the perceived high costs of switching suppliers (Dawson and
Shaw 1989). One component of these switching costs is the high implementation investments
made by both parties. Sunk costs, particularly those on the retailer's side in terms of brand
image, may be expected to influence the level of stability. Variations in product quality risk
the devaluation of the brand and must, therefore, be safeguarded by engaging in monitoring
activities. Other factors positively related to switching costs include, delivery conditions,
ordering patterns, importance of the product to the retailer, the need for joint development
work, the need for supplier flexibility and concentration in the supplying industry.
Switching costs were increased further with the introduction of the British Food Safety Act
(Hobbs and Kerr 1992), by demanding proof of due dilgence by all agents in the food
industry. The new legislation represented a substantial "shock" to retailer-supplier relations.
Under the new Act "to defend themselves, buyers must now show that they have exercised due
diligence - been pro active - in ensuring that not only the food they handle directly but also the
food they receive from suppliers conforms to the provisions of the Act" (Hobbs and Kerr
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1992:577). From a retailer's perspective, this involves incurng costs in monitoring supplier
performance. More importntly, it changes much oftheir existing relationships with suppliers.
Hobbs and Kerr (1992) argue that under this new legislation new relationships would be
expected to emerge as both parties to a transaction establish new forms of vertical relations
to minimise "their joint cost risk". The investments in these new relations are idiosyncratic
by nature and increase the costs of switching suppliers, thereby promoting stability.
UK multiple retailers want suppliers that are capable of serving all their stores, thus raising
barriers to entry (Shaw 1994; Foord et al 1996). Dealing with fewer suppliers has cost
benefits and appears to underlie some retailers' commitment to supplier rationalisation
(Fearne 1996; Collns 1997). In their examination of the horticultural market, Knox and
White (1990) argue that structural change in the retail market changed both suppliers' and
retailers' trading patterns. Concentration of buying and the centralisation of distribution
imposed growing demands on retail buyers to source suppliers who could provide product of
appropriate specification and continuity of supply throughout the year. Bowlby and Foord
(1995:353) found evidence to support that "fostering long-term relationships has been
identified as a means of acquiring the accuracy, efficiency and stability they (retailers) require
for a national and increasingly international presence".
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4.4 Differentiated Relationships and Mode of Governance
Finally the review turns to the third set of characteristics. Here the concern is with variations
in the nature of the relationship between the retailer and manufacturer and the way in which
both parties have organised the working of the relationship. Segal-Horne and McGee
(1989:26) propose that "retail/supplier relations require review at a strategic and not just
structural level". Much of what has been reviewed focused on structural change and the
subsequent implications for retailer-manufactuer relations. Some consideration has also been
given to strategy pertaining to retailers' integration of the distrbution function and own brand
development. However, the portfolio of relationships that retailers and manufacturers manage
is becoming of increasing importance. Chapter two demonstrated that the brand portfolios
traded by food manufacturers vary considerably. When examining own brand variants it
became clear that the required amounts of specific investments displayed considerable
variation. Drawing on the review of the transaction cost literature one would expect this to
result in variation in the way relationships are organised and the degree of inter-firm
integration.
Davies (1994) highlights the strategic nature of the maintenance of channel relationships,
arguing that the key issue facing suppliers is which of a number of options should be used to
achieve best possible relationships. As wil become clear, there is considerable evidence to
indicate that manufacturers and retailers operate within a system of relationships of varying
intensity and subject to different governance modes. This study proposes that the power
balance within these relationships wil vary accordingly.
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4.4.1 Relationship Portfolios
The existence of manufacturers' relationship portfolios is confirmed by Knox and White
(1990) who, in their review of fresh produce suppliers, identify four tyes of retailer-supplier
relations. These are uncommitted, developing, mature and declining. A further finding was
that suppliers attempt to maintain a balanced customer portfolio to ensure maintenance of
negotiation strength and reduce dependency. As argued by Foord et al (1996:79), "the
availability of alternative suppliers or markets becomes important to the negotiating power
of both parties". A striking finding ofKnox and White's (1990) work was that not only do
manufacturers attempt to establish a balanced portfolio of suppliers but that retailers also seek
the same. Indeed, both parties appear to operate a similar strategy independently of each
other. These findings echo Anderson and Narus' (1991:99) recommendation that firms "target
market segments for various kinds of relationship efforts" thus opening up the possibility of
maintaining a portfolio of relationships. Further evidence of the existence of relationship
portfolios is provided by Fearne (1996) who provides case studies ofM&SlMack, Northern
FoodslM&S and ABP/Sainsbury. The interesting feature here was that, while all three
supplying firms dealt with the major multiples, the relationships with the mentioned retailers
were considered unique.
Shaw et al (1994) point to the continuing turbulence and substantial change in the UK retailing
environment. Changing demography, consumer mobilty and social structures have resulted
in changing consumer demand and new behavioural patterns. Product life-cycles are
becoming shorter as the speed of innovation and imitation increase, while rapid access for new
products to the consumer is becoming of growing importance. This has two implications. On
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the one hand, in restricting access to the shelf, retailers can in effect carr out hold-ups and
appropriate substantial rents on manufacturers' development activity. On the other hand, to
achieve greater levels of horizontal competitiveness via own brand products, retailers required
greater involvement in new product development with suppliers. Indeed, many large retailers
provide completed specifications, thereby removing the supplier from much of the product
innovation process completely (Dawson and Shaw 1989b). Consequently, the means by
which these manufacturers can achieve horizontal differentiation is considerably reduced. The
retailer in effect becomes the purchaser of manufacturing services.
Bowlby and Foord (1995) find support for the dominance of relational contracting between
manufacturers and retailers in the UK. They argue that not only "have retailers become more
powerful but that this has led to the prominence of relational contracting" (Bowlby and Foord
1995:340). They subsequently argue that relational contracting between parties "suggests an
increasing interdependence of parties which may diminish overt conflct but not diminish
uneven power"(Bowlby and Foord 1995: 341). A similar argument and its consequences is
put forward by Foord et al (1996:74) who propose that "what is new is its (relational
contracting) increasing dominance across the retail sector; the form in which it is negotiated;
and the implications of contemporary relational contracting for the division of the costs and
revenues of realizing surplus value between retailer and manufacturer".
It is arguable as to whether or not retailers would be wiling to sacrifice power, as greater
control of the distribution channel is likely to be desired for better execution of their
marketing strategies. Thus, we may have a system of relationships where "retailers have
locked manufacturers into a situation of co-operative dependency" (Hughes 1996: 2216) but
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where retailers "rely on the competitive position of these manufacturers to provide the means
for the growth of their own label supply chains" (Hughes 1996: 2212).
Brookes (1995) states that retailers are looking to build up long term-relationships with
suppliers. Central to these relationships is bilateral trust, which is frequently unsupported by
formal contracts. Dawson and Shaw (1989) find evidence of many retailers and suppliers
entering into long-term business arrangements. The basis for these arrangements was the
expectation that they would provide advantages to both parties. Such expectations promoted
heavy investments by both parties in the development of these relationships generating
stability. Shaw et al (1992) found that one significant benefit to manufacturers from enhanced
stability was that retailers refrained from switching suppliers for temporary pricing or other
advantages.
There is considerable evidence supporting the benefits of close collaboration between retailers
and manufacturers. Senker (1986) provides the case of Sainsbury and Poultry Packers who
together initiated the development of the frozen poultry market. Senker's case study
highlights the role of close collaboration and the stringency of product preparation and
delivery conditions due to the increased risks of product contamination. The development of
the chiled chicken market by M&S also provides evidence of retailer involvement in the
innovation process and their wilingness to invest in sunk investments. For instance, in the
development ofthis particular product M&S, acted as information broker, collecting relevant
information on a global basis and providing it to their suppliers. The breadth of retailer
expertise is highlighted in the case study ofKatie's Kitchen. In this instance, Tesco provided
the company with substantial assistance when upgrading facilities to cater for the Tesco
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account during the early 1980's. The technical advice was broad, covering issues fom
hygiene, machinery, packaging to new product development.
The need to achieve supply chain effciencies also promoted new governance modes between
retailers and their suppliers. Gilbert et al (1994) argue that just in time philosophy requires
a partnership between manufacturer and supplier based on a long-term orientation with
frequent communication. Hall (1995), suggests that increasing demands by customers,
governent, shareholders and competitors require more rapid and co-ordinated responses by
retailers and their suppliers to avoid the costs of duplication, fragmentation and confusion.
The drivers for change include customer expectations in terms of quality, availability, variety
and value. Shareholder demands are putting greater pressure to remove costs. Legislation is
constraining areas for growth, while the potential to exploit new technologies demands greater
inter-company integration. Supply chains wil have to become more customer focused,
responsive in terms of shorter lead times and frequency of delivery, lean in terms of stripping
out non value adding activities, and "integrated with retailers and suppliers sharing
information, systems people and physical resources to ensure maximum performance" (Hall
1995:5). Whiteoak (1996) highlights the prerequisites for continuous replenishments. The
need for shorter lead times, daily reviews, scheduled deliveries and consistency in terms of
reliability wil require further learning on the part of both retailers and their suppliers.
Brookes (1995) supports this view and makes the point that future performance gains wil
result from the use of information resources that exist at one level of the overall value chain
being used to improve performance at another.
Shaw (1994) highlights the growing importance placed by retailers on the management of the
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vertical linkages between manufacturers and their suppliers. . As discussed, some of the
interest is due to legislative requirements and the Food Safety Act, that resulted in retailers
being more demanding of their suppliers (Palmer 1996; Hobbs and Kerr 1992). The
relationship between supplier role performance, retailers' performance and product
characteristics was also highlighted by Knox and White (1990) who found strong evidence
to suggest an interrelationship between product characteristics and retailer-supplier
relationships. Supply problems in fresh foods quickly impact on store performance. Retail
buyers are therefore more critical and demanding of these suppliers with subsequent
implications for the level of specific investments and relationship stability. The stringency
of retail standards is stressed by Brookes (1995:155) who proposes that "retailers may appear
to be overly zealous when monitoring their suppliers' standards such as quality, temperature
or other agreed technical specifications". However much of this stringency was due to
retailers' emphasis on branding their stores. The cost of product failure, particularly own
brand, increased dramatically as retailers now assumed the role of brand guarantor.
Vertical linkages also met retailers' need to be involved in the innovation process enhancing
their ability to respond quickly to changing market demands and achieve greater levels of
horizontal differentiation. According to Bowlby and Foord (1995), relational contracting
enabled retailers gain greater control of production processes, product characteristics and
price. Fearne (1996) argues that strategic allances represent a cheaper, more flexible and less
risky means of maintaining growth in a food industry characterised by the need for greater
market responsiveness to a transient consumer. This need for integration is the driving force
for joint development work with suppliers. However, an important aspect of the integration
process is the selection of appropriate suppliers. Here "the distinction between predominately
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own label or predominately brand suppliers is important, as conflicting retail pressures make
radical change with a brand supplier more diffcult" (Hall 1995).
New forms of retailer-manufacturer relations are expected to emerge from the emphasis on
effcient consumer response (ECR). ECR promotes an integrated supply chain response to
consumer requirements to achieve increasing levels of efficiency and customer value. Central
to the ethos of ECR is that of co-ordinated activity among channel partners and the removal
of non value adding or duplicated activities within the supply chain (Viner 1996). Indeed, the
identification of duplication and cost saving opportnities across the boundaries of firms
requires a degree of openness among channel partners that cannot be automatically presumed.
The salient dimensions where ECR expects to yield enhanced performance are new product
introductions, product promotions, store assortments and product replenishment. A review
of recent changes in the UK supply chain suggests that considerable strides have been made
in the area of product replenishment.
While ECR is an industry initiative and seeks to promote best practice at industry level,
category management operates within individual trading relationships (Harris et al 1999).
Thus, category management may be viewed as trading partners' strategic response to the
effciency and market opportnities highlighted initially by the ECR framework. The
relationship between category management and ECR is represented in figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2
The Relationship between Category Management and ECR.
Sources of
Effciencies and Market
Opportunities
Retailer Resources
",
~
=
~
"'
=
~
",
ã:Ži.
~
e
=
",
=
o
U
Promotions
Category
Management
Process
Replenishment
Assortments
Introductions
Supplier Resources I
Many have argued that category management wil add impetus to the evolution of retailer-
manufacturer relationships (Barnes at al 1995; Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran 1996; 1997;
McGrath 1997; Collins 1999a). Category management is viewed as a process "by which
retailers and their suppliers jointly develop strategic category plans" (Barnes et al 1995:8).
Underlying the concept is the notion of differential resources and core competencies.
Retailers are finding it increasingly difficult to develop markets and profitability given the
restrictions of their own resources, while manufacturers cannot achieve further growth within
a framework of confrontational relations. Frequently retail and manufacturer strategies are
not aligned, with the result that scarce resources are expended without generating additional
consumer value. Category management is seen as providing a framework wherein both
retailers' and manufacturers' resources can be effectively co-ordinated (Collns 1999a).
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Central to the successful implementation of the category management process is
communication, both internally in the respective retailer and manufacturing firms and
externally across the participating companies. Furthermore, awareness of interdependence,
a long-term orientation, trust and commitment were identified as essential prerequisites for
close relationship formation as the category management process involved a bilateral shifting
of resources. "Retailers were keen to utilise suppliers' resources and were positive towards
those who allocated additional resources to move a category forward" (Barnes et al 1995:35).
The resources of particular interest to retailers were marketing knowledge, packaging design,
consumer research and merchandising experience. Supplier expectations were firstly,
improved relationships through a greater understanding of the retailer's business and
objectives and secondly, access to retailer held data and information on consumer purchasing
behaviour.
Underlying category management is the central idea of a hierarchy of suppliers where
category captains or "preferred suppliers" work closest with the retailer (McGrath 1997). A
precondition and determinant of the level of collaboration is the supplier's endowment of
resources. This was confirmed by Bowlby and Foord (1995) who found evidence that
relational contracting discriminated against small suppliers. Furthermore, the understanding
of collaboration under category management must be tempered as "suppliers wil only be
termed category captains if they are wiling to take decisions which may adversely affect their
business in the short run, should it be required" (Barnes at al 1995:40). This wilingness to
incur current costs or forego current gains in the expectation of future benefits does not appear
to be reciprocated on the part of retailers. For instance, Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran (1996: 13)
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identified considerable structural change on the part of suppliers who "adapted their
organisational structures to match those of their key retail partnership organisations". Such
supplier reorganisation, to the extent that it is unique to a particular retailer, represents a
specific investment in the relationship. In contrast, the most prominent retail reasons for
reorganisation was to derive internal, rather than external, effciencies through better co-
ordination and incentive alignment (Barnes et al 1995; McGrath 1997).
Hogarth-Scott and Dapiran (1996) propose that the retailer-manufacturer relationships in the
UK have evolved from being adversarial and confrontational to being collaborative and
partner-like. However, this is stil within the context of retailer power but "whilst power and
conflict stil exist in these relationships, their role is frequently different or reduced"...thus the
question arises "are the concepts of power and conflict stil relevant?" (Hogarth-Scott and
Dapiran 1996:5).
4.4.2 Evidence of Transaction Specific Investments
Heide and John (1988) propose that dependent parties to an exchange will attempt to reduce
the level of dependency by engaging in bonding behaviour with other parties by making
specific investments in these relationships. However, the decision as to where such bonding
investments are made may not be as discretionary as suggested. Brookes (1995:155) points
out that "UK retailers expect their suppliers to match structure with structure, with suppliers'
marketing, technical, production and logistics experts working as close knit units with the
retail buying groups". While this matching process involves substantial specific investments
by both parties, it appears that the greater part of the investment is made by the supplier to
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accommodate existing retail structures6.
Shaw (1994), in her case-study of the relationship between the Malton Bacon factory and
Safeway, found evidence of the manufacturer's commitment to engage in dedicated product
development and capital investments in plant and equipment to achieve retailer required cost
economies. On the side of the retailer there was a commitment to buy at "fair but competitive
prices", and the provision of assistance in product development, product marketing and
research, and delivery systems. Fearne (1996) points to a number of characteristics of
successful partnerships. In the case of M&S and Northern Foods, a partnership which
continues to exist 25 years after its inception, multilevel contact between the firms on a
regular basis, complementarity of organisational forms and substantial investments in specific
assets by both parties appear to cement the relationship. In the case of ABP and Sainsbury,
specific investments in terms of a dedicated plant on the part of ABP and technical assistance
on the part of Sainsbury appear to underlie the relationship (Fearne 1996). What is noticeable
is, despite the existence of specific assets, written contracts are not relied upon. Product
specifications relating to product quality and safety are tightly defined but prices and
quantities are flexible.
Senker (1986) points to the growing retail sophistication in food technology as not merely a
6 In certin cases, it is possible to view the allocation of shelf space to a product as a specific investment.
A hypothetical example may serve to demonstrate. Assume a particular retailer decides to reorganise its meat
deparent and rather than use in-store butchers, meat wil now be prepared by suppliers in consumer ready packs.
Now assume that only one supplier is wiling to make the investment in the necessary plant and equipment as it
represents a specific investment. The move to the new provision of meat is duly completed with one supplier
catering for all the retailer's customers. If relationships between the parties deteriorate the retailer could decide
to remove the supplier and find alternative sources. However, this might be difficult give the current modus
operandi. Alternatively, the retailer may decide to redeploy the space allocated to meat to other products.
However, the cost in terms of consumers' store patronage may be high in this instance. Indeed, one could argue
that the extent of the specific investment on the part of the retailer is related to the cost of a stock -out in terms of
customers' perceptions.
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response to legal obligation but to company policy. Technologists' activities included
packaging trials, quality control, new product development, dissemination of information to
buying and marketing functions, and own brand specification. The results of these activities
usually involve the provision of information and expertise to certain segments of the retailer's
supplier base. Once given, the value of the information cannot be removed. As such, it
represents an irrevocable transfer of resource to one's trading partner. The extent of retail
investments was highlighted by Senker (1986). She found one large retailer who estimated
that up to 50% of their technologists' time was spent with suppliers. The contributions made
to suppliers' operations, particularly small suppliers, were considerable, providing expertise
on up to date technical developments.
4.4.3 Relationship Governance and Power
Following Wiliamson (1985) Gilbert et al (1994) argue that the relevant dimensions of
governance wil be to some extent industry specific. Anderson and Narus (1991:96) suggest
that not only is governance industry-related but that each marketplace is characterised by a
range of relationships that are "more collaborative, or more transactional, in nature relative
to that marketplace's norm". This range is referred to as the "industry bandwidth" of
relationships. The extent to which relationships are collaborative wil depend in part on
industry characteristics such as growth, complexity amongst other factors. Doel (1996:58),
examining own brand suppliers, argues that "the mode of initiation has direct implications
regarding the qualitative character of governance relations across the entire own label supply
chain". This suggests that, the balance of power within retailer-manufacturer relationships
may be expected to vary, for while "the general balance of power remains with the
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retailer.. ..this general position of dependency may be modified by a range of factors relating
to the characteristics of the supplier and retailer and the market demand" (Bowlby and Foord
1995:353).
Oliver (1990) proposes 6 critical motives for the formation of inter organisation relationships.
These are necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. Oliver's
conceptual framework is useful in that it provides some insights into the role of power and the
motives for the establishment of inter-organisational relationships. For the current study's
purposes, asymmetry, reciprocity, effciency and stability are of particular interest. By
asymmetry, Oliver (1990:243) argues that "resource scarcity prompts organisations to attempt
to exert power, influence or control over organisations that possess the required scarce
resources". Thus, a supplier may form a relationship with a particular retailer so that it may
exert more influence over the retailer's scare resources than other suppliers.
While asymmetry may exist in terms of resource endowments to the extent that resources are
different, symmetry may emerge when the complementarity of resources is considered as a
whole. Such a view is supported by Bandyopadhyay and Divakar (1999). In this respect,
it is noteworthy that Anderson and Narus (1991: 10 1) assert that there is evidence suggesting
that "collaborative relations prosper as long as the supplier firm and customer firm each have
significant and roughly the same dependence upon the relationship", suggesting a balanced
power relation in this instance. Dependence criteria include, switching costs, which serve to
raise barriers to exit and entry and time horizon, that is the benefit of continuity and market
industry change (Anderson and Narus 1991:101). The importance of balanced dependency
to the successful operation of the relationship is also supported by Feldman (1998). However,
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Duke (1998:96) argues that co-operative arrangements can be based on " mutually agreed
unequal strength". This view is based on the observed relationship between own brand
suppliers and their retail customer. Duke (1998:96) suggests that "the position of own brand
supplier is the weakest a manufacturer can be in" and consequently, wilingly cedes control
to the retailer.
Following Emerson (1962) reciprocity relates to the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals.
Emerson (1962) emphasises balance, harmony, equity rather than coercion, conflct and
domination. This is consistent with Davies' (1994: 192) definition of co-operation as "where
the supplier and retailer co-ordinate their activities towards a common goal" and "where co-
operation is more formalised, a partnership may be said to exist". However, "conditions of
reciprocity also may disguise the acquiescence of a dominated exchange partner to the terms
and conditions prescribed by a more powerful partner" (Oliver 1990:247). Drawing on the
transaction cost framework, potential effciency gains would be expected to play an important
role in determining inter-organisational relations. Environmental uncertainty can be reduced
to some degree by inter-organisational relations, thereby increasing stability (predictability).
What Oliver (1990) argues is that the various methodologies used to examine inter-
organisational relations and their formation, fail to account for the interaction among these
potentially "concurrent contingencies". This suggests that both the motivations underlying
the formation of and the power balance within inter-organisational relationships can and do
vary.
Partnering involves both firms "developing strong, extensive social, economic, service and
technical ties over time with the intent of lower total costs and/or increasing value thereby
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achieving mutual benefit" (Anderson and Narus 1991: 96). One ofthe direct implications of
this involvement is the increase in boundary personnel contact, be it between retail
technologists and production managers or retail buyers and key account managers. In this
regard, the boundaries of individual companies become, increasingly blurred but more
importantly the exchange and constant interplay between personnel assist the reduction in
inter-firm conflct while promoting an adaptive approach to joint problem-solving. Johanson
and Mattsson (1987) stress the importance of the social exchange process in that they
strengthen the bonds between firms and increase relationship durability while permitting
opportnity for change within the relationship.
Anderson and Narus (1991) suggest that while partnerships may be the currently ascribed way
of doing business, it may not necessarily be in a company's interest to organise business in
such a fashion. Shaw (1994) argues that partnerships are not an automatic means of
redistributing margins and returns. Indeed, power relations are present within partnerships,
with the more powerful partner attempting to appropriate the benefits of joint co-ordination
as much as possible (Wilson 1996). However, it is plausible to assume that the asymmetric
distribution of benefits wil continue as long as the benefits to both parties exceed what could
be achieved elsewhere. Segal-Horne and McGee (1989:43) place somewhat ofa dampener
on the notion of mutuality: "All are statements of mutuality of interests implying a common
ground shared by both manufacturer and retailer. The history of manufacturer/retailer
relationships suggest little of the sort...Oligopsony turns manufacturing into commodity
servicing...only weakly differentiated products inconvenience outlets or shared differentiation
costs in non convenience outlets, provide genuine common interests".
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While there has been considerable discussion on the concept of partnership, its meaning and
attractiveness to manufacturers vary. While some manufacturers view the future
optimistically and appeared to work towards partnerships by involving retailers in many
strategic aspects of their businesses, others viewed them with extreme caution seeing
partnerships as a means of undermining the manufacturer's competitive advantage. This is
supported by Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1998: 83), who found that manufacturers viewed
retailer's interest in partnerships as another means to "further erode our competitive
advantage". Retailers' view on partnerships on the other hand were clearer expressing the
necessary condition of self interest (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1996). The retail view was that
"we all want partnerships as long as it is on our own terms". Perhaps this is possible because,
as Brookes (1995) suggests, retailers now have a degree of systemic power and are able to
affect the whole system of their suppliers.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the more commonly referred to reasons for the rise of retailer power
and the subsequent implications for retailer-manufacturer relations. One feature emerging
from much of the literature suggests a uniformity of retailer-manufacturer relationships. This
perceived uniformity may be based on the assumption of a particular evolution path. This
investigation proposes that this uniformity does not, in fact, exist and that variations in
structural, firm, product and relational characteristics ensure diversity with consequences for
the balance of power within these relationships.
Another feature emerging from the review is that much of the literature is fragmented. While
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certain studies adopt an evolutionary approach (Davies et al 1985) and examine retail power
over time, others focus on particular aspects of retail power (Senker 1986; Grant 1987).
While each work contributes in its own way to our understanding of retail power, it is very
diffcult to establish connections between the individual studies. Consequently, questions
such as the relationship between retail power over margin activities and product related
activities cannot be addressed in a reliable manner. To achieve this, we must consider the full
set of relevant related variables and subject them to analysis at a point in time and under a
given set of underlying conditions.
In most academic literature, increasing retail concentration is considered to be a significant
factor in explaining the shift in power from manufacturers to retailers. However, while
concentration is increasing in Britain, higher levels of concentration are evident in Sweden,
Finland, Belgium, and Germany. Similar levels of concentration are witnessed in Ireland and
France (Collns 1997). Furthermore, the absolute purchasing power of individual European
retailers is considerably larger than their British counterparts. This suggests that the analysis
forming the current study must extend beyond the measure of concentration alone. Some
researchers have considered the importance of changes in relative concentration. Thus one
must consider what is happening in the food manufacturing sector. There is growing evidence
to suggest that concentration in manufacturing is also increasing. Sternquist and Kacker
(1994) argue that the emergence of retail alliances was, in part, precipitated by the growing
power of manufacturers through horizontal allances. Finally, although not addressed earlier,
there is a growing body of research on the evolution of international retail alliances (Robinson
and Clarke-Hi11995; Dawson and Shaw 1992).
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While much of the literature reviewed indicates that relative concentration plays an important
role in determining the distribution of power between retailers and their manufacturers, it
remains unclear which measure of concentration should be used. Retail concentration at
national level is alluded to by many commentators. Tucker (1978), for instance, argues that
concentration at a national level was a more important determinant of bargaining power than
product market concentration. This is consistent with the consumer process of shopping
consolidation which would tend to equate concentration across markets. It also reflects the
low barriers to entry into many new product categories by own brand extension. However,
the increasing globalisation of both food manufacturing and retailing suggests that
concentration at a national level only captures part of the determinants of relative negotiation
strengths. The emergence of new organisational forms such as international buying allances
(Robinson and Clarke-HilI995) renders national concentration figures oflimited use with
pricing, assortment and in some cases distribution decisions being made at supra national
levels. Similar problems exist with manufacturing concentration as many manufacturers have
embraced pan European manufacturing and branding strategies since the formation of the
single market.
Our analysis highlighted the importance of economies of scale in influencing retailer-supplier
relations. The cost structure ofUK retailing necessitated that retailers operated at high levels
of capacity. Also, the high opportity cost of storage space at outlet level promoted supply
chain effciencies and the move towards just in time delivery. This, in turn, encouraged the
formation of particular relationships with certain suppliers to identify best practice procedures.
On the other hand, manufacturers subject to economies of scale require high levels of
throughput to maintain their horizontal competitiveness. The loss of a retail account in a
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concentrated market not only represents a loss of share but may also result in uncompetitive
costs.
Much of the literature reviewed stressed the importance of loyalty, both brand and store
loyalty, and the position of brand guarantor within the marketing channel, as a determinant
of channel power. The nature of retail advertising, by emphasising baskets rather than
individual products, promoted consolidation of shopping purchases enhancing store loyalty
rather than brand loyalty. The use of own brand products as a surrogate for the retail brand
was another potent vehicle for generating store rather than brand commitments. While there
is a large body of anecdotal and intuitive evidence, there is a paucity of empirical evidence
to support own brand's influence on the balance of power. More importantly, it appears to be
the strategic use of own brand rather than the mere presence of own brand that contributes to
the shift in power. In this respect, the shift from price to non price competition on the part of
retailers appears to have played a substantial role in altering the balance of power.
The review indicates that the centralisation of retail buying and retailer control of secondary
distribution, by separating the manufacturer from the point of sale and increasing the
transparency of the supply chain, resulted in a further shift in the balance of power. Prior to
the centralisation of distribution, the asymmetry of information favoured the manufacturer.
The manufacturer had greater opportnity to engage in opportnistic behaviour as all relevant
information on supplier performance was not available to retail buyers. However, the
centralisation of distribution, supported by new information technologies, reversed this
position. Indeed, the availability of scanning data provided the retailer with the opportnity
to pursue self-interest through guile by releasing selective information to suppliers. An
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examination of different countries displays a wide variation in the extent of retailer integration
or quasi integration into distribution. The Irish market remains largely DSD and manufacturer
controlled, as do the French and German markets. Also, one witnesses substantial variations
in both the use and provision of retailer generated information across the supply chain. Both
these features would be expected to influence the balance of power within relations.
Another feature that emerges is that particular product characteristics influence the balance
of power within relationships. All products are not of equal importance to retailers. Certain
products may be more demanding in terms of production, delivery and perishability.
Alternative suppliers may be available but at substantial costs in terms of lost sales and even
brand image. Some exchange relations wil involve branded products. Others wil involve
own brand, while even more may involve a portfolio of both types of goods.
Throughout the review, there was considerable reference to growing stability. Foord et al
(1996:68) propose that "the emphasis on interactive, flexible and stable supply networks was
a key retailing strategy". However, in much of the literature, the notion of stability has not
been clarified. Dawson and Shaw (1989) link stability to the development of long term
relationships based on trust and commitment to encourage the investment in specific assets.
However, there appears to be no appropriate measure of stability developed or utilised.
Longevity, or the expectation oflongevity, is a poor proxy for stability. For instance, it takes
no account of volumes traded, which is a form of instability with substantial cost implications
for manufacturers. On the other hand, there is evidence change on many dimensions.
Retailers are assuming greater control over activities formerly the remit of manufacturers.
One finds organisational change at firm level to ensure better fits between manufacturing
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firms and their retail customers. Also there is evidence of concentration in manufacturing,
which is consistent with supplier rationalisation on the part of retailers. While it is clear that
certain retailers have domesticated some of their trading relationships to a greater or lesser
extent, the implications for stability and the balance of power within the relationships have
not been clarified.
In the earlier discussion of the literature on power, it was noted that power was a characteristic
inherent to a social relation and not an attribute of a particular agent. Furthermore, as power
is a phenomenon residing within a social relation it may be viewed and measured from either
of the protagonists' perspectives. From this discussion it is clear that both manufacturers and
retailers may participate in a number of differentiated relationships. This view is supported
by Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1998: 83) who propose the " existence of significant
differentiated relationships each having different power implications". The current study
argues that, on the one hand, these relationships vary in terms of the structural conditions
within which they exist. Manufacturers trading in different countries wil encounter varying
levels of retail concentration, different legislation, varying own brand strategies, different own
brand market shares and varying levels of branded activity. On the other hand, the closeness
of the retailer and manufacturer may vary across customer accounts. Whether or not a given
manufacturer produces own brand for a retailer may be expected to influence their
relationship. The review has found evidence of different degrees of partnershipping, be it in
relation to category management or simply in terms of stage of maturity. Indeed, the
maintenance of a customer portfolio was highlighted as a key strategic decision facing firms.
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is substantial scope for variations within retailer-
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manufacturer relations and to discuss the issue of the balance of power while assuming a
degree of homogeneity is flawed. Following Segal-Horn and McGee (1989) one is inclined
to agree with their view that relationships must be analysed at both a structural and strategic
leveL. Much of the research to date has adopted the retailer's perspective and consequently
missed the diversity that emerges on the manufacturer's side. The analysis suggests that
structural, firm, product and relational characteristics are significant determinants of the
balance of power within the relationships under review. However, to obtain a more complete
understanding of the forces at work a cross sectional approach adopting a manufacturer
framework is required.
The review also suggests an appropriate framework for organising our analysis. It has
highlighted variations in industry characteristics, firm and product related characteristics and
the mode of governance that operates among retailers and manufacturers. As a summary of
the foregoing analysis, these three factors and their underlying characteristics are presented
in table 4.2. It should be noted that some characteristics may operate at more than one leveL.
For instance, economies of scale can be considered an industry characteristic governed by
technology but which plays and important role in determining the minimum effcient scale of
operation. The extent to which companies exploit these scale effciencies wil be a firm
characteristic and can influence dependency relationships. The current analysis, while aware
of these interactions, proposes that the current framework is likely to provide a more useful
base for analysis by simplifying the problem at hand.
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Table 4.2
Determinants of Retailer Power
Factor Group
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Availability of alternative capacity
Importance of economies of scale
Retail concentration
Manufacturer concentration
Own brand penetration
Product complexity and contribution to retailer's positioning
Strategic use of own brands
Product related monitoring
Margin related monitoring
Manufacturer emphasis on innovation
Manufacturer's brand franchise
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Manufacturer dependency
Retail dependency
Interdependency
Retailer's share of manufacturer's sales
Brand portfolio traded
Manufacturer specific assets
Retailer specific assets
Joint Effort
Inter-firm integration
Expected continuity and relationship potential
This framework wil be used to structure the formulation of the hypotheses in chapter 6. It
is proposed that in doing so, a more complete understanding of the determinants of retailer
power may be gained. The framework also has the added benefit of presenting a coherent
flow to the organisation the remaining chapters.
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Chapter Five
Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this research is to investigate the determinants of retail power over food
manufacturers' activities. This wil be achieved by specifying models of retail power and
estimating parameter values for each of the hypothesized determinants. In the review carred
out in the last chapter, it was concluded that there were three sets of characteristics that
merited detailed analysis. These were, industry structure, firm and product, and relationship
characteristics. In the next chapter, a series of hypotheses wil be developed, which wil be
used to investigate these characteristics' role in the determination of retail power. This
chapter addresses the methodology to be employed to test these hypotheses. The chapter has
two major concerns. The first is the composition of an appropriate sample and key informants
to test the hypotheses. The second is the structure of the research instrument to be used and
the development of a series of constructs to measure the phenomena underlying the
hypotheses. Much of the chapter is given to testing the individual measures so that one can
be confident that they measure what we want to capture and are free from measurement error.
Consequently, that chapter devotes considerable effort to establishing construct validity.
This chapter is structured as follows. After addressing the issues of sample and informant
selection the chapter wil adopt the organising framework set out in the previous chapter.
First, the dependent variables, power and influence shall be examined; second, the chapter wil
proceed to industry structure characteristics; third, measures for firm and product
characteristics wil be developed; fourth, measures of relationship specific characteristics wil
be derived; and finally, constructs to measure mode of governance or the degree of
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integration among the firms wil be established.
5.2 Data Collection
One of the main features emerging from the review in chapter four is the complexity of power
relations between retailers and manufacturers. In identifying three sets of factor groupings,
the current study attempts to establish a framework that will reduce the complexity of the
problem, thereby faciltating a more considered analysis. However, within these groups a
rather large number of specific characteristics emerge. As wil be seen, some of these
characteristics are closely related, for example economies of scale and manufacturer
concentration, but are expected to influence retail power in opposite directions. Other
interactions such as those between retail concentration and own brand penetration are both
expected to increase retail power.
These interactions add considerably to the complexity of the task at hand, as this research
seeks to separate out the primary determinants from secondary determinants of retail power.
However, the complexity of the problem and the inter-relatedness of many of the key
characteristics does suggest an appropriate method of analysis and, consequently, the manner
in which data should be collected. To separate out the contributions made by each of the
characteristics, while holding others constant, quantitative analysis, and regression analysis
in particular, are the most appropriate tools. However, carring out this analysis requires
measures of the underlying constructs. Given the role of perceptions in the determination of
power (Gaski 1984) and the matter that few external measures of the characteristics of interest
exist, measures would have to be derived from data obtained from food manufacturers
themselves. Given the number of characteristics of interest, a survey of a sample of food
198
manufacturers using a detailed questionnaire was considered most appropriate. The use of
structured or semi-structured interviews was considered impracticable given the number and
scope of the constructs required. The use of a standard questionnaire also had the added
benefit of facilitating construct validity across responding firms.
5.2.1 The Sample
In July 1997, the author undertook research investigating Irish food manufacturers' customer
portfolios, endorsed by and with the assistance of the Irish Food Board. The results of this
work have been detailed in chapter one and elsewhere (Collins and Burt 1999). As their
contrbution to the project, the Food Board distrbuted the research instrment to the managing
director/owner, manager or key accounts manager of the population of Irish food
manufacturing firms. In total, 155 firms responded of which 85 firms returned usable
questionnaires and dealt directly with grocery retailers.
The sample of firms used in the current study was drawn largely from the list of firms that had
engaged in this earlier research. The sample is intended to capture variations within retailer-
manufacturer relationships. In doing so, it also intends to reflect the range of food
manufacturers' experience of power relations within the grocery sector. The results of the
earlier analysis indicated a broad range of trading relationships and suggested considerable
variations in manufacturer dependency. Consequently, it was decided to use these firms as
the sampling frame for the current study.
Each of the original 85 firms were contacted by the researcher. A number were unwiling to
participate in the current study. The dominant argument against further participation was
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primarily time relatedi. Five firms who had returned unusable questionnaires in the earlier
study indicated their wilingness to' participate in the current studl. Consequently, a total of
63 firms participated in the study. Eight firms participated in the pretest stage and the
remaining 55 food manufacturers provided the data used in all subsequent analysis. The data
were collected during the spring and summer of 1998.
From a statistical perspective, the firms surveyed were not chosen on a strictly random basis,
as participation in the earlier study increased the probability of bring selected for current
study. However, the first sample was representative of the Irish food manufacturing sector
(Collins and Burt 1999) and almost 70% of the original sample participated in the current
study in some fashion, that is pretest or live application. No bias could be detected among
those firms who were unwiling to participate. Furthermore, for confidence in our statistical
analysis, one requires that the selection of retail relationships be random rather than the
manufacturing firms per se. As shall be seen, when discussing informant selection, the
retailer-manufacturer relationships are randomly selected and therefore appropriate for
statistical analysis.
Some of the chief characteristics of the sample relevant to the study at hand are presented in
tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
i At the time of data collection there were a number of other studies were in process under the auspices of the
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) investigating the interaction between retailers and manufacturers
245 of the firms in the initial sample dealt with wholesalers and not directly with retailers.
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Table 5.1
Distribution of Sample: Firm Size
Employee No. 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-100 100-500 ::500
% of Sample 5 13 22 9 36 15
Obseryations (n) 3 7 12 5 20 8
Table 5.2
Distribution of Sample: Product Category
Category Dairy Bread Fresh Dry Chiled Soft Alcoholic Frozen Other
Mea & Grocery Food Drinks Drinks Foods Consumer
Poultr Foods
%of 20 7 10 24 7 7 2 9 13
Sample
Observations 11 4 6 13 4 4 1 5 7
(n)
Table 5.33
Distribution of Sample: Product Shelf-Life
Days Life 1-3 4-7 8-14 15-31 ::31
% of Sample 6 9 6 25 55
Obseryations (n) 3 5 3 14 30
Table 5.4
Distribution of Sample: Brand Portfolio
Mixed Portfolio
Brand Portfolio Brands only Own Bands Only (Both Brands and Own Bands)
% of Sample 26 14 60
Obseryations (n) 14 8 33
3 Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding
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5.2.2 Informant Selection
A single informant was chosen from each firm. The use of a single informant as the sole
basis for data collection dominates much of the marketing literature (Brown et al 1983; Frazier
1983; Knox and White 1990; Price 1993; Davies 1994; Mohr and Spekman 1994; SeInes
1998). However, the methodology has its flaws, with potential problems emanating from
informant bias, adverse selection and error in disclosure. A discussion of some of the
limitations is presented by Bagozzi et al (1991). They highlight measurement error associated
with key informant prejudices or limitations, social desirability, halo effects and acquiescence.
Over-reporting or possible under-reporting of the phenomena under investigation may result
directly from the position of the key informant within the organization. To overcome these
limitations, some researchers have used multiple informants (Anderson and Narus 1990).
However, such a procedure, even when a number of competent informants exist, is not without
its own diffculties. These may emerge with divergent perceptions of the same phenomena,
undermining the validity of averaging responses.
The decision to use a single informant was based on the following reasons. The method
employed required each informant to rate their relationship with two retailers with whom they
were most familiar. During the pretest, it became clear that many of the larger firms had
individual account managers specializing in the management of a limited number of particular
retailer relationships. Thus, it was unlikely to find another informant as familar with the
given retail relationships at the same level in the company. Another issue encountered in large
firms was that they tended to produce a number of different products that frequently came
from different industres. For instance, a number of firms operated in both the dairy and meat
sectors. During the pretest, it was also noted by a number of informants that retail influence
frequently varied significantly across product categories. Thus, the decision was made to
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carr out the analysis at principle category produced. This presented a potential risk as the
more senior the management interviewed the more likely a cross category perspective would
be obtained. Consequently, one risked not comparing like with like. Finally, in smaller firms,
where account management strctures did not exist and the product tended to be homogenous,
it was the most senior executives alone who had suffcient knowledge, or access to the
relevant information, to complete the instrument satisfactorily.
Each firm was contacted prior to the study. Initial contact was made with the individual who
had completed the research instrument used in the first study. This individual was queried to
identify the person with most awareness of retail influence on the organization. Given the
nature of the study, this individual had to have considerable experience of week to week
dealings with the company's retail customers. Subsequently, a letter detailing the nature of
the research, was sent to each individuaL. One week later the potential informant was
contacted by the researcher to ascertain whether or not they were best positioned to complete
the questionnaire and wiling to participate in the study. If they suggested an alternative
informant the new potential candidate was also forwarded the same letter and contacted a
week later. Informants were either owners, managing directors, key account managers or, in
two cases, marketing managers.
5.2.3 Instrument Structure, Pretest and Launch
The instrument, provided in appendix A5.1, is divided into two components, one of which is
not expected to vary across a manufacturer's trading relationships while the other is expected
to vary. The first component focuses on industr, the manufacturing firm's characteristics and
product characteristics. These were the availability of alternative capacity; the importance of
economies of scale in manufacturing, manufacturer concentration, product shelf-life,
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manufacturer emphasis on innovation and retail concentration. This component of the
instrument also measured the importance of a series of strategic variables in maintaining the
firm's competitive advantage which would be used in the construction of the measure of
power.
The second component is relationship specific, designed to capture variations across retailer-
manufacturer relationships. It is composed of items to measure retailer influence, the strategic
use of own brands by the retailer, retail monitoring, retail dependency, retail specific
investments, manufacturer dependency, manufacturer brand franchise, brand portfolio, extent
of joint effort, expected relationship continuity, and the degree of integration among the firms.
The market penetration of own brands is also measured in the retail specific component of the
questionnaire. The reasons for this wil be discussed later. As the purpose of the exercise was
to identify variations in retailer power, the informant was asked to choose and score two
retailers who they considered to differ in the way they did business4. This increased the
likelihood of capturing variations in relations while simultaneously increasing the number of
observations per informant. However, the criteria used to decide the respective retailers were
left to the informant's discretion. Thus, the retailer-manufacturer relationships underlying the
study are considered random and therefore suitable for statistical analysis.
The instrument was developed according to the procedure outlined by Churchil (1979).
Individual items used in the pretest instrument were based on the review of the literature and
the researcher's past experience as a retail buyer. The number of test observations was limited
by the expected number of firms who were likely to participate in the study. It was believed
that firms who had participated in the first study would be wiling to assist once again but very
unlikely to do so on a third occasion. Even if they were wiling to do so, it was very likely
204
that the results would be subject to random error due to fatigue, boredom etc. Therefore, it
appeared that a large pretest could reduce the number of observations in the final study.
Consequently, eight firms were chosen for the pretest. Over the course of each application,
informants were queried in relation to areas requiring clarification or subject to
misunderstanding. Areas omitted but considered important by the informant were
incorporated into the subsequent tests. Areas considered irrelevant by the informant were
noted. Any additions were re-circulated to earlier participants.
On completing the pretest, items generating proposed constructs were tested for internal
reliability using Chronbach's a. The pretest yielded eight observations on items relating to
firm specific, product specific and industry structure characteristics5. Twenty observations
were obtained on relationships with individual retailers6. On the basis of the a scores, items
were deleted until a satisfactory score was achieved. Then, factor analysis was applied to
establish an initial view of the separability of the constructs.
Having finalized the research instrment, the questionnaire was distributed to the participating
manufacturers. In most instances, the informant pre-agreed the names of the retailers,
enabling a dedicated questionnaire to be sent out. This ensured that the instrument was more
easily completed. In some instances, the manufacturer, while willing to participate, wished
the retailers to remain anonymous. In this circumstance, the informant scored retailer 1 and
retailer 2. After a period of three weeks the informant was given a follow-up call. Given the
relative seniority of the informants a number were slow to reply. Under these conditions, a
visit to the manufacturer took place and the instrument was administered personally.
4 One manufacturer scored only one retailer.
S This is a limited number of obseryations for rigorous validity testing. Consequently a number of additional
items were included in the live instrument to increase the likelihood of obtaining appropriate measures.
6 Four of the pretest firms scored three retailers rather than two retailers.
205
The highly structured nature of the instrument enabled the interview to take place without
prompts, which could have resulted in bias. Also, earlier power studies have used a
combination of both personally administered and mailed questionnaires (Brown 1981). In
total, 55 firms were surveyed, 33 of which self-administered the instrument while the
remaining 22 were interviewed personally. However, this procedure risked generating
systematic error (Churchil 1979). To test for the existence of this potential problem, a series
of t-tests comparing the mean values for the constructs were used to identify any between
group differences (self-administered versus researcher administered). One statistical
difference was identified and related to perceived retail concentration. Further analysis
revealed that the source of the discrepancy was the higher proportion of drinks companies in
the personally administered component of the sample. These companies were much less
reliant on the grocery sector with most of their sales going to the pub trade. Consequently,
it was decided to keep these observations in the sample as the differences were unlikely to be
due to systematic error.
5.3 Construct Development
5.3.1 Measures
To complete the analysis and test the hypotheses set out in the next chapter, there is a need to
develop a series of measures for the constrcts given in table 5.5. Because behaviour is based
on perceptions rather than on objective measures, the constructs are measured using the
manufacturer's perceptions of their market, their firm, principal product category and
relationships with specific retailers. With a very limited number of exceptions, self-attibuted
scales were used to measure the constructs. Also, perceptions were measured because, as
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Gaski (1984: 10) suggests, "it may be more correct to regard the perception itself as the source
of power".
Table 5.5
Constructs Required
Construct Measure
'E(' ('
'0 -
~ ~
i:i."C(' ('Cl ~
Retail influence
Retail power
Retail power over product related activities
Retail power over mamin related activities
A vailabilitv of alternative capacitv
Importance of economies of scale
Retail concentration
Manufacturer concentration
Own brand penetration
(/
u
'.¡
(/
'Cè(' ('.. ..
.. El u
~ u ~
'0 e ('
i: .. ..
_ (/ U
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
(/
.S¡
t;
.- .C
i: .. ('(' U ..
ê ;: g'0 ..o ('
.- fo..
~ p. U
Product complexitv and contribution to retailer's positioning
Strategic use of own brands
Product related monitoring
Margin related monitorinl!
Manufacturer emphasis on innovation
Manufacturer's brand franchise
Manufacturer dependencv
Retail dependency
Interdependency
Retailer's share of manufacturer's sales
Brand portfolio traded
Manufacturer specific assets
Retailer soecific assets
Joint Effort
Inter-firm integration
. Flexibilitv/Joint planning/ Information transfer/Communication
Expected continuitv and re1ationshio attractiveness
(/
U
'.¡(/
'5
..
~('
..U
.S-
..(/i:
o
.~
~
Days shelf-life
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Likert Scale
Ratio
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Two issues are of concern, given that many of the variables were constructed from individual
items. The first is one of internal consistency and that the individual items actually measure
the same variable. To measure internal consistency Chronbach's a was used. This is
commonly used to measure reliability for a set of construct indicators with higher values
indicating higher reliability. By reliability one means that the construct indicators are
consistent in their measurements, where indicators of highly reliable constructs are strongly
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intercorrelated indicating that they are measuring the same latent construct (Hair et al 1995).
In this way one can assess the danger of variable error in the development of our constructs.
Values for Chronbach's a can range from 0 to 1.0. Nunally (1981) argues that for the
purpose of construct reliability, a of 0.70 or higher wil suffce. However, earlier studies have
used considerably lower results. Noordewier et al (1990) and Gilbert et al (1994) employ
constrcts with a as low as 0.64 while Ganesan (1994) uses constructs with measures as low
as 0.56 and Klien et al (1990) use constructs with a as low as 0.54
Three factors determined the number of items used to measure a construct. The first was the
limited size of the pretest and the limited number of observations with which to ascertain the
merits of individual items. This was most notable in the case of industry characteristics where
only eight observations were available. To account for the relative uncertainty some
additional items were included. The second was the breadth of the construct in question.
Specific investments, by definition, may be broad, ranging across human, physical and
learning capital amongst others. Thus, the number of items were necessarily large to ensure
suffcient representation and appropriate coverage. Third, a number of the constructs are very
similar but for the purpose at hand need to be clearly separated. For instance, one would
expect a close association between manufacturer and retailer specific investments in their
relationship but, for the current analysis, the two constructs must be clearly separated.
Finally, it should be pointed out that not all of the items in research instrument are employed
in the subsequent analysis. Due to the relatively small sample in the pretest a number of items
did not load clearly on expected dimensions. Consequently, these items were not used in the
final measures.
While Chronbach's a can be used to demonstrate reliability, that is, that the individual items
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are measuring the same construct and would do so in repeated samples, one has to be
confident that what is being measured is actually that which one seeks to measure. In other
words systematic error needs to be accounted for in our analysis. To achieve this the analysis
needs to demonstrate both convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is the
extent to which multiple attempts to measure the same construct are in agreement and covary
highly. Discriminant validity on the other hand is the degree to which different constrcts are
distinct and do not covary highly (Bagozzi et al 1991). In other words, discriminant validity
establishes construct separability.
To establish convergent and discriminant validity among our constructs exploratory factor
analysis was used. In factor analysis, each item (question on the instrument) is a dependent
variable that is a function of some underlying factors, which in turn are composed of all the
original items. Under factor analysis, the factors are determined by maximizing the
explanatory power of the entire set of items. Exploratory factor analysis provides a means of
identifying items that group together under a particular factor, establishing convergent
validity. Where the analysis identifies a number of items with high loadings on a particular
factor, a summed scale or average may be derived for use as a surrogate variable to carr out
the analysis (Hair et al 1995). By generating a series of such factors, and when meeting
goodness of fit criteria, the analysis establishes discriminant validity among the constructs.
To assist interpretation ofthe factors, varimax rotations are carred out. This method is only
one of a series of orthogonal rotation procedures that have the advantage of ensuring that the
factors are mathematically independent and uncorrelated, highlighting the patterning of the
variables into the underlying factors. Consequently, orthogonal solutions are optimal if the
purpose is to generate a reduced number ofuncorre1ated variables for further use in regression
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analysis (Hair et al 1995). This strengthens the use of varimax rotations asmuch of the
subsequent analysis wil use regression techniques.
The varimax rotation method minimizes the number of items that have high loadings on a
particular factor. In doing so, it eases interpretation by generating as simple a structure as
possible to fit the data. However, to interpret the factors, one has to decide which factor
loadings merit consideration. The factor loading is the correlation between the factor and the
item. Consequently, those items with high loading are given more weight in the interpretation
of the factor than those with low loadings. Factor loadings greater than 1.31 are considered to
meet the minimal level of merit for sample sizes of 100 or more (Hair et aI, 1995; Child, 1990;
Comrey and Lee 1992).
Having identified a series of items that constitute a factor, the next problem is to derive a
measure of the construct. Three methods may be used to derive the constructs to be used in
the subsequent analysis. The first is to select the highest loading item on the factor and to use
it as a single surrogate. Clearly, relying on one single item subjects any further analysis to
potentially severe measurement error. The second method is to estimate factor scores. As
each factor is a linear combination of the original items, composite measures for each factor
can be derived. Items that are highly correlated with a particular factor wil contribute more
to the factor score than items with low correlations. However, some items are likely to be
correlated in some fashion (but not significantly different from zero) with the factor, and
consequently, the factor scores are error prone indicators of the underlying factor. As a
compromise, a summated or averaged scale can employed. High loading items are identified
and either summed or averaged generating a measure of the construct. The main drawback
of this method is that the resultant constructs may not be entirely uncorrelated. However, the
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primary advantage of this method, is that the construct is more meaningful and " if the scale
is well-constructed, valid and reliable instrument, the summated scale is probably the best
alternative" (Hair et al 1995:391). This method has most intuitive appeal and, to compensate
for any potential shortcomings, significant effort was placed on using or modifying scales
already tested in the literature.
In the following analysis, either principal component analysis or generalized least squares
(GLS) is used to extract our factors. In cases where exploratory factor analysis is being used
to prove convergent validity and point towards discriminant validity, principal components
wil be used as the method of factor extraction. This is justified by the fact that the resulting
factors are clearer and more easily interpreted as a greater number of items are utilized and
maintained in the creation of the constructs. Where the specific number of factors has
implications for the hypotheses, as against the construction of measures, GLS wil be used.
This is considered appropriate where specific hypotheses are dependent on the particular
number of factors (k) e.g. the dimensions of power and retail monitoring. For instance, where
a uni-dimensional measure of power is required or where a two factor model is specified, the
goodness of fit measures provided by GLS7 which tests the adequacy of the k-factor model
wil assume particular importance.
While principal component analysis does not provide a measure of goodness of fit of the
factor model, the appropriateness of applying the analysis wil be tested using Bartlett's test
of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. Bartlett's test
examines whether or not the population correlation coeffcient is an identity. In circumstances
where it is, factor analysis is not advised (Norusis 1994). The KMO test examines the
relationship between the correlation coeffcients among the variables and their partial
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coeffcients. The correlation coeffcient is a measure of the linear association among two
variables. Where a factor analysis is appropriate, one would expect these to be high where
variables load highly along a given factor. The partial correlation coefficient eliminates the
linear effects of all other variables. Consequently, when factor analysis is appropriate the
partial correlation coeffcients should be low between variables that load highly. By
comparing these relative magnitudes, a measure of sampling adequacy is obtained. Where the
KMO approaches 1, factor analysis is appropriate. Scores below 0.5 are considered
unacceptable (Norusis 1994).
The output of the principal component method of factor extraction also provides the
percentage of total variation explained. This is the sum of the variances explained by each of
the factors. Thus high values for a given number of factors is preferred to low values as more
of the variation in the data is explained by the given factors.
5.3.2 Dependent Variables: Retail Influence and Exercised Power
Central to any study of power is the measure of the dependent variable itself. We have seen
that power has been broadly defined as the ability to influence the strategy variables of another
member in the channeL. Dawson and Shaw (1990:30) define the basis of retailer power as the
"ability to influence other channel members to make decisions which otherwise would not
have been made" or "to alter the strategic direction of others". Krishnan and Sona (1997:37)
define power as "the ability of one channel member to get another channel member to do what
the latter would not have done, affecting him adversely". Thus, power refers to influence in
a particular direction. In this study, power is aligned with French and Raven's (1959)
definition of "positive control", that is, influence in the direction favoured by the influencer.
7 Principal Components does not provide a goodness of fit statistic.
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Following earlier studies power is measured as the extent of the retailer's influence over the
manufacturer's activities, weighted by the strategic importance of activity, as perceived by
the manufacturer. This use of attributed influence as an appropriate measuring methodology
is generally accepted in the literature (Etgar 1978; EI-Ansary and Stern 1972; Hunt and Nevin
1974; Butaney and Wortzel 1988; Brown, Lusch et al. 1995).
However, Gaski (1984) raises a particular concern that is central to the current research. In
his review, he asks whether or not earlier studies actually measured power in the first place.
He argues that the use of attributed power over manufacturing activities clearly captures
exercised power and is not necessarily closely aligned with power if defined as the ability to
influence or alter behaviour. Such an ability or potential may exist unexercised. However,
it is argued here that even Gaski (1984) underestimated the diffculty of deriving an
appropriate measure. Gaski suggests that Wilkinson's (1974) measure of "maximum possible
effect" on policies was heading in the right direction. However, while an informant's scoring
of perceived retail control over a series of activities should implicitly account for
interdependencies among the activities, scoring on the basis of maximum possible effect is
unlikely to do so in any kind of precise manner. For example, take the case ofthree activities,
pricing, product specifications and promotional activity. It should be relatively
straightforward for an informant to score perceived retail influence on each of these activities.
More importntly, the scores are likely to reflect interdependencies and possible tradeoffs that
exist among the variables. If the retailer exerts considerable influence on price and
promotional activity, one consequence might be less influence on product specifications. This
interdependency is likely to be captured by the attributed measure if the informant's
perceptions are accurate. If, on the other hand, an informant is required to assess "the
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maximum possible effect" these interdependencies are likely to be neglected and the resulting
measure suffers error. Thus, in this study, actual influence as perceived by the manufacturer
rather than the ability to influence is measured on the grounds that the latter would be
extremely diffcult to capture if at all possible8.
The distinction between power and exercised power must be set down clearly. An overview
of the literature suggests that exercised power is an appropriate proxy for power. For instance,
Butaney and Wortzel (1988:54) argue that "power can be measured either as the ability to alter
one's behaviour or actual alteration of one's behaviour". It is argued here that this is not
necessarily the case and cannot be asserted as there is a temporal dimension to each measure.
Exercised power is an ex post measure and may be, at best, an appropriate measure for power
in the past. Power, when defined as the ability to influence, is an ex ante construct
representing the potential to influencee. Clearly, in the case of a given relationship the former
may indeed be a poor proxy for the latter and is highly likely to result in bias. Once the
potential is exercised the potential may be exhausted. For instance, a retailer's ability to
extract additional margin from a manufacturer wil, in part, be dependent on the margin
available to the manufacturer which is likely to be partly determined by the outcomes of
earlier retail influence attempts. In such circumstances, a manufacturer may score exercised
power highly (we've been squeezed in the past) but low in terms of potential to influence (any
further price reductions and we're out of business). Thus, the two constructs may indeed be
negatively related under certain conditions or possibly display a positive relationship but at
a diminishing rate.
80ne possibility would be to use a matrix where the maximum possible effect on one
activity is measured against varying levels of influence on the remaining activities. This
would then be repeated for each activity in turn. Such a procedure would be extremely
unweildly and almost certainly beyond the endurance of the informant.
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However, by establishing relationships between the three factors (industry structure, firm and
product characteristics, and relationship characteristics) set out in the last chapter and
exercised power, the basis for understanding power as a potential is provided. In measuring
exercised power, the outcome of successful power attempts is measured. However, that the
influence attempts were successful indicates that the capability or potential had existed. In
this way, relationships between power as a potential and the three sets of factors are
established. Thus, . while deciding not to measure power as a potential directly, the
measurement of exercised power provides the basis for our analysis.
The measure of exercised power is also important from a strategic perspective as it provides
a clear insight into the level of retail involvement that can be expected in manufacturing
operations under different circumstances. In gaining a deeper appreciation of the dimensions
of retail power, that is, product or margin related, one can anticipate the circumstances under
which different strategic variables are exposed to retail influence. As one manufacturer put
it, "retail influence is simply the cost of dialogue". Accurate estimation of this cost is likely
to prove fruitfuL.
The other issue which must be addressed is the use of a unidimensional measure of power.
Clearly, power is multidimensional and extends across a wide range of activities. Many of
these activities are distinct, e.g. product related activities from margin related activities, and
represent different dimensions over which power is frequently be exerted. In addition to being
distinct, they may be related. For instance, the exercise of product related power may
diminish an agent's margin related power. Despite this, in much of the power literature (EI-
Ansary and Stern 1972; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Butaney and Wortzel 1988) power has been
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implicitly assumed to be unidimensional through the measures employed. This implicit
assumption is made by failing to test for the unidimensionality of the dependent variable.
Consequently, bias may be introduced into the analysis in favour of one activity over others,
e.g. product related power over margin related power.
To derive our measure of exercised power, eleven activities were chosen based on a review
of the literature, direct experience of the retail sector as a former buyer and a series of
manufacturer visits prior to pre-testing the research instrument. These were production
process development, new product development, supplier (input) selection, production
processes, product specifications, inventories/stockholdings, delivery conditions
(amounts/frequency), promotional activity, customer portfolio, price to the retailer and credit
terms to the retailer.
The extent of retail influence was captured using a five point Likert scale, anchored by 1 (no
influence) to 5 (major influence) applied to each activity. To derive an index of power, a
weight, derived from the emphasis the manufacturer placed on each activity as a source of its
competitive advantage, was employed. This was also measured using a five point Likert scale
(1, no emphasis to 5, major emphasis). This procedure was used by EI-Ansary and Stern
(1972), Frazier (1983) and Butaney and Wortzel (1988).
There are two issues that must be raised in relation to the use of a weight. First, the definition
of power taken from the literature, defines power as influence in a particular direction, that
is, in the direction intended by the influencer but in a direction that the influencee would not
wish to tend. Consequently, one can exert influence without exerting power. Manufacturers
are unlikely to wilingly cede control over those strategic variables that serve as the basis of
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their competitive advantage. Thus, the use of the weight introduces the directional element
and provides a measure of power rather than influence alone. Second, using a weight provides
one method of aggregation. Omission of a weighting mechanism, and summing scores over
a series of activities, implicitly assumes that each of the manufacturing activities is of equal
importance. Clearly, such an assumption is both unnecessary and potentially misleading.
However, the use of a weight does imply that the measure of influence on a particular variable
and the strategic importance of that variable are given equal weight in the measure of
exercised power.
Aggregation across all the strategy variables outlined above, weighted by the emphasis
manufacturers' place on them to derive a measure of power, is likely to be problematic. The
use of the procedure to form an overall index of power may be unsatisfactory as it does
assume that the items are different and consequently equally weighted. This assumption is
implicitly made and untested in most of the literature reviewed. However, interdependencies
among strategy variables make variable selection a potential source of bias. Ifvariables are
orthogonal to each other and weighted using some measure of importance, the issue of bias
is less likely. However, if the variables are highly correlated and cannot be differentiated
from each other a potential problem, akin to double counting, emerges.
One means of reducing this problem is to construct a measure of power that is unidimensional.
Brown et aI's (1983; 1995) works represent the only cases reviewed where the measure of
power is actually tested for unidimensionality. To ensure unidimensionality, factor analysis
using the GLS method was applied to all eleven items. A one dimensional (that is, . a one
factor solution) measure of overall influence was specified, while ensuring that the model
achieved a sufficient degree of fit. When all the strategy variables were considered, the initial
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one factor solution did not fit the data satisfactorily (X2= 122.463: df=44; p-:.ooot After
several iterations and dropping a number of items, an acceptable one factor solution was
derived (X2= 9.929: df=9; p=.356). The items retained were retail influence over production
processes, new product development, price, inventories, delivery conditions and customer
portfolio. Bartlett's test ofsphericity (X2= 67.48: df=15; p-:.OOO) and the KMO measure of
sampling adequacy (.70) also indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The one factor
solution accounted for 25% of variation in the data. The rotated factor solution is given in
table 5.6. Face validation suggests that these variables cover a substantial range of
manufacturing activities, minimizing the potential problem of double counting and providing
a meaningful one dimensional measure of retail power. To measure internal consistency,
Chronbach's a was derived, and the result, while at the lower range of our tolerance range,
is considered acceptable based on earlier studies (Ganesan 1994; Klien et al 1990). Applying
weights, based on the strategic importance of the strategy variables, to the items yielded our
unidimensional measure of exercised power.
Table 5.6
Uni-dimensional Measure of Retail Influence
FI
(a = .64)
Retail influence on production processes .632
Retail influence on inventories .513
Retail influence on new product development .520
Retail influence on delivery conditions .319
Retail influence on price .404
Retail influence on customer portfolio .526
The review of the literature suggested that retailer influence and power were exercised over
sets of different strategy variables. Two dimensions stood out in particular, product and
margin related. Earlier it was argued, that retail influence appears to be increasingly more
9 The null hypothesis is that the k factor model model fits the data appropriately. Thus we do not want to reject
the null hypothesis. Here the p value ':.05 indicates that we have to reject the hypothesis. The k fator model
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product directed with regard to own brand suppliers but more price orientated in the case of
branded manufacturers. It is proposed that these underlying dimensions of retail influence and
power provide a strategically rich focus for analysis. To examine retail influence and power
over these dimensions a two factor model is required. An initial model based on all strategy
variables failed to provide an appropriate fit. Reducing the number of items yielded a two
factor solution (X2= 7.798: df=8; p=.453). The factor loadings are given in table 5.7. All
display clear loadings and are well in excess ofthose recommended by Hair et al (1995), Child
(1990) and Comrey and Lee (1992).
Factor 1 (F1) represents retailers' influence on product-related activities, covering supplier
(input) selection, production processes, new process development, and product specifications.
Factor 2 (F2) represents retailers' influence on margin related activities through pricing,
promotional activities and credit. Once again, applying the relevant weights to each of the
items and averaging, yields the measures of product and margin related power.
Table 5.7
Internal Reliabilty (a) and Exploratory Factor Analysis:
Product and Margin Dimensions of Influenceteni a F11 F2
.562
.855
.833
.516
.441
.679
.528
Product Related Influence! .77
Retail influence on supplier selection
Retail influence on production processes
Retail influence on new production processes developnient
Retail influence on product specifications
Margin Related Influence .57
Retail influence on proniotional activity
Retail influence on price
~etail influence on credit
Notes: Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares.
Rotation Method: Variniax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations
IFactor titles given in bold.
does not fit the data suffciently welL.
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5.3.3 Characteristics of Industry Structure
This section is concerned with developing measures for the constructs, availability of
alternative capacity, the importance of economies of scale, retail and manufacturer
concentration and own brand penetration. Clearly, one possibility would be to derive ratios
as measures for each of the constructs. For instance, concentration levels are frequently
expressed in this form using concentration ratios and market share information.
However, these measures are critically dependent on a precise definition of the market and,
as a consequence, raise a series of potential problems. Chapter two showed that Irish food
manufacturers displayed a high propensity to export their products to the British market in
particular. However, some manufacturers do not export. Clearly, informants could have been
restricted in their choice of retailer to a specific market. However, to do so would be to defeat
the aim of capturing variations in relationships with retailers. Consequently one could have
two firms producing a very similar product but trading in two different markets (for example,
one firm's definition of their market could be Ireland while the other firm's could include
Britain) and the relevant definition of market would vary. Expressing concentration in a ratio
format would be impracticable, as market share data for all possible combinations of markets
and products is unavailable. The same problem emerges for own brand penetration.
A similar problem exists on the supply side in terms of industry definition and manufacturer
concentration. However, in this case, the problem is greater as there are no concentration
indices available for the Irish food manufacturing sector. Furthermore, while it may be
possible to construct a measure of unused capacity, it is likely to be fraught with diffculties
and certainly beyond the scope of this research. Measures of excess capacity at product level
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do not exist and issues such as the homogeneity of capacity would prove difficult to establish
if an objective measure was required for the analysis. Finally, there are no objective measures
of the importance of economies of scale available to the researcher.
To redress these issues recourse is taken to perceived retailer and manufacturer concentration,
which incorporate the relevant definition of market from the manufacturer's perspective. A
similar procedure was tested to measure own brand penetration, but during the pretest period
comments indicated that informants judged this figure by market as defined by the retailer
under investigation. Consequently, the market relevant to the measure of own brand
penetration is defined by the location of the retailer. A Likert scale method of measuring the
availability of alternative capacity and the importance of economies of scale was also adopted.
Measures of the internal consistency, using Chronbach's a for both industr structure and firm
characteristics, are provided in table 5.8. It shows the items composing the measure of
manufacturer concentration, retail concentration, own brand penetration, the importance of
economies of scale and availability of alternative capacity. In the case of two constructs,
economies of scale and retail concentration, only two items were used. The use of two items
is not unusual in the literature (O'Callaghan et al 1992; Kumar et al 1995b). The items
discarded from the analysis were removed because of low item-construct correlations. In the
case of economies of scale, the link with competitiveness was also considered important in
ensuring a complete understanding of the construct actually measured. All the a scores for
each of the five constructs are very satisfactory and indicate a suffcient degree of reliability
to proceed.
To test for convergent and divergent validity, exploratory factor analysis was applied.
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Principal component analysis was employed as the method of factor extraction as it yielded
more meaningful results. In effect, the principal components method transforms a set of
correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated principal components or factors. While it is
possible to extract as many factors as there are items, it was decided to extract only those
factors that accounted for variances greater than one. In other words, when both factors and
items are standardized, only factors which explain at least 1/N of the total variance are
extracted, where N is the total number of items (i.e. where the eigenvalue exceeds or is equal
to one). The resulting analysis generated five factors to explain the structure of the data,
accounting for over 70% of the total variance.
The factors are provided in table 5.8. Bartletts test ofsphericity (X2= 588: df=105; P':.OOO)
and the KMO test for sampling adequacy (0.65) support the appropriateness of factor analysis.
The factor loadings clearly display convergent validity, with the expected items grouping
together under common factors. The results also point to divergent validity with distinct and
meaningful factors emerging. These are concentration in manufacturing and retailing, own
brand market penetration, the importance of scale economies in manufacturing and alternative
capacity. Items with high loadings on a particular factor were averaged to provide a measure
of the required constructs.
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Table 5.8
Internal Reliabilty (ix) and Exploratory Factor Analysis:
Industry Structure Characteristics
ix Ft! F2 F3 F4 F5
Manufacturer Concentration! .76
Most output in this industry is attributable to a few firms. .697
Our industr is controlled by a small number of large .772
manufacturinl! entemrises.
Our industry is dominated by a few manufacturers. .778
Our industr consists of a large number of similarly sized .666
manufacturers (Reversed),
Retail Concentration .71
A few retailers dominate our industry. .840
Our market is controlled by a small number of large retailers. .882
Own Brand Penetration .73
Own brands dominate this retailer's market. .846
Own brand products account for a large proportion of their .756
total grocery industry's sales.
They and their competitors have an own brand alternative for .524
almost all products.
Most of this retailer's competitors have substantial own brand .743
sales.
Importance of Scale Economies .66
Scale economies play a significant role in maintaining .779
competitiveness in this industry.
In our industr, long production runs are necessary for cost .703
competitiveness.
A vailabiltv of Alternative Capacity .84
Ifwe were to cease trading, our competitors could easily .909
supply suffcient volumes to meet our customers' needs.
Retailers can find other manufacturers with unused capacity .845
to supply their needs.
Our customers would have considerable diffculty in finding .850
alternative suppliers if we were to stop doing business with
them (Reversed).
Notes
Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
¡Factor titles given in bold in column 1
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5.3.4 Firm and Product Characteristics
The review of the literature identified a number of firm characteristics, both retail and
manufacturer, which could be expected to act as determinants of retail power. These were
manufacturer brand franchise, the strategic use of own brands and manufacturer emphasis on
innovation. To derive appropriate measures, a series of items relating to the strength of these
characteristics were scored on a 1-7 scale (strongly disagree - strongly agree). Product shelf-
life was taken as a proxy for the variables product complexity and contribution to the retailer's
positioning. It was measured in terms of days life post productionlO. Using an adaptation of
Stump and Heide (1996), supplier monitoring was measured using a seven point Likert scale
"no monitoring of our performance" to "extensive monitoring of our performance" over a
range of manufacturing activities.
Once again, to test for convergent and divergent validity, exploratory factor analysis was
applied. Principal component analysis was employed as the method of factor extraction. The
number of factors to be extracted was determined by requiring that the eigenvalue equal or
exceed unity. The resulting factor matrix is given in table 5.9. Bartlett's test of sphericity
(x2= 1052: df=190; P-C.OOO) and the KMO test for sampling adequacy (0.74) indicate that one
can comfortably proceed with the analysis. The five factors explained 70% of the variance in
the data. The measures of internal consistency for the constructs are also provided.
10 The argument linking retailer's positioning, product complexity and product shelf-life is discussed in
substantial detail in chapter six under hypothesis H4.
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Table 5.9
Internal Reliabilty (ix) and Exploratory Factor Analysis:
Firm Characteristics
ix F1! F2 F3 F4 F5
Manufacturer Brand Franchise! .82
Delisting our brand is 1ikelv to reduce their sales. .812
Our brand is important to their category. .876
Our brand is the market leader in their category. .855
Stratee:ic Use of Own Brands .87
They market their own brand as quality brand in its own .786
right.
Their own brand is comparable to the best manufacturer .653
brand.
They perceive their own brand to be a quality brand. .884
The image of their own brand is important to them. .886
Own brands account for a large share of their category .489
sales.
Their own brand products are becoming much more .718
complex and sophisticated.
Manufacturer Emnhasis on Innovation .79
Investment in NPD is essential for continued success. .808
Product innovation is an important source of our .842
competitive advantage.
A constant stream of new products is necessary to .834
maintain one's place in the marketolace.
We allocate significant resources to new product .866
development.
Product Related Retail Monitoring .88
Production processes .890
Raw material quality .843
Product qualitv .856
Commercial Performance (Margin Related Retail .58
Monitorine:
Delivery accuracy .558
Price competitiveness .526
Product sales .836
Promotion effectiveness .666
Extraction method: Pr4incipal Components Analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation
¡Factor titles given in bold
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5.3.5 Relationship Characteristics
The earlier review suggested that a series of relationship characteristics exist, which are likely
to vary at relationship level with implications for retailer power. Of these, the more important
were both manufactuer and retailer dependency and their specific investments or assets in the
immediate relationship. These constructs were measured using a seven point Likert scale (1-
strongly agree - 7 strongly disagree) on a series of items. Where possible, items measuring
specific investments. were adapted from Stump and Heide (1996) and Fein and Anderson
(1997).
Two measures of dependency are required, one for perceived manufacturer dependency on
the retailer and another for perceived retailer dependency on the manufacturer. Following
Heide (1994), Buchanan (1992) and Kumar et al (1995) an operational measure Of dependency
was defined in terms of replace ability. Kumar et al (1998), drawing on Emerson (1962), argue
that both replaceability and the value received by a firm through the relationship, should be
incorporated into the measure of dependency. Consequently, they devise a composite
dependence scale incorporating share of sales and profits. However, while a measure of share
of sales was available on the manufacturers' side, it was unavailable on the retail side. A
measure of share of profits was even more problematic as few manufacturers had measures
of account profitability that allocated fixed costs across their trading partners. Thus, for
consistency across the dyad and for simplicity, sales or profits are excluded from the
construction of our dependency measure.
The other motive for ensuring consistency across the dyad is to provide the basis for
measuring interdependency. Increasing levels of dependency are a necessary but insufficient
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condition for increasing interdependency. To derive a measure of interdependency both
dependency measures were multiplied, where higher scores represent higher levels of
interdependency than lower scores. A similar measure, used to capture the symmetricity of
dependency, was employed by Heide (1994).
Chapter two demonstrated that the composition of the brand portfolio traded may also vary
among a given manufacturer's trading relationships. Two ways of identifying the brand
portfolio have been identified. The first is to calculate as a ratio, that is, the proportion of
sales to a retailer in an own brand format. The second is to use a label, which can take the
value of own brand supplier only, branded supplier only or a mixed portfolio supplier.
Principal component analysis was employed to explore the underlying structure of the data.
The measure of interdependence was omitted as it was constructed using our measures of
manufacturer and retailer dependence. Once again, the number of factors was determined by
the data. The only restriction imposed was that the eigenvalue for the final factor extracted
equaled or exceeded one. The resulting factors are given in table 5.10. Bartlett's test of
sphericity (X2= 1245 :df=253; P':.OOO) and the KMO test for sampling adequacy (0.76)
support the appropriateness of factor analysis. The factors point strongly towards convergent
validity with the expected items converging along the same factors. The exception is retail
dependency. This falls across two factors and the distinguishing feature appears to be the
perceived role of competitors. However it is proposed that, for the purpose of construction,
both factors should be used in the composition of our retail dependency measure by averaging
the item scores across the six high loading items on both factors.
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Table 5.10
Internal Reliabilty and Exploratory Factor Analysis: Relationship Specifc
Characteristics
et F1 1 F2 F3 F4 F5
Manufacturer Dependency 1 .87
The loss of their business would be a serious blow to our future .85
profitability.
The volume of business we do with them helps us to be cost .60
comoetitive vis-à-vis other manufacturers.
The loss of their business would increase our unit costs as a result .74
of lost economies of scale.
The loss of their account would significantly reduce our short-term .86
profits.
We would find it very diffcult to replace their business if we were .66
to lose it.
Our business would be in jeopardy if we lost their business. .81
Retail Dependency .70
Few of our competitors could easily meet their quantity .84
requirements.
Few of our comoetitors could meet their quality requirements. .81
Ifwe discontinued supplying to them, they would have diffculty .68
making uo the sales volume in our oroduct category.
If we were to stop doing business with them, they would find it .64
hard to source products quickly with similar customer appeaL.
If our product is out of stock, their customers are unlikely to .71
purchase a substitute.
If they were to stop doing business with us, their customers would .78
quickly notice.
Manufacturer Specific Assets .85
Their delivery conditions are particularly demanding. .60
We spent considerable effort training our staff to deal with their .54
specific requirements.
We spent considerable effort establishing procedures and routines .75
to cater to their specific needs.
If we were to cease trading with them, we would waste a lot of .78
knowledge that's tailored to their method of ooerations.
We have strong oersonal re1ationshios with them. .59
We spent considerable resources tailoring our production processes .61
to meet their product specifications.
Integrating our information systems to cater to their specific needs .66
proved diffcult.
Retailer Specific Assets .80
They carr out a very time consuming due diligence before .58
aooroving a new supplier.
Their buyers and technologists have spent a lot of time and effort .69
providing us with advice and information.
They have allocated a lot of shelf space to our products. .76
Their product specifications are oarticu1arlv demandin2:. .67
Notes
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization
i Factor titles given in bold
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Drawing Heide and John (1990), a measure of joint effort is derived based on joint activities
undertaken by the firm. A seven point Likert scale, minimal joint effort to extensive joint
effort, was employed. This constrct is excluded from the factor analysis above, as the range
of activities assessed suggest that it is likely to fall across a number of those factors. The
items used were new product development, production process development, new delivery
procedures, information systems, sales forecasting, retailer's range (assortment) management,
promotions planning, and product merchandising. The measure of internal reliability was
suffciently high at 0.78.
5.3.6 Inter-firm Integration
The final set of constructs measures the degree of integration and consists of a series of items
designed to capture the closeness of the firms. The mode of governance may be measured by
recourse to the degree of integration in evidence between the firms. According to Crocker and
Masten (1991), relational contracting provides a "structure that encourages rent increasing
adjustments (flexibility) but discourages rent dissipating efforts to redistribute existing
surpluses (opportnism)". Macneil (1981:1205) argues that "discrete transactions differ from
contractual relations respecting many key characteristics. Among the most important for
economic analysis are commencement, duration and termination, measurement and
specificity, planning, sharing versus dividing benefits and burdens, interdependence, future
cooperation and solidarity; personal relations among and number of participants, and power".
For this study, the expected duration of the relationship, and planning, supported by
information transfer and communication, are the more important. The items chosen were
adapted from Gilbert et al (1994) to capture inter-firm symmetry in communication, Mohr et
al (1996) to capture inter-firm information transfer, Heide (1994) to capture flexibility and
inter-firm planning, Heide and John(1990), Kumar et al (1995b) and Ganesan (1994) for
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expectations of relationship continuity while Monczka et al (1995) was adapted to measure
future relationship attractiveness. The series of items were scored on a 1-7 point scale (1-
completely inaccurate description of our relationship, to 7- completely accurate description).
Applying exploratory factor analysis to our items yielded the results below (table 5.11).
Principal component analysis extracted a four factor modeL. Both Bartlet's test of sphericity
(X2= 689.524: df=91; PO:.OOO)and the KMO test of sampling adequacy (KMO = .826) provide
evidence of the appropriateness of the application. The model explained 69% of the variation
in the data. The factors identified are flexibility and planning, information transfer,
expectations of relationship continuity and potential, and inter-firm communication. While
Chronbach's a is low for information transfer, following Ganesan (1994) and Klien et al
(1990) it is considered suffcient. All remaining scores, and expected continuity and
relationship potential in particular, are high indicating a substantial degree of reliability.
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Table 5.11
Internal Reliabilty and Exploratory Factor Analysis: Inter Firm Integration
a F11 F2 F3 F4
Flexibilty and Planninl! .83
The nature of our relationship enables both of us to manage .658
changing circumstances welL.
Flexibilty by both parties in response to requests for changes is .669
a characteristic of this relationship.
Both parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the on- .794
going relationship to cope with changing circumstances.
When some unexpected situation arises, both parties would rather .760
work out a compromise rather than hold each other to the original
deaL.
Both parties make joint plans for the future development of our .671
businesses.
Information Transfer .57
We provide them with a lot of sensitive information about our .711
operations (costs, oroduct specifications, etc).
They provide us with sensitive information (sales, market shares, .499
performance results, etc).
Expected Continuity and Potential of the Relationship .83
Both parties expect this relationship to last a long time. .576
We expect to be working with this retailer for the foreseeable .770
future.
We expect them to become more important to our success in the .833
future.
We expect them to become a greater source of profits in the .715
future.
I expect them to be or continue to be one of our most important .813
customers.
Communication .80
Communication between our companies is such that any member .777
of their team can easilv contact any of ours.
Communication between our companies is such that any member .895
of our team can easily contact any of theirs.
Notes
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
1 Factor titles given in bold
In the confidence that the items provide an appropriate coverage of all the aspects of inter-firm
integration, one can now proceed to generate a one dimensional measure of integration. GLS
was applied to extract a single factor modeL. The items relating to relationship continuity and
attractiveness were excluded as these were considered antecedents of high levels of inter-firm
integration. In other words, expectation of relationship continuity and attractiveness is a
determinant of inter-firm integration. The initial one factor solution did not fit the data
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satisfactorily. However, after several iterations and dropping a number of items, an acceptable
one factor solution was derived (X2= 26.239: df=20; P=.158). Bartlett's test of sphericity (X2=
281.5219: df=28; P':.OOO) and the KMO measure of sampling adequacy (.861) also support
the application of factor analysis. The model explained 42% of variance in the data. The
results are given in table 5.12 and incorporate the important attibutes of flexibility, planning,
communication and information transfer. Chronbach's a is also high yielding a suffcient
degree of construct reliability.
Table 5.12
Uni-dimensional Measure of Inter-Firm Integration
Item (a=.84) Fl
The nature of our relationship enables both of us to manage chan!!in!! circumstances welL. .756
Flexibility by both parties in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship. .704
Both parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the on-going relationship to cope with .738
changing circumstances.
When some unexpected situation arises, both parties would rather work out a compromise rather .720
than hold each other to the original deaL.
Both parties make ioint plans for the future development of our businesses. .679
They provide us with sensitive information (sales, market shares, performance results, etc). .520
We provide them with a lot of sensitive information about our operations (costs, product .449
specifications, etc)
Communication between our companies is such that any member of their team can easily contact .554
any of ours 
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares. i factors extracted. 5 iterations required.
5.4 Construct Validation: Discriminant Validity
While the factor analysis goes some way in pointing towards discriminant validity, further
evidence is required. One requires a more precise test. To do this we examine the correlation
coeffcients among the variables. Following Kumar et al (1995) and Molla and Sanchez
(1997), who employed this method of proving discriminant validity, it is argued that if
variables are distinct, their correlation coefficient should be significantly different from unity.
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The correlation coeffcient matrx is given in table 5.13. The correlation coeffcient measures
the linear association between two variables. It can take a value from -1 to + 1. The sign
indicates the slope of the line. It can be positive or negative. A correlation of + 1 indicates
that the variables lie along an exactly straight line with a positive slope. However the
correlation coeffcient is a point estimate. It has a distribution, and different samples are
likely to yield different coefficient values. Consequently, one needs to establish whether or
not the sample results can support the hypotheses that the correlation coefficients among the
constructs are significantly different from unity. Thus the null and alternate hypotheses can
be given as:
HO: r = 1
HI: r-: 1
The correlation coeffcient matrices and t-test values are given in table 5.13,
where,
Variable Name
Capacity
Scale
Retcon
Mancon
Obstrat
Obmkt
lnnovat
Manspec
Retspec
Manbrand
Retdep
Mandep
Conatt
Integrat
Interdep
Description
The perceived availability of alternative capacity
The importance of economies of scale in manufacturing
Perceived retail concentration
Perceived manufacturer concentration
Perceived strategic use of own brand by the retailer
Perceived own brand penetration of the market
Importance of innovation to the manufacturer
Manufacturer specific investments in the relationship with the retailer
Retailer specific investments in the relationship with the manufacturer
Manufacturer brand franchise
Perceived retail dependency on the manufacturer
Perceived manufacturer dependency on the retailer
Expected continuity and attactiveness of the relationship
The perceived degree of inter- firm integration
The perceived degree of interdependency
All the t-est statistics are significant at the .005% level enabling us to reject the null
hypothesis and claim discriminant validity.
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Table 5.13
Discriminant Validity
Pearson Correlation Coeffcients
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= 0 a' "0 .. "Ia ~ ~ ~ "I "0 ~ .. ~= .. N .. ~ ~ ~ "0 "I ..~ = NQ.
Capacity 1.00
Scale 0.05 1.00
Retcon 0.09 0.10 1.00
Mancon -0.15 0.45 -0.08 1.00
Obstrat 0.04 0.22 0.32 0.17 1.00
Obmkt 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.10 0.76 1.00
Innovat 0.04 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.38 0.30 1.00
Manspec 0.05 0.36 0.11 0.16 0.32 0.35 0.13 1.00
Retspec -0.03 0.12 0.26 0.04 0.41 0.37 0.05 0.65 1.00
Manbrand 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.14 -0.08 -0.13 0.05 0.04 -0.08 1.00
Retdep -0.48 -0.14 -0.10 -0.17 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.27 0.23 0.40 1.00
Mandep 0.11 0.23 0.30 -0.00 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.45 0.32 0.16 0.24 1.00
Conattr 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.36 0.25 0.20 -0.03 0.09 0.45 1.00
Integrat 0.00 0.08 0.14 -0.13 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.50 0.52 -0.13 0.20 0.18 0.43 1.00
Interdep -0.26 0.04 0.10 -0.12 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.83 0.70 0.30 0.27
HO: r= I
HI: re: I
Values for T-test (absolute value)
"0
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~
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Capacity
Scale 9.80
Retcon 9.57 9.42
Mancon 12.13 6.41 11.27
Obstrat 9.99 8.36 7.50 8.76
Obmkt 9.45 7.77 10.35 9.44 3.89
Innovat 9.99 8.36 7.50 8.76 7.01 7.64
Manspec 9.92 7.19 9.34 8.90 7.52 7.27 9.12
Retspec 10.70 9.14 7.95 9.97 6.68 7.03 9.84 4.78
Manbrand 9.92 11.6 10.19 11.92 11.24 11.86 9.90 9.99 11.2
Retdep 17.66 11.96 11.51 12.36 9.76 10.86 10.76 7.91 8.17 6.79
Mandep 9.34 8.30 7.69 10.46 7.69 8.61 8.79 6.47 7.42 8.87 8.21
Conattr 8.14 9.82 8.15 9.93 8.36 9.47 7.10 7.99 8.35 10.59 9.49 6.40
Integrat 10.32 9.58 9.01 11.76 8.31 9.05 9.71 5.95 5.74 11.72 8.47 8.67 6.53
Interdep 13.62 10.04 9.42 11.74 8.80 10.07 9.83 6.69 7.19 7.20 3.22 4.37 7.56 7.81
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed and validated the series of constructs necessary to test the
hypotheses which wil be derived in the next chapter. Internal consistency of each of the
variables has been established using Chronbach's a, and convergent and discriminant validity
have been demonstrated using a combination of exploratory factor analysis and Kumar et aI's
(1995) criterionll. Thus it is now possible to proceed with confidence and test the specific
hypothesis established in the next chapter using the measures derived here.
11 Note also that in no case is the correlation between each of the measures and any other as high as its
Chronbach's lX, providing further evidence of discriminant validity (Gaski 1986).
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Chapter Six
Hypotheses and Results
6.1 Introduction
This investigation's concern is to cast light on grocers' power over food manufacturers'
activities. It seeks to identify the determinants of grocers' power over and the range and
extent of retailers' involvement in these activities. There is considerable evidence to indicate
that retailer power is pervasive and can extend across many manufacturing activities. The
perspective employed in this study, emerging from the earlier review ofthe literature, suggests
that retail power and influence is determined by three sets of factors. These are industry
related, firm and product related and relationship related. This research attempts to identify
the role of these factors in the determination of retail power.
The review of the literature pointed to the factors presented in table 6.1. The table specifies
what is believed to be the determinants of retail power. These are operationalised through a
number of key characteristics or variables. However, much of this work is unsupported by
empirical evidence. It is argued here that much of the literature, by failing to account for
possible interrelationships among these factors and characteristics, fails to provide an adequate
perspective on the determinants of retailer power.
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Table 6.1
The Determinants of Retail Power
Factor Group Characteristic
~ Availability of alternative Capacity in Manufacturing
.E '" Importnce of Economies of Scale in Manufacturingu u
e ''¡ Concentration.. '"iZ .¡:
tu . Retail
'" Cl Manufacturer
.g a .i:Õ Own Brand Market Penetration
Product Characteristics
. Complexity
. Contribution to Retailer's Positioning
.. Retailer Characteristicsu;:
"i '"
. Strategic Use of Own Brandso u
.. ...
0. to . Extent of Monitoring Activities
"' '¡:
i: Q) Manufacturer CharacteristicsCl Õ
Cl
. Emphasis on Innovation
ê aií Õ . Brand Franchise
Dependency
. Manufacturer Dependency
. Retailer Dependency
'"
Interdependency
u Brand Portfolio''¡
'" Specific Investments.¡:2 Retaileru .Cl
a . Manufacturer
..U Mode of Governance or Degree of Integration
.8-
. Flexibility..
'"i: . Joint planning
.8
..
. Information transfer and communicationCl
~ Expected continuity and attractiveness of the relationship
The lack of clarity on the side of the "determinants" is matched by a lack of perspective on
the dependant variable. Some studies of retail power have focused on manufacturers' margin
related activities (Office of Fair Trading 1985; Grant 1987; Restrictive Practices Commission
1987), while others have focused on product related activities (Hughes 1994; McGrath 1995).
This study adopts the view that the dynamics and determinants of retail power over product
related activities can differ significantly from margin related activities. However, none of the
earlier studies have empirically examined these differences and, in doing so, fail to offer a
suffciently broad examination of retail power as a phenomenon.
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In response to these criticisms, the current study seeks to achieve the following;
· To specify the relationships among the structural, firm, product and relationship variables
and retailer power, accounting for possible interdependencies;
. To empirically test the hypothesized relationships.
The immediate task, and the aim of this chapter, is to establish and test a series of hypotheses
that will form the basis for the inquiry. Hypotheses wil be developed along the following line
of inquiry. First, the dimensions of power wil be investigated. Then, a series of hypotheses
wil be developed, building on each other to establish a clearer insight between power and
structural characteristics. Next the chapter wil investigate the role of firm and product
characteristics as determinants of retail power. Concerted attention wil b~ given to the
relationship between retail monitoring activities, the strategic use of own brands and power.
The justification for this is that retail monitoring and specific investments form the bridge
between firm characteristics and relationship characteristics. At this stage, attention will turn
to the determinants of inter-firm integration, the degree to which transactions between retailers
and their manufacturers become domesticated, and the consequences for retailer power. The
final issue to be addressed wil be the role of brand portfolio within retailer-manufacturer
power relations.
It was argued in chapter four that the existing literature was fragmented and, consequently,
fails to offer a suffciently specified model of retailer power either as individual studies or as
a body of work. Possible relationships among the dimensions of retail power are neglected
or implicitly assumed not to exist. Consequently, some relationships are presumed to be
causal, whereas deeper investigation may show other more fundamental relationships to be
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operative. To correct this limitation, the current study wil seek to use individual hypotheses
as building blocks, each of which wil contribute to our understanding of the underlying
determinants of retailer power. It is only having tested these hypotheses and considered the
findings that the study can progress and be in a position to specify a more complete model of
retail power.
In this way each hypothesis adds incrementally to our understanding of retail power. A brief
discussion wil follow our analysis of each of our three factor groupings. The next chapter
wil provide a more detailed consideration of all our findings when taken together,
culminating in a more informed modeling of retail power.
6.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
The conceptual framework underlying this research proposes that differences in retail power
over food manufacturers may be explained by three groups of factors. These are
operationalised using a series of variables to capture variations in industry structure
characteristics, firm and product characteristics, and relationship specific characteristics
(Table 6.1). By structural characteristics, industry features, both retailing and manufacturing,
are considered. These may be expected to influence retail power over supplying firms. By
firm characteristics, individual retailer, manufacturer and product characteristics are
considered. By relationship specific characteristics, the way the individual trading
relationship is organized, supported by specific investments, the distribution of dependency
and other characteristics that may vary among a given manufacturer's trading relationships
with its customers, wil be taken into account.
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In this way, the framework considers variations in retail power within a product category,
where product and structural characteristics may be considered homogenous but where the
mode of governance may vary. It also facilitates analysis of similar relationship
characteristics or mode of governance but across different structural conditions, brand
portfolios, and firm and product characteristics. The review of the literature has shown that,
in an attempt to explain retail power, considerable explanatory power has been attributed to
structural and firm characteristics. Little work has focused on the way relationships are
organized and the impact on power differentials. This may be due to the view that
governance structures are an outcome of a particular power balance (Doel 1996). This
contrasts with the view that effciency determines governance and takes precedence to power
considerations (Wiliamson and Ouchi 1991). Furthermore, the literature has largely failed
to account for the interrelationships between these factor groupings or their constituents and,
in doing so, fails to provide an adequate explanation of the dynamics of retail power.
As a phenomenon, the balance of power resides within a relationship. Consequently, to
discuss the balance of power between sectors is somewhat misleading. To accommodate this,
the study wil take the individual retailer-manufacturer relationship as our basic unit of
analysis. By examining a series of such relationships, it is intended to separate out and assess
the effects of variations in structural conditions, firm and product characteristics and
relationship specific characteristics on retail power.
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6.2.1 Power and Influence
One of the issues emerging from the review of the power literature was the distinction
between power and influence. While French and Raven (1959) define power in terms of
influence, they make a number of clear distinctions. First" the "influence" of 0 must be
clearly distinguished from O's "control" ofP". "The influence exerted by an act need not be
in the direction intended by 0" and consequently, 0 does not control P" (French and Raven
1959:151). This may result from the fact that O's influence may, for instance, mobilize other
forces that have a countervailing effect. French and Raven (1959: 152) define "positive
control" as the situation where induced change is consistent with intended change.
Consequently, for the purpose at hand, this research distinguishes power from influence in
terms of direction, that is, power involves change "in favour ofthe objectives of the channel
member exerting influence" (Wilemon 1972:71). Thus, in this study, the term "power" could
be used interchangeably with the term "control". As shall be seen, this distinction becomes
implicit in many of the earlier works when designing measurement scales.
Also, French and Raven (1959) define power in terms of potentiaL. It was argued in the last
chapter that defining power in this way creates a number of operational diffculties from an
empirical perspective. This study's concern is to establish a clearer understanding of the
determinants and dynamics of exercised power exerted by food retailers over food
manufacturing operations. Thus,the study focused on power as an ex post phenomenon, a
force that has been exerted over manufacturing activities. It does not seek to directly measure
power as a potentiaL.
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6.2.2 Dimensions of Power
The framework also augments the existing literature in the way it views power. It has been
demonstrated that much of the earlier work, through the measures employed, viewed power
as a unidimensional construct. The dependent variable, power, was measured over a series
of strategic variables, which were in some cases weighted, and then aggregated to form an
overall index. Indeed, little attempt was made to test the assumption ofunidimensionality (El-
Ansary and Stern 1972; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Etgar 1976; Wilkinson 1981; Butaney and
WortzeI1988). Exceptions include Brown et al (1983, 1995). Following the discussion on
measurement in the methodology chapter, it is proposed that, at best, much of the strategic
richness of the study of power is lost and at worst, significant bias is entered into the body of
work.
While no particular piece of work offers an integrative framework, the literature on retailer-
manufacturer relations clearly demonstrates a distinction between power exercised over
product related activities and power exercised over margin components. The extent of retail
power over product related activities is well documented by numerous authors (Fearne 1996;
McGrath 1995; Brookes 1995; Hughes 1994; Senker 1986). Other work indicates growing
retail power on supply chain activities, with particular emphasis on logistics and the growing
retail control of the physical movement of products (Collns et al 1999; Collns 1999b; Bence
1995; McKinnon 1985, 1990; Smith and Sparks 1993).
On the margin side, there has also been considerable evidence to support discriminatory
discounts available to retailers of different sizes (Fair trade Commission 1972; Offce of Fair
Trading 1985; Grant 1987). The ways in which these discounts have been extracted vary
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considerably. For instances, Davies (1994a) argues that retailers have up to 40 ways of
extracting margin from manufacturers. This study proposes that a distinction between product
and margin related power is appropriate and of considerable strategic importance, emerging
in parallel with the greater sophisticated use of own brand as a retail phenomenon.
Consequently, the investigation of retail power over these dimensions, and the extent to which
the dynamics of power differ, will be fundamental to the research.
It should be noted that while much of this research focuses on the margin and product
dimensions of retail power, other dimensions could also have been identified. Our
unidimensional measure of power incorporates aspects of vertical restraints by measuring
retailer's influence on manufacturers' customer portfolios. Retailers' influence on delivery
conditions were also included. However, these are not considered in the two dimensions that
wil be analyzed. Consequently, retail power is not simply an aggregation of product and
margin related power as retail power extends beyond these.
6.3 Industry Structure and Retail Power
A given trading relationship operates within the context of two industres, a supplying industr
(manufacturing) and a demanding industry (retail). At any point in time, these industries'
strctures wil impose varying constraints on both parties' behaviours and the extent to which
retailers exercise power over manufacturing activities. Following the review, the essential
characteristics of the manufacturing industry which act as determinants of retail power are:
. excess capacity in manufacturing and the availabilty of alternative production capacity
to the retailer;
. the importnce of economies of scale in manufacturing and the extent to which variations
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in output influence marginal costs and horizontal competitiveness;
. manufacturer concentration.
On the retail side, the literature suggests that the more important aspects of industry structure
in the determination of retail power are:
. retail concentration;
. own brand penetration.
The expected relationships between both industries' characteristics and the underlying
dimensions of power are demonstrated in figure 6.1. Each wil be discussed over the course
of our argument.
Figure 6.1
Industry Characteristics and Retail Power
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6.3.1 Industry Structure and Retail Power Over Margin Related Activities
The existence of excess capacity in manufacturing has been posited to be an important
determinant of retail power. The availability of alternative production capacity to retailers
heightens the degree of horizontal competition among manufacturers. According to Davies
et al (1985), high levels of over-capacity during the 1970's and 1980's led manufacturers to
fight furiously for the available trade. Consequently, margin is competed away to the retail
stage of the marketing channeL.
Davies et al (1985) and Doel (1996) also highlight the link between excess capacity and own
brand. One of the arguments reviewed, was that excess capacity facilitated increasing retail
power by promoting own brand production. By appealing directly to the retailer rather than
the consumer, own brand production provided manufacturers with a faster and less risky
means of utilizing any shortfalls in capacity utilization. This is supported by De Chernatony
(1989), who provides a number of reasons why successful branded manufacturers undertake
own brand production, two of the more important being the achievement of economies of
scale and utilization of excess capacity. Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1998) found that capacity
utilization was the main reason why large manufacturers engaged in own brand production
and that this only took place in product areas that would not threaten their branded products.
Nevertheless, increasing own brand production would be expected to have two immediate
effects. First, it could extend a given retailer's supplier base, increasing competition among
actual and potential manufacturers. Second, own brand would increase the demand for the
given shelf-space, increasing the price of access to the shelf, thereby reducing manufacturers'
margIns.
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These arguents suggest that own brand sourcing by retailers is price orientated, with retailers
switching suppliers as free capacity and the potential for lower prices emerge elsewhere. This
is clearly at odds with the more recent evolution of the own brand market with greater
emphasis on higher value products and relationship stability (Dawson and Shaw 1989;1989b).
The strategic use of own brands to position the overall retail brand and the necessary
idiosyncratic investments made by the retailer are likely to have the effect of reducing the
substitutability of physical plant and equipment. This increases switching costs to the retailer,
thereby promoting relationship stability. However, when switching costs are low, and
manufacturers perceive a high level of substitutability among rival firms' capacity, retail
power over manufacturers' margin is likely to be considerable.
It is proposed in this study that the dynamic of excess capacity on retail power is margin
related rather than product related. Retail power over product related variables is more likely
to promote stability due to increased switching costs and the need for specific investments.
However, as excess capacity increases, manufacturers may be more willing to reduce prices
to maintain their customers' business and cover overheads. Even manufacturers within stable
relationships with their retail customers cannot afford their pricing to vary much from that
available on the open market.
The source of excess capacity is also likely to have changed. Manufacturer concentration has
increased in the Irish food sector over recent years through merger and acquisition activity.
A similar process occurred in the UK during the 1970's and 1980's. The subsequent
rationalization would be expected to reduce the problem of excess capacity on the supply side.
While some sectors are characterized by structural capacity problems, for example, beef, it
is proposed that temporary variations in demand are more likely to be the source of excess
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capacity. The temporary natue of these variations is unlikely to threaten relationship stability
but may influence pricing to a limited extent. This suggests that perceived alternative capacity
wil be more correlated with the exercise of retail power on margin than on the product
dimension!.
Another notion that underlies much of the literature is that variances in relative concentration
in the retailing and manufacturing sectors influence retail power. High retail concentration
increases the importance of a given retail account by reducing the number of alternative
customers, thereby increasing retailer power (Duke 1989).
A similar argument is made on the manufacturing side as high manufacturing concentration
reduces alternative sources of supply. However, concentration in manufacturing is insufficient
to insulate against retail power, particularly when economies of scale are importnt (Burns and
Henson 1995). Where economies of scale are important, reductions in output can result in
significant increases in unit costs. Consequently, large-scale manufacturers can compete
vigorously on the basis of price. Burns and Henson (1995) argue their case based on their
observation of the bread industry. However, there is a strong theoretical argument for a close
correlation between the importance of economies of scale and concentration in manufacturing.
For a given market, the greater the minimum optimal scale in manufacturing, the fewer the
plants that can operate in the long run in a competitive industr. As Martin (1994:238) points
out "the more important are economies of scale, the greater wil be long-run market
concentration". Thus, one needs more substantial evidence to de-couple the roles played by
manufacturing concentration and economies of scale as determinants of retail power.
i See A6.l, HI for statistical testing
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According to Grant (1987), the maIn effect of retail power is the ability to induce
discriminatory discounts. Evidence of large retailers' ability to extract such discounts was
provided by the OFT (1985). However, to suggest that retail power was simply a function of
retail size would be naïve. Grant (1987) proposes that retailer power, effective through
margin and discriminatory discounts, wil be positively and linearly related to the share of
business going through the national multiples (concentration), negatively related to
manufacturing industry growth (a proxy for excess capacity) and negatively related to seller
concentration.
Expanding on Grant's (1987) work, this research proposes that there is another aspect to retail
concentration and retail power over manufacturers' margin related activities. As retail
concentration increases, manufacturers' ability to price discriminate diminishes as the
discriminated-against market is reduced in size. Until recently, Irish manufacturers had the
strategic option of discriminating between the Irish and UK markets. The Irish market was
largely brand orientated while the UK market was characterized by a substantially greater
penetration of own brand products. This variation across markets would be expected to
facilitate discrimination by promoting different elasticities of demand while simultaneously
reducing the likelihood of arbitrage. Furthermore, own brand products are not directly
comparable in costless fashion due to variations in specifications and by the fact that the
manufacturer usually remains anonymous. Both these factors would be expected to enhance
discriminatory possibilities. Under these conditions, larger British multiples would be
expected to be in a better position than Irish retailers to extract discounts from the common
supplier base. However, the takeover of Power Supermarkets by Tesco, representing an
increase in retail concentration when taking the two markets from a supply perspective,
reduced Irish manufacturers' ability to discriminate. Indeed, the net effect is likely to have
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been a reduction in manufacturers' prices to the retail stage across markets and greater retail
power over manufacturers' margins.
There is considerable evidence to indicate that manufacturers' ability to maintain prices above
long run marginal cost is, in part, a function of manufacturer concentration (Martin 1994).
The ability to "coordinate" prices to retailers, avoiding direct price competition, will be
positively related to manufacturer concentration (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1998).
Consequently, manufactuer concentration counters retail power over margin related activities.
As discussed earlier with respect to excess capacity, increasing own brand penetration has the
potential to increase retail power over margin related activities. On the margin side, own
brand penetration, by increasing horizontal competition among food manufacturers and
placing greater demands on the given shelf-space, has the potential to increase the flow of
margin to the retail level of the food channeL.
Drawing the arguments above together leads to a modification of Grant's (1987) hypothesis
and the following proposal:
HI Retail power over margin wil be positively related to retail concentration, negatively
related to manufacturer concentration, positively related to alternative capacity and positively
related to the importance of economies of scale and the market penetration of own brand.
To examine this hypothesis, the model below was tested, regressing retail power over margin
on the variables postulated. The analysis was carried out using Shazame.
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1. Marpower = Const + ß 1 retcon + ß2 mancon + ß3 altcap + ß4 ecscale + ß5 obmkt + U
Where:
const, is the constant,
retcon is perceived retail concentration,
mancon is perceived concentration in manufacturing
altcap is perceived availability of alternative capacity,
ecscale is the perceived importance of economies of scale in manufacturing,
obmkt is the perceived market penetration of own brand
and where ß 1 to ß5 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbance term.
The ordinary least squares results are given below in table 6.2. As the data is cross-sectional,
the potential problem of hetroscedasticity has to be accounted for. Thus, White's
hetroscedasticity corrective procedure is employed in all regression analysis2. Ramsey's reset
test is used to test for model specification.
The regression yielded an adjusted R2 of approximately .263, indicating that about 26% of the
variation in the dependent variable is explained by the modeL. The F statistic indicates that
the regression is significant and that at least one of the postulated variables is significantly
different from zero. The low F statistics for the reset test indicate that the model is properly
specified.
2 For a more complete discussion of White's procedure and Ramsey's reset test see Appendix A6.2
3 The adjusted R2 provides a measure of goodness of fit. In cross-sectional analysis low values are common.
Examples include Heide (1994) where the adjusted R2 =.14, and Klien (1989) where adjusted R2 = .20.
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Table 6.2
Structural Conditions as Determinants of Retail Power over Margin
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is Retail Power over Margin
97 observations 4
CONST
Retail Concentration
Manufacturer Concentration
Alternative Capacity
Importance of Economies of Scale
Own Brand Market Penetration
Coeffcient
-3.4224
.85608
-.19105
.44822
1.0260
.80757
Standard Error
3.027
.2983
.2265
.2677
.2799
.2826
(Prob)
.261
.005
.401
.097
.000
.005
St. Coeffcient
0.0000
.2175
-.0539
.1643
.3110
.2652
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.2989 F-statistic F( 5, 91) 7.760(.000)
.2604
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) = 1.6048 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =90
Reset (3) = 1.908 - F with DF 1 =2 and DF 2 =89
Reset (4) = 1.7026 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =88
The results above support the relationships between perceived retail power over margin, and
perceived own brand penetration, retail concentration and the importance of economies of
scale. The level of confidence with respect to the perceived availability of alternative capacity
is below the 95% confidence level at 90.3%. The results do not support the hypothesized
relationship between manufacturer concentration and retailers' power over manufacturers'
margins.
6.3.2 Industry Structure and Retail Power Over Product Related Activities
Burt (1992) argues that a "simple correlation between growth of retailer market share and
retailer brand penetration is naive. Rather it is the retailer's strategy and attitude to retailer
brands that is the important determinant". However, while retailer strategy and attitude are
4 Due to a number of missing responses for different items a common sample of 97 obseryations is used in
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necessary conditions for increasing levels of own brand penetration, they alone are
insuffcient. The size and distribution of shares within the market are likely to be key
determinants of the number of products worthwhile to produce as own brand variants. In a
small market, it may be economical to produce the top 100 lines in an own brand format,
while in a larger market more own brand products may be possible. For a given market, and
particularly for small markets where volumes are relatively low, the extent of retail
concentration is likely to be of considerable importance. As a retailer's share of the given
market increases, own brand extension into new product categories becomes more feasible.
Consequently, more of the food supplier base is likely to be affected, working to retail
specifications and thereby establishing a tentative relationship between retail concentration
and retail power on the product side.
In many instances, and particularly within new relationships, established manufacturers may
be unwiling to invest in capital equipment dedicated to own brand production. However,
where and when excess capacity exists, manufacturers may be more likely to supply own
brand products subject to retailers' specifications (Doel1996). Under this condition, the cost
and risk associated with own brand production may be expected to be relatively low on the
manufacturer side, while the potential benefits both immediately, through greater capacity
utilization, and over time as relationships evolve, may be considerable. Thus,one expects
there to be a positive relationship between product related retailer power and excess capacity.
De Chernatony (1989) and McGoldrick (1990) argue that where economies of scale are
importnt, manufacturers are more likely to engage in own brand production and cede control
of certain decisions to the retailer. However, as increasing retail control is required and
all regressions.
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product specifications become more idiosyncratic, the scale benefits of own brand production
are reduced. Consequently, it is proposed that scale motivations are considerably less
important than the need to utilize excess capacity in explaining the extent of retail product
related power.
Chapter three demonstrated that the decision to produce own brand products can be viewed
as a prisoner's dilemma (Galizzi et al 1997). From the manufacturing industry's perspective,
the optimal situation is where no manufacturer produces own brands, thereby removing one
source of inter-manufacturer competition. However, there may be an incentive for at least one
firm to cheat at the expense of the remaining firms. Where concentration is high and
manufacturing capacity is controlled by a few firms, the ability to prevent cheating is likely
to be greater. This is due to the fact that an individual firm's actions are more observable to
rivals and subject to more rapid competitive reactions. Thus, "understood but unspoken
agreements to resist price cutting or supply own label exist between oligopolistic
manufacturers" come into effect (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1998:82). Consequently, one
would expect manufacturer concentration to be negatively related to retail power both on the
product and, as argued earlier, margin sides.
The argument relating structural conditions to retail power on product related activities is
notably weaker than that on the margin side. The dominant structural conditions favouring
retail product power are likely to be retail concentration and own brand penetration. However,
developing on Burt (1992), the extent of product related power is more likely to be related to
the nature of the strategic use of the own brand products. Retailers' requirements for control
over product related activities are likely to be related to the positioning of those products.
However, this is a retail characteristic and wil be dealt with later. Nevertheless, while the
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nature of the relationship between structual conditions and product related power is likely to
be weak, it is postulated that:
H2 Retail power over product related activities wil be positively related to retail
concentration, positively related to own brand penetration, positively related to availabilty
of capacity but negatively related to manufacturer concentration.
To test this hypothesis the model below was employed:
2. Prodpower = Const + a 1 retcon + a2 obmkt + a3 mancon + a4 altcap + U
Where:
const is the constant
retcon is perceived retail concentration
obmkt is perceived market penetration of own brand,
mancon is perceived concentration in manufacturing
altcap is perceived availability of alternative capacity and
where a 1 to a4 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbance term.
The results are provided in table 6.3. The first feature to note is that the F-statistic is
significant, indicating that at least one of the independent variables is significantly different
from zero. Second, the adjusted R2 indicates that the model explains over 17% of the variation
in the dependent variable. The results of the reset test support an appropriate model
specification. An investigation of the coefficient values and their significance levels
highlights that both retail concentration (95%) and own brand penetration (99%) are both
significant and positively related to retail product related power. Manufacturer concentration
is also found to be significant at the 95% confidence level and displays the expected negative
relationship.
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Table 6.3
Structural Conditions and Retail Power over Product Related Activities
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is Retail Power over Margin
97 observations 5
CONST
Retail Concentration
Own Brand Market Penetration
Manufacturer Concentration
Alternative Capacity
Coeffcient
3.4359
.88558
1.0750
-.58045
-.26588
Standard Error
2.574
.2593
.2737
.2818
.2514
(Prob)
.185
.001
.000
.042
.293
St. Coeffcient
0.000
.2336
.3666
-.1700
-.1012
R-Squared
R -Bar-Squared
.2070 F-statistic F ( 4, 92) 6.003(.000)
.1725
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) = 0.25634 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =91
Reset (3) = 0.42066 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =90
Reset (4) = 0.66429 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =89
6.3.3 Structural Conditions and Retail Power
So far, our analysis has tested a series of relationships between retail power on both product
and margin related dimensions and a number of structural characteristics in both the retailing
and manufacturing industries. Retail power, measured as a unidimensional construct
embodies both dimensions amongst others. Consequently, it can be hypothesized that:
H3 Retail power wil be positively related to retail concentration, negatively related to
manufacturer concentration, positively related to excess capacity and the importance of
economies of scale and positively related to the market penetration of own brand.
5 Due to a number of missing obseryations for various items, regression analysis is carried out on a sample of
97 obseryations to ensure consistency across the analysis.
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To test this hypothesis the model below was regressed.
3. Retpower = Const + yl retcon + y2 mancon + y3 altcap + y4 ecscale + y5 obmkt + U
Where:
const is our constant
retcon is perceived retail concentration
mancon is perceived concentration in manufacturing
altcap is perceived availability of alternative capacity
ecscale is perceived importance of economies of scale
obmkt is perceived market penetration of own brand and
where y1 to y5 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbance term.
The results are presented in table 6.4. The adjusted R2 indicates that approximately 22% of
the total variation in the dependent variable is explained by the modeL. The results of the reset
tests suggest that the model is correctly specified. The results are of considerable interest.
They indicate that the perceived own brand penetration of the marketplace is significant at
the 99% level and retail concentration is significant at the 95% leveL. The importance of
economies of scale is significant at the 94% leveL.
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Table 6.4
Retail Power and Industry Structure
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
* * * * * ** ** * * * * * * * * ** ***** * * * **** * * *** * * * *** * * * ******* *** ** * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * ** * *
Dependent variable is Retail Power over Margin
97 observations
CONST
Retail Concentration
Own Brand Market Penetration
Manufacturer Concentration
Importnce of Economies of Scale
Alternative Capacity
Coeffcient
1.2019
.60870
1.0365
-.27705
.56395
-.07552
Standard Error
2.543
.2489
.2595
.2843
.2934
.2603
(Prob)
.638
.016
.000
.332
.058
.772
St. Coeffcient
0.000
.1803
.3969
-.0911
.1994
-.0323
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.2606 F-statistic F( 5, 91) 6.415(.000)
.220
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) = 0.72871 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =90
Reset (3) = 0.54555 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =89
Reset (4) = 0.37283 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =88
6.3.4 Discussion - Structural Characteristics
From the above, it is clear that the analysis of retail power over margin and product related
activities has proved particularly usefuL. While structural conditions on the manufacturing
side do not appear to be significant determinants of our unidimensional measure of retail
power, they play an important role in the vertical flow of margin to the retail sector. In
particular, the high standardised coeffcient value on the importance of economies of scale
indicates that this is likely to be the most important structural characteristic in the
determination of margin related power. Evidence, albeit somewhat weaker, also suggests that
retail power over margin is positively related to manufacturers' perception of the availability
of alternative capacity.
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The findings relating to manufacturer concentration are also noteworthy. No evidence has
been found to support the view that concentration in the manufacturing sector is negatively
related to retail power over margin. Rather, the results found that the importance of
economies of scale in manufacturing is highly significant in the determination of margin flow
to the retailer, having taken variations in manufacturer concentration into consideration. This
supports the work of Burns and Henson (1995) but provides stronger evidence as our result
is more general. The findings above also demonstrate that manufacturer concentration is
negatively related to retail product related power. This provides partial support Ogbanna and
Wilkinson's (1998) view that, where oligopolistic conditions prevail, manufacturers can resist
retail control to a greater extent.
As expected on the retail side, perceived own brand penetration and perceived retail
concentration were found to be positively related to retail power over margin and product
related activities. The important feature to note here is that both variables are significant,
having accounted for variations explained by the other.
The results so far suggest that structural characteristics of the retail sector act as the chief
determinants of retailer power when measured as a unidimensional constrct. An examination
of the standardised coefficient values shows own brand penetration to have the largest effect
on retail power. Retail concentration is also highly significant even having accounted for the
variation due to own brand penetration. However, the importance of economies of scale in
manufacturing is also significant and displays a large standardised coeffcient value.
The dominance of structural conditions on the retail side may be explained as follows. Own
brand is likely to affect both the product and margin dimension simultaneously. In both large
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and small markets, increasing retail concentration is likely to promote further own brand
production. This is because economies of scale come into play for the retailer encouraging
own brand range extension into new products and categories. As own brand production
increases, it is likely that more manufacturers become involved in producing these products
subject to retail direction and specification. Consequently, retail power increases by way of
extension across a wider the supplier base.
On the other hand, as own brand penetration increases and as the extent of horizontal
competition among suppliers grows, manufacturers that are not engaged in own brand
production may find that their existing brands face a greater threat of delisting to make way
for more own brand variants. Finding alternative markets becomes more diffcult as retail
concentration increases. Under these circumstances, branded manufacturers are more likely
to succumb to retailers' demand for greater margin terms through lower prices, more below
the line promotional activity and possibly better credit terms. Own brand manufacturers are
also likely to experience similar demands for better margin terms.
Consequently, one expects to see a positive relationship between own brand penetration and
retail power over product related activities when controllng for power over margin and vice
versa. This is supported by the partial correlation coeffcients given below (table 6.5). The
partial correlation coefficient measures the linear association between two variables, while
controllng for the effects of one or more other variables. The results are both positive and
significant at the 95% and 99% levels respectively.
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Table 6.5
Own Brand Penetration and the Dimensions of Power
(Partial Correlation Coeffcients)
Controlling for Power over Margin Controlling for Power over Product
Own Brand Own Brand
Penetration Penetration
Retail Power Coeffcient! .1997 Retail Power Coeffcient! .2673
over Product over Margin
N2 105 N2 105
P 3 .039 P 3 .000
! Partial Correlation Coeffcient 2 Number of Observations 3 Probabilitv level
To conclude this section, substantial evidence has been found to indicate that structural
conditions on both the retail and manufacturing sectors are positively related to retail power
on margin and product related activities. In decoupling the relationship between manufacturer
concentration and economies of scale, it has been shown that the importance of economies of
scale outweigh the countervailing influence of manufacturer concentration with regard to
margin related power. Indeed, as retail concentration increases and as individual retail
accounts become of greater importance to a manufacturer, this relationship is likely to become
even more pronounced.
6.4 Firm and Product Characteristics and Retail Power
This section moves beyond structural conditions as determinants of retailer power to
investigate those characteristics that may vary at firm leveL. It is concerned with firm
attributes, product attributes and the role of both the manufacturer's and retailer's own brand
franchise as determinants of retail power. The analysis then proceeds to examine the
determinants and implications of retail monitoring activities and the implications for power
relations. The literature suggests the following characteristics as determinants of retail power:
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. the nature of the product exchanged in terms of complexity, measured in terms of product
shelflife, and its contribution to the retailer's market positioning;
. the strength of the manufactuer's brand franchise and the importance of innovation to the
manufacturer;
. the strategic use of own brands;
. the extent of retailer monitoring activities.
The hypothesized relationships are demonstrated in figures 6.2 and later in figure 6.3, which
examines the determinants of retail monitoring activities. Each relationship wil be discussed
in turn.
Figure 6.2
Firm and Product Characteristics and Retail Power
Strategic Use
of Own Brands
Margin
Manufacturer brand _ _ _ _ ~ related power Ifranchise ~ ~Retail
Product Shelf-Life ~---+- -------------~ Product SPowerc _ _ _ _ - - ?rCiated power
~ Joint EffortImportance of innovationto the manufacturer
Positively related
Negatively related - - - - - - .
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6.4.1 Product Characteristics and Contribution to the Retailer's Positioning
In chapter two, it was argued that marketing channels compete, in part, by providing better
channel outputs measured in terms of lot size, spatial convenience, delivery time and
assortment width and depth. However, in the food marketing channel, there is a growing
argument that food safety represents a further dimension of channel output (Food Safety
Authority of Ireland 1999). Until relatively recently, the assumption that food consumed in
moderation was intrinsically safe, appears to have been made by most consumers. However,
this trusting behaviour appears to have ceased. Heightened consumer concerns have emerged
from an almost continuous flow of well-publicized scares including salmonella, BSE, CJD,
E.coli 0157, Belgian dioxin and even genetically modified organisms. Consequently, allaying
consumer concerns about food safety plays a growing role in retail strategy and offers a very
real point of horizontal differentiation.
The risk of product failure, is to a considerable extent, dependent on shelf-life. Shorter-shelf
life products run greater risks of temperature abuse. Many short shelf-life products are prone
to particular hazardous agents such as E-Coli 0157, and some are subject to more direct
handling. Consequently, it is proposed that short shelf-life products pose greater safety
hazards than long shelf-life products. To minimize the risks associated with these products,
some retailers have sought to implement enhanced traceabilty systems and make greater
demands of their suppliers with regard to due diligence. In doing so, the provision of the
product to the consumer has become considerably more complex. This complexity has been
added in the form of processes and procedures at the point of production and throughout the
physical distribution process, to reduce the likelihood of product failure.
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Earlier it was argued that the contrbution made by a product category to a retailer's image and
positioning can vary and as such may be expected to influence retail dependency. This
appears to be the case with regard to fresh foods in particular (Brookes 1995; Knox and White
1990; Dawson and Shaw 1989b). Food products have a limited shelf-life, which has to be
distributed throughout the supply chain. The longer a product spends in processes and
inventory post production, the less shelf-life is available to the consumer ceteris paribus.
However, within a given temperature regime, for example, fresh, frozen or ambient,
consumers value longer product shelf-life. To maximize shelf-life and product availability
to consumers while simultaneously reducing stock costs, some retailers are streamlining their
supply chains. Products are spending less time in the supply chain yielding more shelf-life
to the consumer. To achieve this, inventories are being pushed back up the chain with
manufacturers being made more responsible for the inventory function (Collns 1997). In
many instances, fresh products such as meat and mushrooms, are cross-docked at retail
controlled regional distribution centres. In these cases, retail stockholdings are minimal and
any unforeseen problems in the chain are quickly reflected by out of stocks at store level
resulting in lost sales, tarnishing of retail image and possible devaluation of the retail brand.
Consequently, one would expect retailers to exert greater power in these categories through
the use of tight specifications and delivery terms and conditions. Thus,it is proposed that:
H4 Retail power over product related activities is negatively related to product shelflifé.
To test this hypothesis the correlation between retail power over product related activities and
6 Given the arguments above, it is proposed that product shelf-life may serye as an appropriate proxy for a
product's contribution to the retailer's positioning. Clearly, product complexity can vary at different stages of
the supply chain. Chiled ready meals are more complex than fresh meat in terms of research and development
and production processes However, post production, the level of complexity for these products are similar but
significantly greater than tinned peas. Consequently, it is proposed that shelf-life may also serye as a suitable
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product shelf-life is examined. The results are presented in table 6.6 below. They support a
significant relationship between retail power over the product dimension and product shelf-
life. The relationship is as predicted, with shorter shelf-life associated with increasing retail
power.
Table 6.6
The Relationship between Power, Retailer, Manufacturer and Product Characteristics
(Pearson Correlation Coeffcients)
Product Manufacturer Strategic Use Manufacturer
Shelf-life Brand of Own Brand Emphasis on
Franchise Innovation
Retail Power Coeffcientl -.103 .040 .419 .184"
p2
.299 .681 .000 .057
N3 104 107 108 108
Power over Product Coeffcient -.244 -.048 .324 .097
P .013 .625 .001 .317
N 104 107 108 108
Power over Margin Coeffcient .185" .144 .318 .202
P .060 .138 .001 .036
N 104 107 108 108
" Significant at 94% level
1 Pearson Correlation Coeffcient 2 Probability Level 3 Number of obseryations
Significant relationships at 95% confidence level or above are in bold.
On the margin side, however, one would expect the dynamic of retail power to differ. While
the retailer may require greater control over product related activities, excessive influence on
margin may induce undesirable behaviour on the part ofthe manufacturer. Faced with very
tight margins, the manufacturer may not see any viable course of action other than cheating.
Product which, under normal circumstances should be wasted, may be repacked and delivered
to the retailer. Alternatively, the manufacturer may fail to deliver the required quantities of
product or, under extreme circumstances, refuse to deliver. Given the limited safety stock in
the retail controlled component of the supply chain, either of these situations is likely to result
proxy for the relevant aspects of product complexity.
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in out of stocks and risk tarnishing the retailer's desired market positioning. Consequently, it
is proposed that:
H5 Retail power over margin related activities is positively related to product shelflife.
The correlation between product shelf-life and retail power over margin is also noteworthy
(table 6.6). Its sign is positive and significant at the 94% level supporting the hypothesis and
indicating that retailers' power over margin related activities diminishes with shorter product
shelf-life.
6.4.2 Manufacturer Brand Franchise and Manufacturer Emphasis on Innovation
The role of brand franchise as a means of reducing retailer power is stressed in the literature.
Manufacturers' investment in advertising, by supporting their brands and maintaining
customer franchise, is seen as one of the few ways of insulating against retail power (Porter
1974; Davies et al 1985; Duke 1989; de Chernatony 1989a; Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1996).
By establishing brand preferences, manufacturers increase the likelihood of consumers
switching stores within brand rather than switching brands within stores. The strength of the
brand and its impact on customers' patronage decisions increases the manufacturer's ability
to resist retail control. This is imperative, particularly on the product side. If manufacturers
were to become subject to retail control on the product side, their ability to maintain a clear
point of differentiation between the branded product and own brands is reduced and both sets
of products become more substitutable in the store. In this circumstance, the ability to
establish points of differentiation among the products rests almost entirely with the retailer
through in-store activities. Consequently, manufacturers with strong brands, by necessity,
have to limit retailers' product orientated influence and control. Thus, one would expect a
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negative relationship between retail power on the product side and manufacturer brand
franchise and propose that:
H6 Retail power over the product dimension is negatively related to manufacturers' brand
franchise.
The correlation coeffcient between manufacturer brand franchise and retail power over
manufacturer product related activities is given above (table 6.6). The result does not support
any relationship between manufacturer brand franchise and retail product related power. It
should be noted that this does not indicate that such a relationship does not exist, but rather
that this study cannot find any support for it. However, the result is somewhat surprising but
may be due to the composition of the sample and the particular product mix of Irish food
manufacturers.
The review of the literature on retailer-manufacturer relationships pointed to manufacturers'
emphasis on innovation as a determinant of retail power. With shortening product lifecycles
and rapid imitation of new products, manufacturers, who are heavily dependent on innovation
as a source of competitive advantage, are subject to hold-ups. Up to 80% of products fail to
maintain shelf-space two years after launch (Viner 1996), highlighting the need for rapid
access to the shelf if investment costs are to be recouped. Drawing on Steiner (1984),
Pellegrini and Zanderighi (1991) argue that, in the absence of a strong brand franchise,
retailers' discretionary power is at its highest when the manufacturer is seeking shelf space
for a new product. As the consumer is unaware of the product, store choice wil not be
influenced by its unavailability. However, in this study it is argued that, under these
circumstances, the outcome of the retailer's discretionary power is to subject the manufacturer
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to hold-ups. In particular, the retailer, in threatening to deny the manufacturer immediate
access to the shelf, can appropriate some of the rents generated through innovation by
demanding better margin related terms. A strong brand franchise serves to diminish this
discretionary power by increasing the possibility of generating adverse customer perceptions
and even store switching among consumers if the product is not stocked. Thus, it is proposed
that in the absence of a strong brand franchise, the manufacturer dependent on innovation and
new product introductions is particularly prone to hold-ups.
H7 Retail power over margin is positively related to manufacturer emphasis on innovation
when controllng for brand franchise.
Table 6.6 above supports the existence of significant relationships between retail power over
margin and manufacturer emphasis on innovation at the 96% confidence leveL. Following
Pellegrini and Zanderighi (1991), the results below (table 6.7), showing the partial correlation
coeffcient, support the hypothesis that retailers' power over the margin dimension is
positively related to manufacturer emphasis on innovation when controllng for variations in
manufacturer brand franchise.
Table 6.7
Partial Correlation Coeffcients: Innovation
Controlling for Manufacturer Brand Franchise
Power over Margin
Manufacturer Coeffcient1 1986
emphasis on
Innovation p2
.041
N3 104
1 Partial Correlation Coeffcient 2 Probability Level 3 Number of obseryations
Significant relationships at 95% confidence level or above are in bold.
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This result appears strange, because it suggests that manufacturers who do not have a strong
brand franchise would be advised to refrain from innovation. However, there is increasing
evidence of retailers relying on their suppliers to provide the innovative content of their new
and existing products (Omar 1995; Fearne 1996; Doel 1996). Manufactuers provide retailers
with access to capital equipment and expertise that are, in many cases, unavailable to retailers
in other circumstances. In tandem with these developments, there is also growing evidence
of greater retail willingness to collaborate with their suppliers. Retailers are more ready to
engage in joint activities with their suppliers bringing their expertise and knowledge to bear
within the manufacturing process (Senker 1986; Hughes 1994; McGrath 1995). In this way,
a retailer's ability to compete horizontally is partly determined by its ability to harness
innovative resources from its suppliers.
This study proposes that a retailer's ability to compete with other retailers is, to a large extent,
governed by the resources it can extract from its supplier base. These resources may be
composed of margin, which is then available to the retailer to compete away, invest internally
or appropriate as profit. Alternatively, these resources may be made up of expertise and
access to other scarce resources, which enhance the retailer's ability to compete on a non-price
basis. The quality ofthese resources, and the retailer's ability to avail of them in a dedicated
fashion, wil be positively associated with the retailer's ability to compete (Wileman and Jary
1997). Hence, one would expect a relationship between manufacturers' innovative resources
and retail dependency but also a selection process whereby retailers chose the more innovative
suppliers for collaborative activities. Consequently,it is proposed that:
H8 There wil be a positive relationship between joint effort and manufacturer emphasis
on innovation.
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Table 6.8
Manufacturer Emphasis on Innovation and Joint Effort
Joint Effort
Own Brand Relationships Manufacturer Innovation
CoeffcieniI .253
p2
.054
N3 59
Branded Only Relationships Manufacturer Innovation
Correlation CoeffcieniI -.028
p2
.850
N3 47
1 Pears on Correlation Coeffcient 2 Probability Level 3 Number of obseryations
Significant relationships at 95% confidence level or above are in bold.
The results in table 6.8 above provide evidence of a significant and positive relationship
between manufacturer emphasis on innovation and joint effort within own brand relationships.
However, no similar evidence is found with regard to branded relationships.
6.4.3 The Strategic Use of Own Brand
One of the most notable features of the recent evolution of the retail market has been the
emergence of the retailer as the brand. Central to the establishment of the retail brand has
been the exploitation of the opportnities provided by own brand products (Leahy 1987;
1994). Wileman and Jary (1997:135) propose that "there are five stages in the development
of store brands, roughly matching the stages of maturity and power of own brand". These
stages extend from generics, cheap, re-engineered cheap, par quality, through to leadership
with increasing quality versus manufacturer brands and increasing retail investments in terms
of time and resources. Greater strategic use of these products is also displayed by the fact that
retailers are proving themselves increasingly adept at developing ranges of own brand
products targeted at different segments of the market and using the products to build the retail
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brand. Some authors have argued that the increasing sophistication and more strategic use of
own brands increases retail power by providing consumers with a credible alternative to
manufacturers' brands (Segal-Horne and McGee 1989). In doing so, retailers' own brands
restricted the premia available to brand leaders ensuring a greater vertical flow of margin to
the retailer. In addition to increasing retail power over branded manufacturers' margin related
strategy variables, the increasing sophistication of own brand necessitated further retail
involvement in their supplier bases' product related activities (McGrath 1995). As shall be
demonstrated, much of this involvement relates to retail specific investments bringing retail
expertise to the manufacturing process. This increases the likelihood that the resultant product
wil help the retailer differentiate itself from its rivals in the marketplace (Senker 1986; Omar
1995). Consequently,the following hypothesis is established:
H9 The strategic use of own brands is positively related to retail power on both the margin
and product dimensions.
The results of the correlation analysis above (table 6.6) provide strong support for positive
relationships between the strategic use of own brand and all measures of retail power. The
signs of the correlation coeffcients are relatively large suggesting that the strategic use of own
brand may act as a key determinant of retail power. However, greater strategic use of own
brand necessitates that retailers embrace additional functions. For the purposes at hand, the
most important of these is product monitoring to protect brand investments. Consequently,
the role of monitoring in the determination of retail power must be investigated.
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6.4.4 Retailer Monitoring Activities
To assist the reader, an overview of the hypothesized interaction between the strategic use of
own brand, retail monitoring and retail power is demonstrated in figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3
Retail Monitoring, Retail Power and Strategic Use of Own Brand.
Strategic U se M anufacturer Retail Influence
of Own Brand Specific on Price
Lnvestments i
¡ 1 ¡---------
Product
Monitoring l
Retail
Monitoring
Commercial
Performance
Monitoring
.
Retail
Power
Throughout much of the retailer-manufacturer literature, the move to relational contracting
appears to be the result of retailers' growing power and their desire for flexible and
accommodating business relationships (DoelI996; Foord et al 1996). Rather than accept this
perspective, it is proposed that one can view the nature of vertical relationships and the rise
to dominance of relational contracting within the grocery sector as a means of protecting
retailers' specific investments. Brands may be considered specific investments. For instance,
the value of the Tesco brand in its next best alternative use, that is, outside grocery retailng,
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is likely to be considerably lower than its current value. The strategic use of own brands and
the emergence of the retail brand as one of the more potent forces in many contemporary
retailers' marketing mix is a considerable specific investment in the retailer-consumer
relationship. This is particularly so in the case of British retailers. However, maintaining the
value and integrity of the retail brand is partly determined by suppliers' activities. Clearly,
gaps can emerge between manufacturers' actual behaviour and the behaviour required and
specified by their retail customers. These gaps in behaviour may be due to opportnistic
actions on the part of the supplier. Consequently, retail brand investments are subject to
quasi-rent seeking behaviour on the part of unscrupulous manufacturers. To reduce the
incentive to engage in such behaviour and promote greater alignment between specified and
actual behaviour, theory suggests that retailers can engage in monitoring activities. Following
French and Raven (1959) this study argues that monitoring activities facilitate greater control
of the manufacturer's behaviour. Thus,it is proposed that:
HI0 Retail power is positively correlated with retail monitoring activities.
The results in table 6.9 highlight a significant and positive association between retail power
and the extent of retail monitoring activities. The measure of retail monitoring used here is
the average over all the variables monitored. The correlation is large, suggesting that a strong
relationship exists.
Table 6.9
Retail Monitoring and Power
Retail Monitorinl!
Retail Power Correlation Coeffcientl .544
p2
.000
W 106
1 Pearson Correlation Coeffcient 2 Probability Level 3 Number of obseryations
Significant relationships at 95% confidence level or above are in bold.
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In the above, and in much of the existing literature, the dynamics of the power relationship
have not been clearly exposed. This investigation proposes the existence of two dominant
dimensions, margin and product related. The exercise of power along these dimensions may
be correlated. However, there is no a priori reasoning to suggest why this should be the case.
The initial evolution of own brands was largely based on price differentials vis-a-vis
manufacturers' branded products. Such differentials were usually in the region of 10-20 per
cent (de Chernatony 1989). In addition to providing savings to consumers, retailers also
viewed own brand products as a means of enhancing their own financial performance through
margin contribution (Davis, Giligan et al 1985). The need to provide customers with a
discount while simultaneously enhancing margin was likely to result in a margin orientation
in dealings with suppliers supported by rigorous monitoring of supplier margin performance.
However, one would expect that as greater strategic use is made of own brands for positioning
purposes and as retailers' products and requirements become more sophisticated, relatively
less emphasis would be placed on margin. This is not to say that manufacturers are permitted
to become uncompetitive, but rather that some limited leeway exists. As the strategic
importance of own brands increases, more retail focus wil be placed on product performance
in terms of quality, consistency and availability. Therefore, one expects to see product
monitoring emerging as a distinct activity from margin or commercial performance related
monitoring.
Drawing both issues together, it is proposes that the monitoring activities undertaken by the
retailer wil reflect the dimensions of power. Thus, it is postulated that
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H 11 Retailers' monitoring activities may be decomposed into two distinct dimensions,
product related and margin (commercial performance) related.
To test this hypothesis, the seven variables measuring retailers' monitoring activities were
subjected to factor analysis using the generalized least squares algorithm. The results are
presented below in table 6.10. The low value of the Chi-square indicates a good fit. Using
a cut-off point of eignvalue = 1, the analysis generated a two factor model, explaining 61 %
of the variation in the data. In much of the literature, factor loadings in excess of .4 are
considered significant. The results below provide two items with the highest factor loadings
in the region of .37 to .38. However, these load clearly on the margin dimension. The factor
loadings on the product monitoring dimension are particularly strong. Thus, it is proposed
that monitoring may be decomposed into an intrinsic product related dimension (factor 1) and
a commercial performance (margin) dimension (factor 2).
Table 6.10
Factor Analysis: The Dimensions of Retail Monitoring
Goodness of Fit Test
Chi-Square Df Sig.
5.508 8 .702
Rotated factor Matrix
Retail Monitoring of: Factor 1: Product Monitoring Factor 2: Margin Monitoring
Production Processes .866 .004
Raw Material Quality .871 .115
Product Quality .761 .009
Delivery Accuracy .281 .369
Price Competitiveness -.006 .458
Product Sales .187 .881
Promotion Effectiveness .005 .378
Extraction Method: Generalized Least Squares
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaisir Normalization
At this stage the analysis wil proceed to investigate the determinants of retailers' product
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monitoring activities. A retailer's exposure to the risk of quasi-rent seeking behaviour by a
manufacturer wil, in part, be determined by the amount of rent available. The available rent
wil be a function of the retailer's strategic use of own brand and its investments in the
manufacturer to support these brands. For instance, retailers frequently invest their own
expertise in their suppliers to enhance production capabilities and bring suppliers up to the
standard required for own brand production (Fearne 1996; Omar 1995; McGrath 1995; Senker
1986). In the absence of retail monitoring, these improved capabilities could be used by
unscrupulous manufacturers to serve competing retailers. As a result, the retailer's
investments may fail to provide the intended horizontal differentiation at the retail stage of the
food marketing channeL.
The rent stream wil also depend on the manufacturer's specific investments. In many
instances, retailers require dedicated procedures and equipment to be used in the production
of their own brands. To promote manufacturers' wilingness to undertake such investments,
the retailer is likely to agree a certain price terms for the resulting output. However, the
manufacturer may decide to engage in opportnistic behaviour and fail either to maintain
specific equipment to the standard required by the retailer or operate the procedures as
specified by the retailer. Consequently, in the absence of monitoring, the stream of returns
to the opportnistic manufacturer would be higher than that to a compliant supplier.
The risk of quasi-rent seeking behaviour on the part of the manufactuer by either of the above
wil be positively related to the manufacturer's expected gain from cheating, weighted by the
probability of being caught. The gain from cheating wil be partly related to the rents
generated by both parties' specific investments. As argued above, to reduce the likelihood of
such cheating, the retailer may engage in monitoring activities and incur the associated costs.
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Alternatively, the retailer may choose to reduce the extent of monitoring activities but pay
the manufacturer a premium, which serves to increase the manufacturer's loss associated with
the detection of cheating (Klien et al 1978). It is suggested in this study that the premium is
likely to come in the form of the retailer's reduced influence on price.
Finally, it is argued that the retailer's incentive to engage in product monitoring costs wil be
a function of the brand traded. In the case of a manufactuer's brand, the retailer has relatively
little incentive to engage in such activities as a product failure would only serve to reduce the
manufacturer's brand franchise. However, a failure on an own brand product would be
expected to have a negative impact on the retailer's brand image. This leads to the hypothesis
that:
H12 For own brand suppliers, a retailer's monitoring of the product dimension wil be a
positive function of the strategic use of the own brand, a positive function of manufacturer
specifc investments but a negative function of retail influence on price to the retailer.
This hypothesis was tested using the model below and the sample of trading relationships
involving either own brand only or mixed brand product portfolios.
4. Monprod = Const + ß 1 iprice + ß2 manspec + ß3 obstrat + U
Where:
const is the constant
iprice is perceived retail influence on the manufacturer's price
manspec is perceived manufacturer specific investments in the relationship with the retailer
obstrat is the retailer's strategic use of own brand as perceived by the manufacturer
and where ß 1 to ß3 are the variable coefficients and U is a random disturbance term.
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The results below (table 6.11) confirm the hypothesis, with significant coefficient values for
the strategic use of own brand and retail influence over price. The significance of the
manufacturer specific investments is marginally outside the 95% confidence level at 94.5%.
The signs of the coeffcients are all in the hypothesized directions.
Table 6.11
The Determinants of the Extent of Product Monitoring
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Dependent variable is Monprod
57 observations
*******************************************************************************
Regressor Coeffcient Standard Error (Prob)CONST 1.8780 1.083 (.089)Iprice -.36255 .1436 (.015)Manspec .36339 .1853 (.055)Obstrat .47217 .1678 (.007)
*******************************************************************************
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.1943 F-statistic F( 3, 53) 4.26(.009)
.1487
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers of yhat
Reset (2) = 0.023288 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =52
Reset (3) = 0.36595 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =51
Reset (4) = 0.35150 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =50
6.4.5 Discussion: Firm and Product Characteristics
It is clear that the analysis above has added to the understanding of the dynamics of retail
power. The findings on the relationship between retail power and product shelf-life was
particularly instrctive as it highlighted the importance of analysis at dimension level and the
trade-offs that exist between product and margin related power. The analysis also provided
some support for the positive relationship between manufacturer emphasis on innovation and
retail influence on margin. While this result had support from earlier work (Pellegrini and
Zanderighi 1991), it appears counter-intuitive. However, our finding of the positive
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relationship between joint effort between the retailer and the manufacturer and manufacturer
emphasis on innovation provides a more sensible rationale. It suggests that the benefit to the
manufacturer may be through the influence on the retailer's supplier selection process for its
own brand products and the associated flow of retail resources through collaboration.
The analysis of brand franchise indicates that it is the rise of the retailer as the brand that
dominates the balance of power. Also the results provide trong support for positive
relationships between retail power over both margin and product related activities and the
strategic use of own brand. However, by establishing themselves as brands, retailers have had
to embrace new responsibilities in the areas of both brand development and brand protection.
The need to protect the brand name introduces monitoring activities. Drawing on the
transaction cost literature helped identify the determinants of retailers' product monitoring
activities. Developing on the importance attached by French and Raven (1959) to
observability, led to the finding that product monitoring acts as a key determinant of product
related power.
This finding is important as it establishes a link with relationship characteristics and the mode
of governance employed to facilitate transactions between the retailer and the manufacturer.
It was demonstrated in chapter three that the transaction cost framework proposes a
discriminating alignment such that the mode of governance chosen, minimises transaction
costs ceteris paribus. The main components of transaction costs are those concerned with the
monitoring of partner performance to ensure that specific investments are protected.
Consequently, the analysis wil now proceed to examine relationship characteristics, the
determinants of inter- firm integration and the implications for retail power.
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6.5 Relationship Characteristics and Retail Power
When concerned with relationship specific factors we witness variations in the mode of
governance (Hughes 1994; Barnes 1995 al 1995), brand portfolio (Collins and Burt 1999)
interdependency and the length of the trading relationship (Knox and White 1990). Variations
in the degree to which parties to a relationship have formed vertical relations and the extent
to which relationships are supported by specific assets are observed (Senker 1986; Fearne
1996). We have seen that the nature of the relational form between trading partners can vary
significantly. Indeed, Anderson and Narus (1991) support firms' management ofa portfolio
of differentiated relationships. Retailers are increasingly forming more collaborative
relationships with some suppliers but not necessarily all suppliers (Hughes 1994; Barnes et
al 1995; Doel 1996). Thus, a given retailer may operate a number of modes of governance
both within and across product categories. A supplier may also organize its customer
relationships in different ways and these relationships may vary over time (Knox and White
1990).
Central to the management of a portfolio of relationships is the notion of dependence
balancing (Buchanan 1992; Feldman 1998). In the review of the power literature, the link
between dependence and power was clearly established (Emerson 1962; Hunt and Nevin
1974; Frazier 1983). The following sections examine the relationship characteristics which,
by varying across relationships, influence the extent and distribution of dependency together
with the institutional arrangements established to govern the relationship. Thus, the sections
are concerned with:
. Specific Investments
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. Dependency
. Brand portfolio traded
These act as important determinants of the degree of inter-firm integration or mode of
governance, which can also be expected to vary across trading relationships. The
hypothesized interrelationships among these variables are given in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4.
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6.5.1 The Determinants of Inter-firm Integration: Specific Investments
A considerable body of work has emerged highlighting the management of vertical relations
by retailers to enhance their horizontal competitiveness (Dawson and Shaw 1989; 1989b;
Fearne 1986; Boon 1986; GEA 1994). In line with this work, it is proposed that retail
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emphasis on vertical relations is intended to promote appropriate investments in specific assets
by manufacturers. This is particularly so in the case of own brands where the manufacturer's
specific investments? (or assets) in the relationship enhances the retailer's ability to compete
vis-a-vis other retailers.
In a market environment, such idiosyncratic investments are unlikely to take place,
irrespective of the level of retail power due to moral hazard risks. To promote these
investments the review suggests that retailers adopt an appropriate mode of governance
coupled with offsetting or credible commitments (Wiliamson 1983). These commitments
may take the form of retail specific investments in the relationship. This study proposes that
these investments have a dual effect. First, one would expect that in most instances the
application of these resources is retail dedicated and to own brand production in particular.
By bringing these retail resources to complement those of the manufacturer, risk is shared,
the final product is enhanced and the retailer's competitiveness improves ceteris paribus
(Wileman and Jary 1996). Indeed, one would expect retailers to make more specific
investments as the strategic use of own brand increases in importance as a means of achieving
competitive advantage.
Second, as they are irretrievable, they act as a form of hostage. In this way, these retail
commitments promote the manufacturer's view that the relationship wil endure. As the
retailer's specific investments increase, the cost of terminating the relationship rises. The
manufacturer's expectation of incurring the risk of quasi-rent seeking behaviour on the part
7 To restate, a specific investment or asset is one which loses much of its value outside the particular relationship.
Manufacturers make such investments in their relationships with different retailers e.g. specialist production
equipment, investments in time and effort learning a particular retailer's procedures etc. Retailers also make
specific investments in their relationships with manufacturers. These include time spent vetting plants, passing
on know-how to suppliers etc.
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of the retailer is reduced as the potential for retaliatory behaviour by the manufacturer
increases. In this way, the investments provide the basis for a relatively stable planning
horizon, giving the manufactuer greater confidence of earning the required return on its own
specific investments. Consequently, one expects to see retail specific investments to be
positively correlated with both the strategic use of own brand and manufacturer specific
investments8.
However, relationship endurance alone is likely to be insuffcient. Manufacturers are unlikely
to enter into such relations unless it is part of a focused strategy to ensure future benefits. The
return on specific investments can be represented as a flow over time. Consequently,
manufacturer specific investments are expected to be positively correlated with the expected
continuity and attractiveness of the relationship9.
6.5.2 The Determinants of Inter-firm Integration: Manufacturer Dependency
The literature reviewed earlier clearly establishes a link between power and dependency
(Emerson 1962). Given the findings in chapter two, which examined trading patterns, one
expects to see considerable variations in the extent of retailer and manufacturer dependency.
Dependency emerges from the differentials that exist in trading partners' available resources
and needs. It emanates from resource shortages and the uncertainty associated with the lack
of control over resource flows (Heide 1994). The primary resource held by the retailer and
required by the manufacturer is shelf space and access to the consumer. The extent to which
a given retailer controls a manufacturer's access to the customer is likely to be a key
determinant of manufacturer dependency. Thus, a manufacturer is likely to be dependent on
8 These relationships are supported. See H2 and H3 Appendix A6.1.
9 This relationship is supported. See H4 Appendix A6. 1.
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a particular retailer in proportion to its volume of business. This has been supported by earlier
work (EI-Ansary and Stern 1972).
However, a crucial determinant of manufacturer dependency is the amount of manufacturer
specific investments (Feldman 1998). The size of the value stream emanating from these
investments is contingent upon both trading partners maintaining the relationship. The return
from these investments is significantly lower in alternative trading relationships.
Consequently, if the relationship is terminated, the loss to the manufacturer exceeds the lost
sales associated with lack of access to the retailer's customers as the manufacturer is likely
to find itself holding assets with very low salvage value. Thus, manufacturer dependency on
a retailer is proposed to be positively related to its specific investments in the relationship
having accounted for the retailer's share of the manufacturer's saleslO. Linking power to
dependency, it follows that retail power wil also be positively related to its specific
investments in the relationship having accounted for the retailer's share of the manufacturer's
salesl! .
6.5.3 The Determinants of Inter-firm Integration:- Interdependency
Dependency, although an intrinsic element of any relationship, is essentially a one-sided
representation of that relationship. The notion of interdependency on the other hand is a two-
sided representation. Increasing levels of dependency is a necessary but insufficient condition
for increasing interdependency. Thus, the two concepts, while clearly related, are
conceptually distinct. As discussed earlier, dependency emanates from uncertinty of resource
10 This relationship is supported. See H5 Appendix A6.1.
11 This is also supported. Manufacturer specific investments are found to be positively related to all measures
of retail power having controlled for the retailer's share of sales. See H6 Appendix A6.1.
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flows in a unilateral fashion. It is concerned with partner substitutability and alternative
sources of resources. Interdependency, on the other hand, may be viewed as uncertainty of
resource flows in a bilateral fashion and has been measured as a function of both partners'
dependence on the relationship (Kumar et al 1995). Asymmetric dependency exists where
differences in dependency among partners occur. Thus, while uncertainty underlies
dependency, the distribution of dependency wil be governed by the relative evaluation of
resource endowments (Buchanan 1992).
One means whereby firms can manage environmental uncertinty is by establishing particular
modes of governance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Willamson (1991), following Macneil
(1981), supports a continuum of modes of governance and argues that bilateral dependency
relationships are supported by a variety of specialized governance features. At one extreme
there is the autonomous market transaction while at the other there is hierarchy. The need to
adapt, an outcome of uncertainty, is achieved in markets due to incentive intensity resulting
from independence. Adaptation in the case of the hierarchy is as a result of internal co-
ordination and co-operation supported by administrative controls. The intermediate forms of
governance are termed hybrids by Wiliamson (1991) or bilateral governance by Macneil
(1981). The hybrid possesses intermediate values of both intensity and control and displays
middling adaptive capabilities. The appropriate mode of governance is a function of
discriminating alignment where the need to economize on transaction costs are positively
correlated with the degree of integration or closeness.
The review of the literature suggests that the dominant source of transaction costs within
retailer-manufacturer relationships are specific assets. The potential costs of uncertainty wil
be positively related to the extent of these investments and the costs of re-deploying these
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assets should circumstances require. Increasing amounts of specific investments generate
bilateral dependency, the costs of which can be minimized through the appropriate mode of
governance. While bilateral dependency may exist, there is no expectation that it is
symmetric. Retailers may, for instance, have other rent streams available to them. Under
these conditions, the manufacturer faces increasing safeguarding problems. In these
circumstances it is proposed that any such asymmetry in dependency is likely to be negatively
related to the degree of inter-firm integration. This is due to the fact that the less dependent
party is less likely to invest in the administrative controls and coordinating mechanisms.
The review of the transaction cost literature supports the argument that increasing amounts
of specific investments generate a safeguarding problem. In doing so, transaction costs
increase due to the greater need for monitoring activities. This is particularly so in the case
of retailers and their own brand suppliers. By arguing for discriminating alignment, the
transaction cost perspective proposes that the mode of governance to emerge should be that
which minimizes these costs ceteris paribus. It supports the view that the need for increased
monitoring activities would promote an organizational form which would minimize the
associated costs, thus tending towards greater inter-firm integration and ultimately hierarchy.
Increasing the extent of inter-firm integration is not costless. Administrative controls and
mechanisms need to be established and maintained to ensure the smooth workings of the
arrangement. More importantly, these investment costs, being largely irretrievable by nature,
must be recouped over the duration of the relationship. Consequently, it is argued that the
mode of governance or the degree of inter-firm integration is likely to be influenced by the
expected continuity and attractiveness of the relationship. Thus, we hypothesize that:
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H 13 In the case of own brand suppliers, the degree of inter-frm integration wil be
positively related to product monitoring activities, positvely related to the extent of perceived
interdependency and expected continuity and attractiveness of the relationship but negatively
related to both retailer and manufacturer dependency.
To test this hypothesis the model below was estimated:
5. Integrat = Const + a 1 monprod + a2 conattr + a3 interdep + a4 retdep +
a5 mandep + U
Where
const is the constant
monprod is the retailer's product monitoring activities as perceived by the manufacturer
conattr is the manufacturer's expectation of relationship continuity and attractiveness
interdep is the perceived degree of interdependency
retdep is perceived retail dependency on the manufacturer
mandep is perceived manufacturer dependency on the retailer
and where a 1 to a5 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbancé term.
The results are given in table 6.12. The F-statistic indicates that at least one of the specified
variables is significantly different from zero. The adjusted R2 indicates that almost 23% of
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the modeL. The reset test supports the
choice of model used. The results provide support for the hypothesized relationships between
monitoring activities, retailer and manufacturer dependency, interdependency, and the
expected continuity and attractiveness of the relationship. It is noteworthy that both
manufacturer and retail dependency are negatively related to inter-firm integration, while the
measure of interdependency is positively related to the dependent variable.
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Table 6.12
The Determinants of Inter-firm Integration (1)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Dependent variable is Inter-firm Integration
57 observations used
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Regressor Coeffcient Standard Error (Prob)CONST 4.5117 1.281 (.001)Product Monitoring .23618 .09951 (.021)
Expected Continuity and Attactiveness .37590 .1347 (.007)Interdependency .15423 .0600 (.013)Retail Dependency -.73130 .3267 (.030)Manufacturer Dependency -.63926 .2576 (.016)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.2973 F-statistic F (6, 51) 4.316 (.002)
.2284
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) = 1.266 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =50
Reset (3) = 0.80874 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =49
Reset (4) = 0.54287 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =48
In formulating H12, it was argued that, in the case of own brand suppliers, the extent of
product monitoring was positively related to manufacturer specific investments, positively
related to the strategic use of own brand but negatively related to the retailer's influence on
the product's price. To generalize the results a dummy variable to represent own brand
suppliers is included. Substituting this into H13 yields:
H 14 The degree of inter-frm integration wil be positively related to manufacturer specifc
investments, positively related to the strategic use of own brand, positively related to the
extent of perceived interdependency, and expected continuity and attractiveness of the
relationship but negatively related to both retail and manufacturer dependency and the
retailer's influence on price. The degree of inter-frm integration wil be greater for suppliers
of own brand.
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This was estimated using the revised model below:
6. Integrat = Const + ß 1 manspec + ß2 obstrat + ß3 interdep + ß4 conattr + ß5 retdep +
ß6 mandep + ß7 iprice + obß8 supp + U
Where;
const is the constant
manspec is perceived manufacturer specific investments in the relationship with the retailer
obstrat is the retailer's strategic use of own brand as perceived by the manufacturer
interdep is the perceived degree of interdependency
conattr is the manufacturer's expectation of relationship continuity and attractiveness
retdep is perceived retail dependency on the manufacturer
mandep is perceived manufacturer dependency on the retailer
iprice is the perceived retail influence on the manufacturer's price
opsupp is a dummy variable for own brand suppliers
and where ß 1 to ß8 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbance term.
The results are given below (table 6.13). The adjusted R2 indicates that almost 49% ofthe
variation in the dependent variable is explained. All variables, with one exception, are
significant at the 95% level and have signs as hypothesized. The exception is the strategic use
of own brand. A possible explanation may be the inclusion of the dummy for own brand
suppliers. This was considered necessary to make the results more general and because ofthe
argument that integration was more likely where the relationship was dedicated in some
fashion.
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Table 6.13
The Determinants of Inter-firm Integration (2)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is Inter-firm Integration
97 observations used for estimation
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Regressor
CONST
Manufacturer Specific Investments
Strategic Use of Own Brand
Interdependency
Expected Continuity and Attactiveness
Retail Dependency
Manufacturer Dependency
Retail Influence on Price
Dummy for Own Brand Supplier
Coeffcient
3.2882
.36053
.01873
.17976
.61515
-.85475
-.78477
-.18998
.61081
Standard Error
1.08800
.07311
.08736
.05258
.07391
.26060
.21000
.09328
.21850
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.5284 F-statistic F (8, 88) 12.325 (.000)
.4855
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers of yhat
Reset (2) = 0.19988 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =94
Reset (3) 
= 0.10495 -F with DF1=2 andDF2=93
Reset (4) = 0.23008 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =92
6.5.4 Inter-firm Integration and Retail Power
Prob
.003
.000
.831
.001
.000
.001
.000
.045
.006
St. Coeffcient
0.000
.3850
.0227
1.2723
.4963
-.8795
-.8991
-.1812
.2514
Drawing on the arguments relating to the interplay between specific investments,
manufacturer dependency, and inter-firm integration, it is proposed that retailer power wil
be positively related to inter-firm integration. Specific investments, by promoting greater
inter-firm integration, encourage greater joint decision-making and facilitate greater influence
across firms' boundaries. In this way, manufacturer specific investments in a particular
relationship are more likely to promote retail influence rather than power per se, that is, yield
retailers more influence rather than control. However, a shift from retail influence to retail
control is likely to emerge for two reasons:
. The establishment of particular information flows;
. Increase in manufacturer dependency.
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Because of the retailer's exposure to quasi-rent seeking behaviour, manufacturer specific
investments in the relationship are likely to be coupled with the establishment of particular
information flows resulting from the retailer's monitoring activities. These information flows
are likely to emerge from the use of retail technologists for site visits and plant audits etc
(Howe 1998). Following earlier arguments, it is proposed that it is these monitoring activities
that ensure greater alignment between expected behaviour and actual behaviour and,
ultimately, greater retail control.
However, there is another aspect to the use of retail technologists. In many instances, this
form of retail specific investment in the relationship is the conduit for retail expertise to the
manufacturer. The nature of this expertise can be advice on technologies, processes or
information available to the retailer resulting from its proximity to the consumer. Indeed,
these retail specific investments in the relationship may enhance the manufacturer's
competitiveness vis-à-vis rival firms, thereby increasing manufacturer dependency on the
retailer.
Consequently, it is proposed that both retail specific investments and manufacturer specific
investments, by increasing manufacturer dependency and establishing new information flows,
help establish the conduits for the exercise of retail power. The power exercised is more likely
to be product rather than margin related. The exercise of product related power, on the other
hand, may be expected to enhance the retailer's horizontal competitiveness and, ultimately,
the joint competitiveness of both firms. Consequently, it is hypothesized that:
H15 Retail power over product related activities is positively related to the degree oJinter-
firm integration
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The results in table 6.14 provide support for a positive and significant relationship between
retail power over product related activities and the degree of inter-firm integration.
Table 6.14
Inter-firm Integration and Retail Power over Product and Margin Related Activities
Degree of Inter-Firm
Integration
Retail Power over Product Coeffcient! .468
N2 .000
P 3 106
Retail Power over Margin
Coeffcient! .231
N2 .017
P 3 106
1 Pearson Correlation Coeffcient 2 Number of Obseryations 3 Probabilitv level
In contrast to product related power, the exercise of power over the margin dimension may
be more likely to be perceived to be zero-sum in nature and possibly compromise the
workings of the partnership. However, it is not suggested that the degree of integration is
negatively related to power over margin but merely that is likely to be less than product
related power. Evidence of retailers and manufacturers working together to remove costs from
the supply chain has already been found (Collns 1997; Boitoult 1997). This suggests a
considerable margin orientated interactionl2. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H16 The degree of inter-frm integration is more closely related to retail power over
product related activities than over margin related activities.
12 Earlier, a negative relationship between the degree ofinter-firm integration and the retailer's influence on the
manufacturer's pnce was proposed. The rationale for this was that by reducing influence on price, the retailer
provided the manufacturer with an incentive not to cheat and could reduce monitoring activities and costs.
However, where price is an importnt source of the manufacturer's competitive advantage, one would expect
to see a stronger association between integration and retail power over margin. This is because the difference
between power and influence is related to the weights on the relevant manufactunng strategy vanable. In some
cases, passing on margin to the retailer may be a source of the manufacturer's competitive advantage. For
instance, this may be more likely to be the case where open book dealings with the retailer apply. Here retail
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The results in table 6.14 provide support for positive and significant relationships between the
degree of inter-firm integration and both retail power over product and margin related
activities. However, the linear association is considerably greater with respect to product
related power. Consequently, the hypothesis is accepted.
6.5.5 Brand Portfolio
The final characteristic that may vary at trading relationship level is the brand portfolio.
Ogbanna and Wilkinson (1998) highlight the importance of brand portfolio as a determinant
of differentiated power relations among retailers and manufacturers. Three possibilities exist
within a given trading relationship. These are a brand only product portfolio, an own brands
only portfolio, or a mixed portfolio made up of a combination of brands and 'Own brands.
Some ofthe debate on the impact of brand franchise on the balance of power and the extent
of retail power has already been reviewed. However, the nature of that debate has been to
view branding as a firm characteristic, which has already been examined. Here consideration
is given to the brand portfolio as a relationship decision.
The effect of brand portfolio within a trading relationship on the balance of power has not
been addressed in a systematic fashion to date. Chapter two found a relationship between firm
size and brand portfolio, with larger manufacturers displaying a greater propensity to produce
a mixed portfolio of brands and own brands. There are many reasons why strong branded
manufacturers may desist from producing own brand products. Such activity could lead to
the dissemination of new technologies to retailers who are in effect competitors. A dual
power may be expected to exceed influence.
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branding strategy might also generate consumer confusion and devalue the manufacturer's
brand. However, there are reasons why strong branded manufactuers might also produce own
brands. Protection against loss in volumes with consequences for economies of scale and
competitiveness and reductions in barrers to new entr are but two possible reasons. Gallizzi
et al (1997), in their study of the Italian distribution system, find some empirical evidence that
the wilingness to engage in dual branding increases as own brand penetration grows. Indeed
they postulate that the negative relationship they found between the wilingness to produce
own brand products and manufactuers' competitive strengths in terms of non price strategies
would collapse where own brand penetration is high.
The above gives some reasons why a given manufacturer mayor may not decide to supply a
particular brand portfolio. It does not explain why retail power might vary across portfolios.
It is proposed that one reason why retail power is likely to vary by brand portfolio is through
the effect of specific investments. Own brands offer retailers the opportnity to differentiate
themselves horizontally from other retailers and, in doing so, gives the retailer a greater
incentive to exercise more control over the product. However, the retailer wil seek that the
outcome ofthese activities is dedicated to enhancing its performance and not those of its rivals
(Doel 1996). One of the ways by which the retailer can be more confident of achieving this
is to ensure that the control is exercised through specific investments on the part of the
manufacturer. Under this condition, the retailer enjoys the benefits of dedicated assets which
cannot be costlessly redeployed to serve rivals. However, branded manufacturers are volume
driven. All things being equal, they are less likely to make specific investments in a
relationship with a particular retailer. To do so may place some of their other customers at
a disadvantage and, over the longer term, undermine their own customer base. This suggests
that differentials exist in terms of specific investments with subsequent implications for power
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relations.
Strong brands, either manufacturers' or retailers', represent specific assets in the
manufacturer-consumer relationship or retailer-consumer relationship. As we have seen, these
assets are subject to quasi-rent seeking behaviour. In the case of the former, retailers can
engage in quasi-rent seeking behaviour by demanding better margin terms and reducing the
manufacturer's return on the branding activity. Alternatively, the retailer may attempt to
appropriate the returns on innovation by demanding that product enhancements on the branded
business be incorporated into own brand specifications. In the case of the latter, it has been
shown that retailers seek to protect against quasi-rent seeking behaviour on the part of their
manufacturers. These variations in brand portfolios present an interesting mix of potential
quasi-rent seeking activities.
In the case of the own brand supplier, where monitoring of both product and cost activities are
likely, the retailer may have considerable access to cost information through open book
dealings (Collins 1997). However, in this case, the retail imperative will be to ensure
competitiveness but in a context where the supplier's likelihood of engaging in quasi-rent
seeking behaviour is reduced to acceptable levels. Therefore, while retail power may be
expected to be high on product related issues, retailers are unlikely to squeeze suppliers
excessively on margin.
In the case of the mixed brand supplier, the need to prevent opportnistic behaviour on the
part of the supplier remains. Thus, it is likely that the retailer wil have less power over
product related activities but similar power over margin related issues. Following Ogbanna
and Wilkinson (1998), in the case of brand only suppliers, retailers wil have little if any
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power on product issues and, in the absence of cost information, less power over margin
related activities. Consequently, it is proposed that:
H 17 Retail power wil vary by brand portfolio. It wil be greatest in the case of own brand
only suppliers and least in brand only suppliers.
One-way anova analysis was used to compare the means in our unidimensional measure of
retail power and power over product and margin related activities by product portfolio.
Having tested for equality of the variances, Bonferroni's test was applied to identify
significant differences in the means at the 95% leveL. The differences in means and the
significance levels are given in table 6.1513.
,.
The analysis of the unidimensional measure of power supports a significant difference at the
95% confidence level between power exerted over brand only suppliers and those that supply
either own brand only or a mixed portfolio of brands. Less power is exerted over brand only
suppliers than over those who supply own brand products. No significant difference exists
among own brand only or mixed portfolio suppliers.
13 The means are presented in table A6.5 in appendix A6. 1.
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Table 6.15
Mean Differences in Retail Power by Brand Portfolio
Brand Portfolio Brand Portfolio Mean Difference Sig
(i (j (i-i)
Own Brand Only Brands Only 4.1253* .001
Mixed Portfolio 2.0246 .233
..
Brands Only Own Brand Onlv -4.1253* .001
(1 Mixed Portfolio -2.1007* .033
~00.
- Mixed Portfolio Own Brand Onlv -2.0246 .233
'8 Brands Only 2.1007* .033-(1
~
Own Brand Only Brands Onlv 1.5034 .813
"0 Mixed Portfolio -.7442 1.000(1
-
ro
ã)
~ Brands Only Own Brand Only -1.5034 .813
.S Mixed Portfolio -.2.2476 .074o.
..
ro
:: Mixed Portfolio Own Brand Onlv .7442 1.00:- ?¡
n ~ Brands Only 2.2476 .074
~æ
Own Brand Only Brands Only 6.9765* .000
Mixed Portfolio 4.2443* .002
- ..
u (1 Brands Only Own Brand On1v -.69765* .000;: ~
"0 080. Mixed Portfolio -.27322* .007
0. "0
_ (1
.- -
ro ro Mixed Portfolio Own Brand Only -.42443* .002--(1 (1
~ ~ Brands Only 2.7322* .007
* indicates a significant difference at the 95% level
Examining power over product related activities reveals that retailers exert significantly more
power over own brand only suppliers than either brand only suppliers or mixed portfolio
suppliers. The results also reveal that retailers also exert more product related power over
mixed portfolio suppliers than brand only suppliers.
Finally, the results do not support any differences in retail power over margin related activities
among any of the brand portfolios traded.
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6.5.6 Discussion: Relationship Characteristics
The foregoing analysis of relationship specific characteristics has highlighted a number of
notable power dynamics which would have been neglected if the analysis had been restricted
to industry, firm and product characteristics. One of the key findings has been the
determinants of inter-firm integration. Convincing evidence has been found that both retailer
(i.e. retail brands) and manufacturer specific investments play important roles in the
determination of the appropriate mode of governance. Where these investments are high,
integration is promoted. Further progress and insight was gained by operationalising
Wiliamson's (1979) notion of bilateral dependency. In doing so the distrbution of perceived
dependency was isolated as a critical determinant of the appropriate mode of governance.
Individual agents' perception of asymmetric dependency reduces the incentive to integrate.
Partners who perceive themselves to be more dependent are less likely to want to integrate,
while those who are less dependent face the question as to why bother integrate. Through
dependency, the mode of governance is related to power.
The finding of the positive relationship between the degree of inter-firm integration and retail
power may seem surprising at first and merits further discussion. Why, after all would a
manufacturer choose to form closer bonds with a retailer if the outcome was simply to
increase the retailer's power over the manufactuer's activities? It is proposed that the answer
lies in French and Raven's (1959) observation that power is system specific. "It is necessary
to define power with respect to a specified system because the power of O/P may vary greatly
from one system to another" (French and Raven 1959:153). Consistent with this line of
thought is the view that the existence of retail power over certain aspects (systems) of
manufacturing activities does not exclude the possibility of manufacturer power over certain
297
aspects of retail activities. That agent A can control certain aspects of agent B' s behaviour
does not rule out the possibility that agent B can control certin aspects of agent A's activities.
It should be noted this does not relate to countervailing power acting to reduce retail power
but power operating on a different agent. Symmetricity of dependency was found to be
necessary to promote increasing degrees of inter-firm integration. Given the relationship
between dependency and power, increasing retail power emanating from greater manufacturer
dependency can only be sustained through increased retailer dependency and manufacturer
power if greater inter-firm integration is to take place. Consequently, it is proposed that the
observed positive relationship between retail power and inter-firm integration is matched, as
distinct from offset, by increasing manufacturer power.
The analysis of the relationship between retail power and brand portfolio demonstrated that
retail product related power was significantly greater in the case of own brand only suppliers
than in either branded or mixed portfolio suppliers. It was argued earlier, that the application
of product related power is more likely to be motivated by the retailer's need for products to
promote its horizontal competitiveness. However, the direct link between the application of
power and horizontal competitiveness can only occur where the outcomes (superior products)
are dedicated to the retailer. It is suggested that this is less likely to be the case where the
manufacturer produces branded products. Finally, the lack of evidence to support differences
in retail power over margin related activities is somewhat surprising but lends support to the
view that retailers expect all their suppliers to be equally competitive.
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the series of hypotheses that form the basis of the study under review.
The results emerging from each of the hypotheses add incrementally to the understanding of
the dynamics of retailer power. It has been argued that, while power resides within a
relationship, the determinants of retail power over manufacturing operations have their origins
in industr structure, firm and product characteristics and finally relationship specific factors.
The chapter argues that while power may be measured as an unidimensional construct, an
understanding of its underlying dimensions adds to the strategic richness of the analysis. The
results indicate that the dynamics of retail power differ according to whether or not the focus
is margin or product related. In some instances, the exercise of power along these dimensions
may be positively correlated but that under certain conditions the relationship may be
negative. The arguments underlying the hypotheses generally support the view that industry
structure characteristics are more likely to determine the extent of retail power over margin
activities. The determinants of product related influence are more likely to lie in firm and
product characteristics and the way in which the trading relationship is organized. In this case,
the roles played by specific investments, together with the constraints they impose on
individual agents and trading relationships come to the fore.
The review of the retailer-manufacturer literature in chapter four demonstrated the
sophisticated contractual and institutional arrangements in the grocery sector. It is proposed
that to suggest that an understanding of retail power within such a context can be attained by
recourse to only one of the three factors discussed here is naïve. In testing the hypotheses
developed in this chapter, the analysis sought to highlight both the complexity of power
relations within the manufacturer-retailer relationships and the dynamics of retailer power.
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The findings emerging from this chapter provide a more solid foundation for a more complete
understanding of retailer power. Various interdependencies have been explored and in the
next chapter the findings wil be considered in more detail, culminating in a more complete
model of retailer power.
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Chapter Seven
Discussion and Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
The last chapter was based on a series of hypotheses specified to add incrementally to the
understanding of the determinants of retail power. Consequently, the first aim of this
chapter is to consider these results in greater detail to yield a more complete and holistic
understanding of the determinants of retailer power in the grocery sector. This
understanding will be achieved through a greater awareness of the interconnections among
the variables used in this study. In this fashion, the discussion of the findings should result
in a more complete model of retailer power leading to the formulation and estimation of
three separate models of retail product related power, retail margin related power and our
unidimensional measure of retail power. The strategic implications emerging from the
findings wil then be discussed.
The chapter also integrates the findings into the existing literature, highlighting its
contributions and pointing to issues that require further investigation. Throughout much of
this thesis, it has been argued that the existing literature is fragmented. Consequently, one
of its chief aims is to redress this limitation. This chapter's task is to demonstrate that this
fundamental objective has been achieved to a suffcient degree.
The overriding goal of this research is to provide a more complete understanding of the
determinants of retailer power by applying an integrative perspective to the existing
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fragmented literature. However, to achieve this a number of assumptions and
methodological decisions were made. While facilitating our ultimate task by simplifying
the research problem, these decisions resulted in certain limitations that must be addressed.
7.2 The Findings
7.2.1 Retail Power and Industry Structure
One of the more notable features emerging from the last chapter was the richness of the
analysis of the dimensions of retail power. The benefit of exploring the dimensions of
retail power became clear when examining retail power over manufacturers' margin related
variables. In addition to confirming the expected relationships between retail
concentration, own brand penetration and retail power over margin, the results indicate that
structural conditions on the supply side also play an important role as determinants of the
vertical flow of margin to the retailer. In particular, the importance of economies of scale
in manufacturing was highlighted. The findings provide empirical evidence that the need to
exploit economies of scale, and enjoy the associated cost competitiveness, outweighs any of
the countervailing power that increasing manufacturer concentration might have been
expected to bring. The results also yield weaker evidence to suggest that the perceived
availability of alternative capacity increases retailer's margin related power.
This series of relationships suggests the following. First, the technology underpinning the
manufacturing sector, by determining the minimum effcient scale, governs the required
share of the market to maintain competitiveness. The intensity of competition among
manufacturers is likely to be partly determined by this relationship between costs and
volumes. Where economies of scale are important, lost volumes increase average costs and
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reduce the manufacturer's competitiveness. This problem is compounded by high levels of
retail concentration. Under this condition, the loss of a given retail account is more likely
to result in greater reductions in volume sales. The effect of such a loss on an individual
firm's horizontal competitiveness is likely to be immediate and substantiaL. Consequently,
there is more intense competition among manufacturers, ensuring that a larger share of the
cost reductions are passed to the retail stage of the marketing channel reflecting greater
retail power over margin related variables.
This is compounded by the perception that retailers have access to alternative production
capacity, which increases the degree of horizontal competition among manufacturers for the
available volumes. In this way, the need to defend against actual competitors or potential
entrants ensures a greater vertical flow of margin to the retailer. The existence of an own
brand supplier base is likely to generate such a perception. Own brand, by hiding the
identity of the manufacturer, can make suppliers more substitutable. Consequently, some
suppliers may feel relatively unsure of their futures, placing greater pressure on the need to
be price competitive.
The existence of own brand variants on the market also increases competitive pressures on
branded manufacturers for two reasons. Both sets of products compete for the same shelf
space and consumers' loyalty. First, as consumers become less wiling to switch stores
within brand and more wiling to switch brand within stores, the price of retail shelf-space
increases to the manufacturer. Consequently, the return to the retailer, who controls the
way space is allocated, increases. Second, own brands have, over time, become credible
substitutes to manufacturers' brands. This is particularly so in the case of secondary and
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tertiary brands where manufacturers' brand franchise is relatively weak. Devoid of large
volume sales and customer franchise, the only means of maintaining presence on the shelf
is through improved margin contribution to the retailer.
The findings also support the view that retail concentration and the penetration of own
brand are both positively related to retail power over manufacturers' product activities. On
the other hand, manufacturer concentration was found to act in a countervailing fashion to
structural characteristics on the retail side. It has been argued that manufacturers have an
incentive to desist from engaging in own brand production, thereby reducing competition
on the supply side. High levels of concentration were expected to make this easier by
encouraging unspoken agreements with respect to pricing and not to supply own brands to
retailers (Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1998). Such collusion was considered to be more
feasible as potential cheaters, that is, manufacturers who produced own brand, could be
more easily identified and retaliatory actions undertaken. However, while the expected
relationship between manufacturer concentration and retail product related power was
upheld, no support was found on the margin side.
On the retail side, both retail concentration and own brand penetration were identified as
significant determinants of retail product related power. In the case of the Irish market,
retail concentration was expected to be important, as a large share of a relatively small
market was considered necessary before a retailer would consider producing an own brand
variant. Also, as own brand penetration increases, more suppliers are likely to become
involved in own brand production and subject to retailers' product requirements, thereby
increasing retail power across a larger supplier base as against more power over a given
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supplier base. However, from a strategic perspective, these findings add relatively little to
the understanding of the implications of retail power.
To summanse this section, evidence has been found to support the view that retail
concentration, own brand penetration, the importance of economies of scale in
manufacturing and the perceived availability of alternative capacity, wil be positively
related to retail power over margin related activities. On the product side, the evidence
demonstrates a positive relationship between retail concentration and own brand
penetration but a negative relationship with respect to manufacturer concentration.
7.2.2 Retail Power, Product and Firm Characteristics
Extending the analysis beyond structural conditions to examIne the role of product
characteristics proved particularly fruitfuL. On the one hand, strong empirical evidence was
found to support a positive relationship between retail power over margin variables and
product shelf-life. Shorter shelf-life is associated with less retail power over margin. The
review earlier demonstrated that some product categories are more important to some
retailers than others in terms of their image generating effects. In general, fresh and chiled
products appear to contribute more to retailers' positioning than other products. Because of
their limited shelf-life, supply chains are likely to contain less inventory, placing the retailer
in a position subject to hold-ups. Suppliers are likely to be less substitutable in the short
term and the impact on out of stocks at store level, if a supplier terminates supplies, is likely
to be immediate. The findings suggest that retailers have to pay for these image
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contributions and the guarantee of availability by exerting less demands on their
manufacturers' margins.
On the other hand, the analysis of the relationship between retail power over the product
dimension and product shelf-life found significant support for a negative relationship.
Retail power on the product dimension increases with shortening product shelf-life. The
argument supporting this finding relates to retailers' need to control all aspects of the
product that contributes to the positioning of their brand. This need is likely to be
demonstrated in the use and enforcement of stringent and detailed product specifications.
Both these findings highlight the merit of carring out an analysis of the dimensions of
power because of the inherent trade-offs that may exist. Little of the existing literature
makes this explicit. The analysis of the unidimensional measure of retail power does not
provide any support for a relationship between retail power and product shelf-life.
However, this finding obscures the strategic richness of the underlying relationships - that
retail power over product related attributed is negatively related to product shelf-life but
that retail power over margin related variables is positively related to product shelf-life. In
effect, both relationships tend to obscure each other when analysis is restricted to power
measured as a unidimensional construct.
Turning to the manufacturer's characteristics, the results failed to support the expected
negative relationship between manufacturer brand franchise and retail power. This was
surprising given the importance attached to branding throughout the literature. There are
two possible explanations for this finding. The first explanation lies in the composition of
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the sample and the restriction of the analysis to Irish food manufacturers and their trading
relationships with British and Irish retailers. The Irish market is small by international
standards and Irish food manufacturers have few strong international brands. The British
market demonstrates a very high own brand orientation. As discussed in chapter two, a
considerable effort has been made by the Irish food sector to target the own brand sector in
the British market. Consequently, any relationships with British retailers used in this
analysis were unlikely to highlight the role of manufacturer brand franchise.
Second, the Irish retail market has, up to recently, displayed relatively little interest in own
brand products. Own brand penetration was relatively low, and for reasons of scale
economies, retailers appeared to display little interest in developing the market (Pratt
19941). Thus, manufacturers with strong brands had little incentive to produce own brand
variants for Irish retailers, given the apparent low growth prospects and the potential to
damage existing brands. During the mid 1990's, circumstances had changed to a
considerable degree. The launch of Power Supermarkets' "Premium Choice" range and
Dunnes Stores' attempt to reposition the St. Bernard brand would have encouraged
indigenous branded manufacturers to reconsider their brand portfolio strategies. In this
fashion, strong brands could be coupled with retail influence on the own brand business.
The arrival of Tesco in 1997 would have accelerated this revaluation of the attractiveness of
own brand products. Due to Power Supermarkets' existing product portfolio, some
manufacturers who had been producing branded products for the Irish market now had the
opportnity to extend their business into the British market (and possibly increase their
business in the Irish market) through own brand products for Tesco. This market
opportnity may have proved suffcient for manufacturers with strong brands in the Irish
307
market to engage in own brand production for Tesco. The coupling of own brand
production and strong brand franchise, although for different markets but for the same
retailer, would provide another reason why the expected negative relationship between
brand franchise and retail power, or any of its dimensions, might not be supported.
The analysis also highlighted a positive correlation between retail power over margin and
the manufacturer's emphasis on innovation. This is suggestive of the hold-up argument as
presented by Pellegrini and Zanderighi (1991). Nevertheless, the hold-up argument does
not appear to be particularly rigorous for it provides manufacturers with an incentive to
refrain from engaging in innovative activity. Why invest in a particular activity if the
benefits are appropriated by another channel member? It also doesn't make sense from the
retailer's perspective. If a retailer's horizontal competitiveness is partly determined by its
access to manufacturers committed to innovation, it is in its interest to ensure that the
manufacturers have a flow of returns to ensure future innovation. Surely, the last thing that
the retailer wants to do is to put these suppliers out of business. Consequently an
alternative explanation is required.
The finding of the relationship between joint effort and manufacturer emphasis on
innovation within different brand portfolios supports the view that retailers seek out, or
possibly even assist the emergence of manufacturers who place more emphasis on
innovation to engage in joint own brand development activities (McGrath 1995; Hughes
1996). While retailers may formerly have been content to imitate branded manufacturers'
branded products and enjoy higher margins, they are now concerned with the vertical flow
of resources other than purely margin related, to differentiate themselves from their
1 Maurice Pratt was marketing director for Power Supermarkets at the time. 308
competitors. Supporting this view, evidence was found that manufacturers, who place
greater emphasis on innovation, are more likely to enjoy retail provided resources through
joint projects. The return to the manufacturer is likely to be partly through access to retail
controlled resources on which it is dependent for continued success. It should be noted that
the finding that the retailer has more power over the innovative manufacturer's margin does
not rule out the likelihood that the margin resulting from greater joint effort exceeds that
which would have been achieved by working in isolation. However, this hypothesis is
beyond the scope of the current study but merits further investigation. Consequently, it is
suggested that manufacturer emphasis on innovation acts as an indirect determinant of retail
product related power as it partly governs the retailer's selection of collaborators.
Extending the analysis to retail characteristics, the chief determinant of retail power was
found to be the retailer's strategic use of own brand and the associated monitoring
activities. A strong theoretical case was made for a link between the strategic use of own
brand, rent seeking behaviour and monitoring activities. The greater the strategic use of
own brands, the greater the stream of rents generated by the retailer and the greater the risk
of manufacturer opportnism. Consequently, there is a greater need for monitoring
activities by the retailer. From the manufacturer's perspective, the extent of monitoring
activities determines retail power. It brings about adherence to the desired behaviour.
Following French and Raven (1959), it is the degree to which behaviour is observed that
determines the degree to which actual behaviour conforms to desired behaviour.
To summarise, the findings emerging from the analysis of firm and product characteristics
suggest that our unidimensional measure of retail power wil be positively related to the
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retailer's monitoring activities. Also, the retailer's monitoring of product related activities,
tied directly to the retailer's strategic use of own brand, wil act as a determinant of retail
product related power. Product shelf-life is expected to be negatively related to retail
product power. Finally, the findings on margin related power suggest that it wil be
positively related to product shelf-life.
7.2.3 Retail Power and Relationship Characteristics
Following the resource dependency framework (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), a retailer
exerts power over manufacturers' operations to enhance its horizontal competitiveness. To
achieve this, the retailer needs to ensure that beneficial outcome of the exercise of power is
unique to that particular relationship. A retailer's exercise of power over margin is a case
in point. In this instance, there is a zero sum characteristic to the exercise of retail power.
The margin gained by the retailer is unavailable to other retailers. However, with regard to
product related power, an opportnity may exist for the manufacturer to bring any learning,
that was gained through a retailer's exercise of power, to bear in other retail relationships.
To prevent this situation from occurring one would expect retailers to exert more product
related power through relationship specific investments which cannot be easily or costlessly
used in alternative relationships. The finding that retail power over product related strategy
variables is more strongly correlated with manufacturer specific investments than retail
power over margin supports this view. The findings also support the view that these
specific investments are retail dedicated through to own brand related activities.
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Examining relationship specific factors in the last chapter, manufacturer dependency on a
given retailer was found to be related to its specific investments in the relationship, having
accounted for its share of the manufacturer's sales. Also, the retailer's power over margin
was found to be positively related to the manufacturer's specific investments2. This result
seems surprising at first. Retail power over margin is unlikely to be the outcome of
opportnistic behaviour on the part of the retailer. A partial explanation may be found in
the strong positive correlation between manufacturer and retailer specific investments. This
suggests that, to elicit specific investments by their suppliers, retailers balanced the
relationship by making offsetting investments or credible commitments. Thus, if the
retailer was to behave opportnistically, retaliation would be possible by the manufacturer.
Furthermore, any additional investments on the part of the immediate manufacturer and
possibly other manufacturers would be unlikely due to the damage to . the retailer's
reputation. Consequently, an important means of achieving competitive advantage in the
retail market would be compromised.
Given the above, an alternative to opportnistic behaviour is required to explain the
positive relationship between manufacturer specific investments and retail power over
margin. The existence of retail and manufacturer specific investments in the relationship
changes the very nature of the relationship, by promoting effciency in the organisation of
vertical relations. One witnesses administrative controls and information transfer among
the firms. These identify and help exploit transaction cost savings. These effciencies
generate a stream of returns through superior performance. However, evidence has been
found, demonstrating that the extent of manufacturer specific investments is strongly
correlated with the manufacturer's perception of dependency on the retailer. Thus, the view
2 See the results of hypothesis H6 in appendix A6.l 311
taken here is that manufacturer specific investments, by acting as partial determinants of
dependency, are positively associated with margin related power.
It was also argued in chapter six, that one of the outcomes of retail specific investments in
the relationship was greater retail knowledge of manufacturing operations. Open book
dealings and the use of technologists in both collaborative and monitoring activities can
highlight margin opportnities, some of which the retailer may appropriate. This does not
imply that the retailer behaves opportnistically. Greater collaboration and the application
of retail expertise across the boundaries of both firms may help identify cost reductions,
which can improve margin to both parties. Consequently it is proposed that retail specific
investments are positively related to margin related power3.
However, while the retailer may claim much of the benefit emanating from the new
organisational form and its associated effciencies, suffcient rewards must exist to
encourage manufacturers to participate. Mutual gain does not suggest an equal division of
the gains. It merely suggests that both parties gain. Power determines the precise division
of the gain among the participants.
Finally the analysis examined retail power by brand portfolio where a clear hierarchy of
product related power was found to exist. In the case of product related power, suppliers
who supplied only own brands were subject to most retail power. Mixed brand portfolio
suppliers were subject to less retail power than own brand only suppliers but more retail
3 Clearly, there wil also be an association between retail specific investments and product related power.
However, some of these investments in the form of technologists' time and effort etc, wil be highly
correlated with monitoring activities. Thus we argue that, with regard to product related power, it is the
product monitoring activities that is the determinant rather than the investments per se.
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power than brand only suppliers. The other noteworthy and unexpected outcome was that
no evidence was found to support any variation in power over margin across the different
brand portfolios. This suggests that retailers demand their entire supplier base to be equally
competitive and that the measures applied to own brand suppliers are applied to branded
manufacturers as well. Finally, when considering the unidimensional measure of power,
evidence was found of greater retail power in the case of own brand only suppliers
compared with either mixed or branded suppliers.
To summarise, evidence has been found to suggest that retail product related power wil be
positively related to manufacturer specific investments and the brand portfolio supplied by
the manufacturer. On the margin side retail power wil be positively related to
manufacturer specific investments through its effect on perceived dependency. When
considering power measured as a unidimensional constrct, manufacturer specific
investments and brand portfolio are likely to be the key determinants among relationship
characteristics.
7.2.4 Retail Product Related Power
Drawing the findings on product related power together suggests that:
H 18 Retail power over product related activities is positively related to retail
concentration and own brand penetration of the market-place, negatively related to product
shelflife and manufacturer concentration but positively related to retailers' product
monitoring activities and manufacturer's specifc investments. It wil be higher in the case
of own brand only suppliers.
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This was tested using the model:
1. Prodpower = Const + ß 1 retcon + ß2 obmkt + ß3 mancon+ ß4 slife + ß5 monprod + ß6
manspec + ß7 ob only + U
Where
const is the constant
retcon is the measure of perceived retail concentration
obmkt is the perceived market penetration of own brand
mancon is the measure of perceived retail concentration
slife is product shelf-life
monprod is the retailer's product monitoring activities
manspec is the manufacturer's specific investments
ob only is a dummy to indicate an own brand only supplier
and where ß 1 to ß7 are the variable coefficients and U is a random disturbance term.
Table 7.1
Retail Power over Product Related Activities
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
* * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Dependent variable is Retail Power over Product
97 observations
Coeffcient Standard
Error
1.994
.2508
.2485
.2595
.0019
.2707
.1927
1.331
CONST
Retail Concentration
Own Brand Market Penetration
Manufacturer Concentration
Product Shelf-Life
Manufacturer Specific Assets
Product Monitoring
Own Brand Supplier only
-.71780
.49860
.34624
-.40014
-.00428
1.0594
.79346
2.2077
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.5780 F-statistic F (7,89) 17.414(.000)
.5448
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) 
= 2.8373 -F with DF1=1 andDF2=88
Reset (3) = 1.4127 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =87
Reset (4) = 1.0498 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =86
(Prob)
.720
.050
.167
.127
.027
.000
.000
.101
St.
Coeffcient
0.000
.1315
.1 181
-.1172
-.1509
.3088
.3270
.1636
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The results above in table 7.1 provide strong support for the significance and signs of all the
hypothesised variables, with the exceptions of the market penetration of own brand
products and manufacturer concentration. The results of the reset test support the model
selected, with the F values fallng below the critical value at the 99% confidence leveL. The
contribution to the understanding of product related power, by extending the analysis from
structural features to include product, firm and relationship characteristics, is to be found in
the observation that all of the additional variables are significant. The adjusted R2 indicates
that the model explains approximately 55% of the variation in the dependent variable.
The role of product monitoring as the chief determinant of product related power is
demonstrated by its high standardised coeffcient value. Manufacturer specific investments
feature next, supporting the view that retailers exercise product related power through
investments that are dedicated to their relationship. The negative relationship between
product shelf-life and retail product related power provides evidence of more retail
involvement in product categories, which are likely to play a greater role in determining the
retailer's positioning. The results also indicate that brand portfolio is significant at the 90%
leveL.
These results are notable as they support the organising framework used throughout this
research, and confirm the view that a more complete understanding of retailer power can be
obtained by considering industr structure, firm, product and relationship characteristics
simultaneously. The results also indicate that, with regard to product related power, it is the
strategic decisions made by the retailer and manufacturer that assume the greater
importance. It is the strategic use of own brand, reflected in the retailer's product
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monitoring activities, and the manufacturer's decision to make specific investments in the
relationship together with the product portfolio supplied to the retailer, that play the more
important roles in determining retail product related power.
The analysis above suggests that structural characteristics play a limited role. Retail
concentration was the only structural characteristic found to be significant. In chapter six,
when considering structural conditions in isolation, a negative relationship was found
between retail product related power and manufacturer concentration. However, when the
analysis was extended to include firm, product and relationship characteristics the
significance of manufacturing concentration diminished. One possible explanation is that
when considering manufacturing concentration, one implicitly assumes that production
facilities are homogenous. However, specific investments explicitly acknowledge that
capacity is heterogeneous and that it is defined, in part, by both parties' identities. It is
likely that this heterogeneity acts to overshadow manufacturing concentration.
The negative relationship identified between product shelf-life and product related power
supports the argument that retailers exert greater control over food products which are more
likely to play a greater role in positioning the outlet. Recent and ongoing events in the
consumer market suggest that food related issues such as health and safety wil provide
retailers with more opportnities to differentiate themselves from their competitors.
However, if retailers pursue these opportnities, the outcome for manufacturers wil be
more vertical co-ordination and the exercise of more retail product related control.
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Manufacturer specific investments were also found to be significant determinants of
product related power. The relationship was found to be linear. More specific investments
are associated with increasing product related power. It is proposed that these specific
investments act as the conduits for retail control for two reasons. First, given the
idiosyncratic nature of the investments, it is plausible to assume that the retailer participated
in the investment decision. This is not to suggest that financial contributions were made,
but rather that the projected use of the investments were evaluated and agreed prior to the
investment taking place. Second, it was also found that manufacturers' specific
investments were complemented by similar investments by the retailer. In this way the
retailer can, by directing product related power through these complementary sets of assets,
ensure that the benefits of the investments are dedicated to itself, thereby enhancing its
performance vis-à-vis its competitors.
The implications for manufacturers are considerable. Manufacturer specific investments
represent considerable commitments in terms of resources allocated to a particular business
relationship. In addition to resource allocation, the findings indicate that manufacturers
cede control of some of their product related activities to the retailer. Thus, manufacturers
reduce the latitude of discretion and further undermine their autonomy. While off-setting
retail specific investments in the relationship may appear to be suffcient compensation,
increasing manufacturer dependency raises questions about the ability of the manufacturer
to stay in business outside the immediate trading relationship.
Finally, the positive relationship between retailers' product monitoring activities and
product related power underscores the importance of French and Raven's (1959) argument
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that observability plays a critical role in the determination of power. It was established
earlier that the strategic use of own brands acted as an important determinant of retailers'
product monitoring activities. In chapter four, it became evident that retailers were
increasingly relying on the retail brand as a means of achieving competitive advantage
(Davies 1992; Leahy 1994, 1987; Laaksonen 1994). Consequently, manufacturers can
expect greater retail involvement in their product related activities.
7.3.5 Retail Margin Related Power
Drawing together the arguments outlined on margin related power suggests that:
Retail power over manufacturers' margin related activites wil be positvely related to
retail concentration, the market penetration of own brands, the importance of economies of
scale, the availabilty of alternative capacity, product shelflife, manufacturer specifc
investments, but negatively related to manufacturer concentration4 and the retailer's
specifc investments.
This was tested using the model:
2. Marpower = Const + a 1 retcon + a2 obmkt + a3 mancon + a4 ecscale + a5 altcap +
a6 slife + a7 manspec + a8 manspec2 + a9 retspec + U
4 Manufacturer concentration is included as the literature provides considerable evidence that it should act as
a determinant of counteryailing power. For regression purposes omission of a relevant variable would result
in biased estimates. The inclusion of an irrelevant variable on the other hand, while resulting in loss of
effciency, would not risk bias (Kennedy 1996).
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Where
const is the constant
retcon is the measure of perceived retail concentration
obmkt is the perceived market penetration of own brand
mancon is perceived manufacturer concentration
ecscale is the importance of economies of scale
altcap is the availability of alternative capacity
slife is product shelf-life
manspec is the manufacturer's specific investments
manspec2 is the squared value of manufacturer's specific investments
retspec is the retailer's specific investments
and where a 1 to a9 are the variable coeffcients and U is a random disturbance term.
Table 7.2
Retail Power over Margin Related Activities
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is Retail Power over Margin
97 observations
CONST
Retail Concentration
Own Brand Market Penetration
Manufactuer Concentration
Importance of Economies of Scale
Alternative Capacity
Product Shelf-Life
Retailer Specific Investments
Manufacturer Specific Investments
Manufacturer Specific Investments 2
R-Squared
R- Bar-Squared
Coeffcient
5.7110
.54296
.56525
-.34334
.93818
.23031
.00490
-.44065
-.34097
.58445
Standard Error
3.882
.2680
.2742
.2072
.2484
.2345
.0022
.3404
1.522
.1931
.4247 F-statistic F ( 9, 87) 7.135(.000)
.3651
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers ofyhat
Reset (2) = 0.007851 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =86
Reset (3) = 0.29957 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =85
Reset (4) = 0.77321 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =84
(Prob)
.145
.046
.042
.101
.000
.329
.030
.199
.028
.003
St. Coeffcient
.000
.1379
.1856
-.0968
.2844
.0844
.1662
-.1447
-.9571
1.590
The results presented in table 7.2 above indicate that the variables, with the exceptions of
alternative capacity and retail specific investments, are significant and in the hypothesised
directions. Manufacturer concentration displays the expected sign but is significant at the
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90% leveL. It should be noted that the standardised value of the importance of economies of
scale is substantially larger than the corresponding value for manufacturer concentration.
This indicates that the influence of economies of scale is substantially greater than
manufacturer concentration in determining retailer margin related power.
The results above indicate that structural conditions are considerably more influential on
retail margin related power than on product related control. Structural conditions, by
promoting horizontal competition among manufacturers, promote the flow of margin to the
retail stage of the marketing channeL. The extent of competition at the manufacturing stage
of the marketing channel is governed by the interplay between costs and volumes, which is
partly determined by the importance of economies of scale. Retail concentration, by
reducing the availability of alternative customers, increases the cost of losing a client over
and above lost sales. Lost customers increases unit costs and risks making the
manufacturer less competitive in its other business arrangements. The market penetration
of own brands increases the demand for shelf-space and, in doing so, increases margin
contributions to the retailer.
Nevertheless, while structural conditions may be unfavourable, product characteristics may
act in a countervailing fashion. Certain product categories contribute more to the retailer's
desired positioning than others. Currently fresh food categories appear to be of particular
importance. Thus product shelf-life was used as a proxy. Porter (1974:421) suggests that
"as the retailer's influence on product differentiation increases, the bargaining power of the
retail stage vis-à-vis the manufacturer stage increases". The positive relationship between
power over margin and shelf-life simply presents the corollary. The manufacturer's
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bargaining power increases as its contributions to the retailer's ability to differentiate itself
increases.
The result on the relationship between manufacturer specific investments and retail power
over margin is particularly interesting. The non-linear relationship indicates that, at low
levels of investments retail, power over margin is negative but, as further investments take
place, becomes positive. One possibility is that the relationship is the direct result of retail
strategy: promote specific investments by reducing power over margin initially but increase
pressure on margin when such investments are high and the manufacturer is tied to the
relationship. Theory suggests that post-contractual opportnism on the part of the retailer is
an implausible explanation for the relationship specified, as relational forms would arise to
reduce the likelihood of such behaviour. The evidence highlights that this is the case. It
was found that manufacturer specific investments are protected from opportnistic
behaviour, in part, by the degree of firm integration supported by countervailing retail
investments. This suggests that it is the perception of dependency, tied to specific
investments as against other sources of dependency, which determines the non-linear
relationship identified.
The benefit of merging an understanding of structural, product and relationship specific
characteristics is supported by the finding that all the structural variables which were
significant at the 95% level remain significant5 but the new model incorporates two new
significant variables in product shelf-life and manufacturer specific investments. The
arguments set out provide a strong justification for the inclusion of these variables and the
finding of the non-linear relationship between retail margin related power and
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manufacturer specific investments seems highly plausible.
The managerial implications emerging from the above are clear. Any rationalisation on the
supply side and the associated increase in manufacturer concentration is unlikely to reduce
retailer power over manufacturers' margin related activities. Indeed, where rationalisation
is driven by the relationship between costs and volumes, retailer power is likely to increase
over these activities. On the other hand, the evidence finds that increasing retail
concentration, driven largely by the need to achieve greater cost efficiency through scale
economies (Dawson and Shaw 1989), is positively related to retail power over
manufacturers' margin related activities. Consequently, recent and ongoing events across
international markets, with continuing consolidation of the retail sector, appear ominous for
manufacturers.
However, the nature of the product and its contribution to the retailers positioning may
provide some reduction in the pressure on manufacturers' margin activities. Recent years
have seen certain food categories transformed, where the defining differential is in terms of
product shelf-life. Examples include chiled soups and juices. In other instances, new
categories have been developed such as chiled ready-meals and prepared salads. While
these categories offer retailers an opportnity to differentiate themselves from their
competitors, they offer manufacturers a means of reducing retail power over margin.
5 The availability of alternative capacity was significant at the 90% leveL.
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7.2.6 Retail Power
In the last chapter, both the perceived penetration of own brand and perceived retail
concentration were found to be related to the unidimensional measure of retail power. On
the manufacturing side, the need to achieve economies of scale was also positively related
to retail power.
Examining product and firm characteristics, product shelf-life, while positively related to
retail control over margin, was found to be negatively related to retail control over product
related activities. Consequently, when considering the unidimensional measure of retail
power, shelf-life is unlikely to be significant as the dynamics operate in different directions.
At relationship level, there was very strong evidence to indicate that retail monitoring of
both commercial performance and product activities was positively related to retail power.
Product related power was positively related to retail product monitoring activities.
Manufacturer specific investments were found to be significant determinants of both
margin and product related power. On the margin side, the relationship was non-linear.
Brand portfolio was found to be significant with own brand only portfolios subject to
greater retail power, primarily through product related activities.
The above suggests the following hypothesis:
Retail power over manufacturing activities is positively related to retail concentration, own
brand penetration in the market, the importance of economies of scale in manufacturing,
manufacturer specifc investments, retail monitoring activities and brand portfolio.
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This was tested using the model:
Retpower = Const + ß 1 retcon + ß2 obmkt + ß3 mancon + ß4 escale + ß5 manspec + ß6
manspec2 + ß7 monall + ß8 ob only + U
Where,
const is the constant
retcon is the measure of perceived retail concentration
obmkt is the perceived market penetration of own brand
mancon is perceived manufacturer concentration
manspec is the manufacturer's specific investments
manspec2 is the manufacturer's specific investments
monall is the retailer's monitoring activities
obonly is a dummy for own brand only suppliers
and where ß 1 to ß8 are the variable coefficients and U is a random disturbance term.
Table 7.3
Retail Power over Manufacturing Activities
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
*******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is Retail Power
97 observations
CONST
Retail Concentration
Own Brand Market Penetration
Manufacturer Concentration
Importance of Economies of Scale
Manufacturer Specific Investments
Manufacturer Specific Investments 2
Retail Monitoring Activities
Own Brand Supplier Only
Coeffcient
6.34240
.07645
.56365
-.27464
.59798
-3.78950
.58739
.83767
-.12501
Standard Error
2.326
.2372
.2406
.2124
.2759
1.13
.1535
.4009
1.172
R-Squared
R-Bar-Squared
.5507 F-statistic F( 8, 88) 13.481(.000)
.5098
Using hetroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix
Ramsey Reset Specification Test using powers of yhat
Reset (2) = 0.15678 - F with DF1=1 and DF 2 =87
Reset (3) = 0.09776 - F with DF1=2 and DF 2 =86
Reset (4) = 1.7213 - F with DF1=3 and DF 2 =85
(Prob)
.008
.748
.021
.199
.033
.005
.000
.040
.915
St. Coeffcient
.0000
.0227
.2159
-.0903
.2114
-1.2407
1.931
.2413
-.0104
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The results are presented in table 7.3 above. The F-test is significant, indicating that at least
one of the independent variables is significantly different from zero. The results of the
reset tests suggest an appropriate model specification. The adjusted R-square indicates that
the model explains 51 % of the variation in the dependent variable.
The results are interesting as they provide evidence that only one of the structural features
of the retail sector, own brand penetration, is significantly related to retail power. No
evidence is found to support the significance of retail concentration. On the manufacturing
side, the evidence supports the view that economies of scale is a significant determinant of
retail power, having accounted for variations in manufacturer concentration.
Examining firm characteristics, the importance of retailers' monitoring activities as a
determinant of retail power is supported, providing further evidence to promote the role of
observability within the power literature.
Finally, an examination of relationship characteristics reveals that, once agaIn,
manufacturer specific investments display a non-linear relationship with retail power. At
low levels the relationship is negative, but becomes positive as investments increase. The
relatively high standardised values indicate that manufacturer specific investments play the
largest role in the determination of retail power.
Our dummy variable, used to identify own brand only suppliers, is not found to be
significant.
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7.3 Discussion
The findings above and the results emerging from the hypotheses tested in chapter six
highlight a number of relatively clear issues:
. Analysis of retail power must explicitly consider the underlying dimensions;
. An understanding of the dynamics of retail power can only be gained by a simultaneous
understanding of structure, product, firm and relationship characteristics;
. While the mode of governance results through discriminating alignment, the degree of
inter-firm integration wil partly determine the extent of retail power.
During the review of the power literature it was noted that investigations of power within
marketing channels treated the phenomenon under review as unidimensional. Indeed, in
most instances, this assumption was made implicitly through the measures used to capture
the construct and was not explicitly tested. The review of the retailer-manufacturer
relationship literature suggested that retail power extended across a range of dimensions of
manufacturing activities. It identified two particular dimensions which were considered to
merit more detailed investigation. These were product related (Davies 1994; Dawson and
Shaw 1989; 1989b; Galizzi et al 1997; Omar 1995; Segal-Horne and McGee 1989; de
Chernatony 1989; Senker 1986) and margin related (Porter 1974; Grant 1987; Akehurst
1983; Davies et al 1985). Adopting this perspective facilitated the development of a series
of hypotheses that were used to build up a greater understanding of the dynamics of retail
power at dimension leveL. One of the key strengths of the forgoing analysis is that, by
devising a unidimensional measure of power together with parallel analysis of some its
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underlying dimensions, the relative richness of viewing power at dimension level was
clearly demonstrated.
The second issue emerging from the analysis of the retail power literature was that many of
the earlier authors attempted to explain the dynamics of power by recourse to one of a
number of possible sets of factors. Some focused mainly on industry characteristics (Grant
1987; Akehurst 1983; Davies et al 1985; Duke 1989) while others considered firm and
product characteristics (Dawson and Shaw 1989; 1989b; de Chernatony 1989; Brookes
1995) while even others focused on the relationship (Collins and Burt 1999; Hogarth-Scott
and Dapiran 1996; Bowlby and Foord 1995; Davies 1994). While each perspective makes
its own unique contribution, interdependencies among the three sets of factors and their
underlying characteristics are ignored. Consequently, some variables may appear to be
more significant than they actually are, simply because related variables have not been
considered.
This point is driven home by the variation uncovered in the dynamics of retail power over
margin and product related activities and over the unidimensional measure of power. When
focusing on margin related power the structural characteristics, retail concentration, own
brand market penetration and the importance of economies of scale were found to be
important determinants. However, product shelf-life and manufacturer specific investments
were also found to be significant. Consequently, if the focus of the analysis had been
restricted to anyone set of characteristics it would have been flawed to a considerable
degree.
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A similar diffculty would have emerged in the analysis of product related power. Here
retail concentration, product monitoring, specific investments, brand portfolio and product
shelf life were found to be determinants of product power. While determinants of margin
and product related power share some variables in common, others do not and, in the case
of product shelf-life, the nature of the relationship is different.
The strategic richness of the study is enhanced by the identification of the variations
highlighted above. This was made possible by stratifying the hypotheses into product and
margin related power. In comparison, the findings emerging from the analysis of our
unidimensional measure of power offered considerably less from a strategic perspective.
In considering the results, four issues stand out:
. The role of industry structure as a determinant of margin related power;
. Observability as a determinant of retail power;
· The impact of manufacturer specific investments on all dimensions of retail power;
· The consequence of inter- firm integration on retail and manufacturer power.
From the analysis it is evident that structural characteristics act as determinants of retail
power on the margin rather than product side. Currently one can observe considerable
structural change in both the retailing and manufacturing sectors. On the manufacturing
side, consolidation is observed throughout the Irish food industry. This is most noticeable
in the dairy and meat sectors. However, much of the impetus towards consolidation
appears to be cost driven in search of operational efficiencies through scale. The findings
suggest that the need for scale in manufacturing increases retailers' ability to extract margin
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from their suppliers. Consequently, consolidation taken by itself, may not generate the
improved returns that cost savings might have been expected to yield.
However, scale also appears to be a determinant on the retail side. Dawson and Shaw
(1989) highlight the potential effciencies that can be achieved through scale in retailing.
Current events in the international arena appear to bear this out, with increasing
concentration becoming evident both within and across national markets. However, as
retail concentration increases, the results suggest that further retail control wil be brought
to bear on manufacturing margins. In tandem with increasing retail concentration we have
the growth in own brand penetration. This was also found to increase retail margin related
power over and above that explained by variations in retail concentration. Consequently,
current trends in both the manufacturing and retailing sectors do not augur well for
suppliers to the grocery market.
As part of the analysis, retailers' motives underlying their product monitoring activities
were investigated. The role of observability, although stressed by French and Raven
(1959), had been neglected throughout the power literature. In the review of the retailer-
manufacturer relations literature, it became increasingly evident that one of the more
dramatic features of the recent evolution of the supply chain was the increasing degree of
transparency from the retailer's perspective. Hughes (1994) suggests that the repositioning
of the Tesco brand would not have been possible without the physical transformation of the
supply chain and the establishment of regional distribution centres, which facilitated
monitoring activities. This research has found empirical support for this relationship
between product monitoring and the strategic use of own brand. But this was only the first
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stage because, as we progressed, further evidence was found to support the relationships
between monitoring activities and both product related power and our unidimensional
measure of power. Observability promotes partner compliance and ensures that retailers do
not suffer from quasi-rent seeking behaviour on the part of their suppliers.
The finding of the negative relationship between product monitoring activities and retail
influence on the price to the manufacturer also supports earlier work (Klien et al 1978),
which suggested that monitoring activities could be traded-off against an insurance
premium paid to agents. This may be of particular interest to retailers that do not have
suffcient scale to impose high levels of monitoring activities yet suffer the risk of supplier
opportnism. However, it also suggests that as monitoring activities become more easily
implemented, retail power over manufacturers' margins is likely to increase.
One of the more interesting issue emerging from the study is the role of manufacturer
specific investments. These investments were found to be positively related to all our
measures of retail power. The linear relationship on the product side appears highly
plausible and is supported in the literature (Fearne 1996; McGrath 1995).
However, as pointed to earlier, the results on the margin side appear contradictory. The
non-linear nature of the relationship is notable as it suggests that the dynamics of specific
investments varies according to the level of investments. It is likely that specific
investments are made incrementally. Past behaviour sets expectations of future conduct.
Thus, a retailer's proven ability to restrain opportnistic behaviour is necessary but
insuffcient to generate enough manufacturer confidence to engage in further investments.
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Following earlier theoretical work by Wiliamson (1983), evidence was found to support
the hypothesis that compensating retail specific investments are required to act as credible
commitments. Despite this, however, the findings suggest that a level of specific
investments is reached where retailer power over margin becomes positive. Why
manufacturers are wiling to invest beyond this point remains unclear.
To make sense of this finding, consideration must be given to the rationale underlying the
move towards integration. Inter-firm integration enhances vertical co-ordination between
trading partners. In doing so, the costs of transacting are reduced and, in many cases,
performance-enhancing investments are made, which in other circumstances would not
occur. The nature of competition within the food chain appears to be where chains of
vertically aligned firms compete (Collns 1997; Hughes 1994; Dawson and'Shaw 1989b).
Effciencies within the boundaries of firms is now being supplanted by the achievement of
effciencies across firms (Collns 1997; 1999b). The identification of potential effciencies
on the boundaries between firms and the attainment of these cost reductions increasingly
depends on the relationships between both parties. In this manner, the effciency of the
chain determines to a considerable degree each individual firm's competitiveness. The
adaptive strengths of the hybrid ensures that the move away from market contracting yields
better returns. However, the distribution of these rewards favours the retailer due to
favourable structural conditions, its access to better information channels and its role of
brand guarantor in the grocery channeL.
The move to greater inter-firm integration reduces incentive intensity, which can be
restored through greater administrative controls and/or reward systems (Wiliamson 1991).
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This explains the negative relationship between inter-firm integration and retail influence
over price to the retailer. Thus the findings support the proposition that relational
contracting, that is, increasing degrees of inter-firm integration, can moderate the exercise
of dependence based power (Provan and Gassenheimer 1994). Consequently, while retail
power over margin increases with manufacturer specific investments, the superior
performance resulting from these investments ensures that both parties achieve a better
return than would be possible under other circumstances.
7.4 Theoretical Contributions
The foregoing has made at least five important theoretical contributions. First, through its
review of the French and Raven's (1959) pioneering work, and by emphasising the
importance they placed on observability, the current work has filled a crucial gap in the
power literature. In placing observability as a critical determinant of power, French and
Raven implicitly allow for the behavioural assumption of bounded rationality and the
possibility of agent's engaging in cheating behaviours. These possibilities are not
considered elsewhere in the evolution of the power literature.
The power literature argues that power, invested in channel members, acts as the co-
ordinating mechanism within the marketing channeL. "Unguided channel activity, with
each channel member independently seeking its own self interest, is therefore apt to lead to
sub-optimal performance. Only through the exertion of channel power can the actions of
disparate channel members be co-ordinated" (Stern et al 1996:286). The transaction cost
framework offers a competing model of channel co-ordination. It proposes that, in the
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absence of transaction costs, markets are suffcient to optimally co-ordinate channel
activity. However, where markets fail, different modes of governance emerge such that the
cost of establishing, monitoring, adapting and completing contracts are minimised. Power
is considered secondary to efficiency in the co-ordination of economic activity.
The question as to which is the more useful framework in the analysis of the organisation
of economic activity is beyond the scope of this work. However, it is clear that, within the
power literature both empirical and theoretical, the concept of observability is notable by
its absence. However, the concept of observability, through monitoring, has evolved
within the transaction cost literature. By incorporating monitoring activities into the study
of power relations, the existing deficit in the power literature has been rectified to a degree
thereby strengthening the analysis.
The second contribution made in this research is to reassert the importance of specifying
the dimensions of retail power. French and Raven (1959) propose that power is system
specific. "It is necessary to define power with respect to a specified system because the
power ofOIP may vary greatly from one system to another" (French and Raven 1959:153).
However, in the power literature reviewed, power is not explicitly defined by system but
rather by the agents, for example retailer-manufacturer (Brown et al 1983; Butaney and
Wortzel 1988; Ogbanna and Wilkinson 1996; 1998). This study explicitly acknowledged
that power was system specific by focusing on specific dimensions. The rewards are clear.
It found that the determinants of power over product related activities were different from
those over margin related activities. This suggests that much of the former literature may
have lost its strategic value because of an inappropriate level of analysis and the failure to
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treat power as system specific. This research has shown that analysis at dimension level is
substantially more rewarding and meaningful than analysis of power as a unidimensional
construct.
The third contribution made was specifying the determinants of retailers' product
monitoring activities. By measuring retailers' monitoring activities rather than costs,
which would have been extremely diffcult and impracticable, the analysis could test and
provide empirical evidence to support one of the more interesting hypotheses emerging
from the transaction cost literature. The resulting empirical evidence, that retailers trade-
off monitoring activities against a form of insurance premium, is of considerable strategic
merit. Assuming that monitoring activities are undertaken as long as the expected benefits
exceed the expected costs, it is proposed that, as monitoring activities become more easily
applied and as the associated costs fall, retail influence on manufacturers' prices wil
increase. Thus, moves to centralised distribution and greater transparency of the supply
chain, may be expected to increase the pressures on manufacturers' prices ceteris paribus.
However, the greater strategic use of own brand and the associated increase in specific
investments wil act in a countervailing fashion.
The fourth contribution was to improve our understanding of the role of specific
investments in the determination of retailer power. Earlier work, emerging from the
transaction cost literature, examined the role of specific investments in determining the
mode of governance (Wiliamson 1979; 1985: Klien et al 1990). Other authors have
incorporated specific investments into the dependency literature (Heide and John 1988).
However, the findings above extend our understanding of the role of specific investments
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by uncovering their role as determinants of power. It is also notable that the analysis has
found that specific investments increase retail power, having accounted for retailers'
monitoring activities. This indicates that there is an associated compound effect in
process.
The fifth, and possibly most important contribution, was to improve our understanding of
the determinants of inter-firm integration. It is clear that the organisation of inter-firm
relations in the grocery channel is evolving dramatically. Transactions are moving from
the market to domesticated arrangements as described by Arndt (1979). However, most of
the literature examining this phenomenon is descriptive (Fearne 1996; Senker 1986;
Hogarth-Scott and Parkinson 1993a; Hughes 1994; Shaw and Gibbs 1995) and does not
claim to offer a complete understanding of the factors underlying the organisational form
decision. While the work of Wiliamson (1975; 1979; 1991; 1994; 1996) Klien et al
(1978) provided the starting point for the analysis, the contributions from the dependency
balancing literature (Buchanan 1992; Feldman 1998) and the work of Heide and John
(1990) proved particularly important. The transaction cost literature while signalling the
importance of bilateral dependency as a determinant of inter-firm integration implicitly
assumed that the dependency was symmetric. By incorporating the ideas expressed by
Buchanan (1992) and Feldman (1998), the current study proceeded and provided empirical
evidence to show that integration was positively related to perceived interdependency but
negatively related to perceived dependency. In this manner the findings build substantially
on earlier work (Heide 1994), which examined the relationship between interdependency
and certain limited aspects of inter-firm integration (i.e. flexible adjustment processes).
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Recent authors suggest that "the relative power of retailers and manufacturers in the
supplier relationship is demonstrated in the form and process of contracting" (Foord et al
(1996:79). Doel (1996: 52) acknowledges "that transaction specific investments have
certainly been made by both parties in the context of intensive product development and
exclusivity agreements" but ignores the role of retail brands as specific investments.
Nevertheless Doel (1996: 64) proceeds to argue that "the impact of power differentials for
instance is thoroughly implicated in the governance structures that currently dominate the
food manufacturer interface". Both these arguments suggest that power determines the
relational form and that the current position of the retailer as the most powerful agent in the
food channel has led to the dominance of relational contracting. The findings on inter-firm
integration suggest that this is not the case and provides support for the discriminating
alignment perspective. Retailers' specific investments in their brands necessitated that
they form particular relationships with their suppliers. In doing so, retailers could ensure,
to a greater extent, that the costs of opportunism were reduced while further value adding
specific investments by both parties were more likely to emerge. This suggests that retail
power is not the determinant of relational form but may be a consequence of the way in
which firms decide to organise their trading relationships.
Finally, the analysis has explored retail power in the context of retailers' and
manufacturers' brands competing for the position of guarantor within the food marketing
channeL. Integrating both brand formats into the analysis of power has extended the
existing literature. Research by Hughes (1996) and Fernie and Pierrel (1996) suggest that,
while French and US retailers' own label products are not as developed from a strategic
perspective as their UK counterparts, they are likely to follow a similar evolutionary path.
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Wileman and Jary (1997:97) propose that "there are no innate structural reasons why the
UK model cannot be replicated and ... that the retail brand-building achieved by UK
grocers should be a strategic imperative for grocers in other countries". If this is so, then
the current research points to some of the likely implications for both food retailers and
manufacturers trading in these markets. However, this convergence in evolutionary paths
may not necessarily occur. Nevertheless, the framework used in this study, by embracing
variations in structural, firm, product and relationship characteristics, wil continue to offer
a useful tool in the analysis of retail power irrespective of the precise market conditions and
prevailing manufacturer and retailer strategies.
7.5 Limitations of the Study
Despite its strengths, there are a number of limitations to the study. The first is that the
work focuses on only one side of the dyad. This limitation is of little consequence for
much of the analysis when considering retail power over manufacturing activities but
assumes greater significance when considering the determinants of inter-firm integration.
Clearly, basing the study on perceptions from both sides of the dyad would have added to
the analysis and given even greater confidence to our measures of perceived dependency
and interdependency.
The second limitation of the study is that it ignores the social dimension of power relations
and the norms that govern the exercise of power. Variations in organisational factors and
corporate culture, as alluded to by Hogarth-Scott and Parkinson (1993a), are not
considered. There is a substantial body of work that emphasises the role of negotiation
337
strategies and personal characteristics as determinants of retail power. For instance,
Davies (1994) points to the higher educational qualifications of retail buyers as a
determinant of retail power. Campbell (1985), Wren and Simpson (1996) and Fairhurst
and Fiorito (1990) highlight the importance of the individual buyer's characteristics as a
determinant of the interaction process. While clearly relevant to the study of power
relations such a micro focus was considered beyond the scope of the current work.
A third limitation is that the analysis is category specific. Over the course of the pre-test
stage, it became clear that a retailer's power over a given company could vary across
product categories. This presented considerable data collection difficulties if aggregate
power was to be measured. Consequently, underlying the study is the assumption that the
power dynamics at category level are the same as at corporate level and the only variation
is caused by aggregation. While such an assumption is plausible, and certainly fits with
the view that power is system specific, it remains untested. It is quite possible that scope
effects may come into play.
7.6 Direction for Future Research
One of the more notable features emerging from the review of the sources of power
literature in chapter three is that the topic has, by and large, fallen off the research agenda.
One possible reason is that reliance on the concepts of "power sources" meant that the
findings were of a limited value from a strategic perspective. Furthermore, diffculties
raised by Gaski (1984) with regard to the distinctions among power sources have yet to be
satisfactorily resolved. Future research may be more rewarding if focused on selected
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dimensions of power and when the independent variables relate to factors that enable an
agent to reward or apply sanctions on trading partners. In this study, the chosen
dimensions of power were margin and product related. In future work, the components of
these dimensions could be refined and greater emphasis placed on more precise
performance measures. This would be of considerable benefit in the assessment of the
findings relating to organisational form. For instance, do manufacturers achieve higher
rates of return in relationships characterised by higher levels of inter-firm integration yet
subject to more retail power than those displaying a more market contracting orientation
ceteris paribus?
Second, this research has highlighted the critical role played by manufacturer specific
investments in the determination of all aspects of retail power considered'in this study.
However, retail power over manufacturers' investment decisions has not been dealt with in
this research. In a trading environment where the retail brand is assuming greater strategic
importance, a retailer's ability to influence manufacturers' specific investment decisions
represents an important source of competitive advantage. Also, these investments have
important implications for a manufacturer's ability to manage a balanced customer
portfolio. The decision-making processes underlying these investment decisions is worthy
of investigation particularly in a retail trading environment characterised by continuing
consolidation and where trading relationships can be severed by a third part's actions, for
example, through retail internationalisation (Collns and Burt 1999).
The importance of specific investments also points to another area worth of investigation.
This concerns the role of trust within retailer-manufacturer relationships. Although not
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incorporated into this research, a growing body of work is emerging examining the role of
trust within exchange relationships (SeInes 1996; Andaleeb 1996; Zaheer and Venkatraman
1995). According to Luhmann (1979:42) "one fundamental condition of trust is that it must
be possible for the partner to abuse the trst; indeed it must not be merely be possible for
him to do so but he must also have a considerable interest in doing so". Clearly, the
existence of specific investments meets these conditions. However, the existence of
offsetting hostages or credible commitments reduces the motivation to abuse and the need
for trust as they make opportnistic behaviour irrational due to the expected loss associated
with being caught. Nevertheless, making offsetting investments can impose significant
costs. Consequently, "trust may be applied because it is the only option available, or it
may be employed because it is a cost efficient mechanism" (SelnesI998:308). Thus, trust
would also appear to be part of the optimisation problem.
Third, the argument relating to manufacturer brand franchise, points to an area worthy of
investigation. In the literature, it appears that the negative relationship between retail
power and manufacturer brand franchise is based on the assumption of like-for-like
markets. Retail power is implicitly assumed to range over manufacturing activities
addressing the needs of the market where the manufacturer's brand franchise is strong.
This may be due to the fact that much of the current research on retailer-manufacturer
relationships tends to be retail market specific with a focus on British retailers in particular
and their relationship with suppliers supplying the British market. However, given the
internationalisation of retailing this assumption is becoming increasingly less plausible.
Many firms with strong national brands may decide to produce brands for a given retailer in
one market but own brands for the same retailer in its other markets. Thus, brand power is
340
market specific but retailer power is not. It is relationship specific. The managerial
implications of this product mix decision could be worthy of further investigation.
Finally, the determinants of retail power were examined by focusing on manufacturing
activities over which retailers exercised control. Countervailing power is defined as
manufacturers' ability to resist this control. However, the findings on the determinants of
inter-firm integration and the symmetry of dependency suggests that there are two power
relations in operation. These are retail power over the manufacturer and, alternatively,
there is manufacturer power over retail operations. No recent work has investigated this
phenomenon in the UK where retail power is arguably strongest. This is peculiar given
that manufacturers have as much incentive to control aspects of retail operations as
retailers have to control manufacturing operations. Power is exercised to gain control over
resources outside the firm but on which the firm is dependent. To suggest that
manufacturers are passive players in the food chain would be naïve. Because power is
system specific both sets of power relations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a
symmetric investigation of power relations, examining both sides of the dyad, may show
this to be the case.
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Appendix A2.1
Table A2.1
Retailers' Percentage Share of Suppliers' Trade for 1990 and 1986 Where Available
Supplier No. Dunnes Dunnes Musgrave PSL PSL Superquinn Superquinn
1990 1986 1990 1990 1986 1990 1986
1 19 17 17 22 21 6 6
2 17 7 18 4
3 21 18 18 21 19 6 7
4 13 12 21 8
5 21 27 17 13 15 3 2
6 5 7 5 2
7 9 0 3 24 15 5 4
8 18 14 21 27 18 7 10
9 6 13 16 5
10 10 18 20 6
11 9 0 32 7
12 24 4 0 1
13 30 28 16 20 13 5 5
14 3 4 41 0
15 9 43 7 4
16 14 13 16 4
17 3 2 2 4 2 2 1
18 17 16 24 6
19 6 4 12 8 8 2 2
20 17 10 31 7
21 13 26 17 17 16 5 7
22 5 8 16 5
23 10 16 17 4
24 23 14 21 5
25 19 40 26 13
26 14 14 16 12 9 2 2
27 13 12 17 22 22 6 7
28 14 14 13 22 21 7 8
29 20 12 24 5
30 13 2 27 7
31 13 12 19 5
32 19 24 17 19 18 5 6
33 9 7 12 12 8 3 3
34 7 6 22 7
35 20 14 19 8
36 6 22 22 6
37 8 3 7 14 5 4 2
38 16 16 14 3
39 57 0 38 0
40 16 15 14 26 25 6 8
41 12 45 16 7
42 4 11 8 5
43 12 11 16 5
44 40 5 0 0
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Supplier No. Dunnes Dunnes Musgrave PSL PSL Superquinn Superquinn
1990 1986 1990 1990 1986 1990 1986
45 17 19 22 4
46 16 10 14 4
47 17 16 32 8
48 0 0 0 0
49 12 10 2 2
50 79 0 21 0
51 17 12 17 4
52 7 12 16 4
53 18 3 1 0
54 10 12 17 9
55 8 5 2 20
56 5 20 35 20
57 0 16 53 19
Source: Fair Trade Commission 1991
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Appendix AS.! The Instrumentil
Your Company Details Company Name
Age of Company Turover for last 12 months £ Nuiber of Employees _
Principal product category sold to retail to customers
Approxiate shelf life (day of production to use by date) of your main products (days)
Do you supply branded products to any retailer? (Please tick .I) Yes _ No _
Do you supply own brand (private label) products to any retailer? (Please tick .I) Yes _ No
How many retailers do you curently trade with? _
What % of your sales are accounted for by the retail grocery trade? _
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Using the scale above please indicate how much emphasis your company places on each of the
following strategy variables to gain competitive advantage. Please ensure that your scores reflect any
variations in emphasis on the variables.
Strategy Variable Score
Production Process Develonment1
New Product Develonment
Sunn1ier (innuO Selection
Production Processes2
Product Snecifications
Inventories/Stockholdinir
Deliverv conditions (amounts freauencv)
Promotional Activitv
Customer Portolio
Price to the Retailer
rrpr1;t TpnY" tt'" ~
i Refers to the development of new production processes by your company
2 Refers to the use of particular production processes as a means of achieving competitive advantage.
3Refers to the strategic management of inventories as a source of competitive advantage.
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Using the scale above please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following
statements.
~ . Score
A few retailers dominate our industrv
We are more innovative than our comnetitors.
Most outnut in this industr is attbutable to a few 1ar!!e firms.
Scale economies nlav a siinificant role in maintaining competitiveness in this industrv.
In this industrv 1ar!!er firms do not eniov substantiallv lower unit costs than smaller ones.
Few if anv. firms in this industrv are oneratin!! at full canacitv.
Investment in new nroduct develonment is essential for continued success.
Rapid imitation of new nroducts bv competitors is a feature of our cate!!orv.
If we were to cease trading, our competitors could easily supply sufcient volumes to meet our
customers' needs.
Retailers can find other manufacturers with unused canacitv to supplv their needs.
Our industrv is dominated bv a few manufacturers,
There is too much canacitv in our industr,
Our customers would have considerable diffculty in finding alternative suppliers if we were to
stop doing business with them.
In our industrv Ion!! nroduction runs are necessarv for cost comnetitiveness,
Product innovation is an imnortant source of our competitive advanta!!e.
In our industr hiiiher volume thouphnut results in considerablv lower unit costs.
Our industrv is characterised bv lonii nroduct 1ife-cvcles.
Smaller firms are not at a simiificant cost disadvantage to lariie firms in this industr.
A constant stream of new oroducts is necessarv to maintain one's nlace in the marketn1ace,
There is excess canacitv in our industr.
We allocate simiificant resources to new oroduct development.
Our industr consists of a lariie number of similarilv sized manufactuers,
Our market is controlled bv a small number of large retailers
Retailers recoinise our exnertise in nroduct innovation.
Oiir' . .. . h" ~ "m~l1 of' ~
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~Retailer Details How long have you Retailer's share Own brand share of Expected
been trading with of your sales your sales to this growth/decline in
ths retailer? (%) retailer sales in the comig
(Years) (%) year
(+/-) %
Retailer 1
Retailer 2
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Using the scale above please indicate how much influence each retailer has over the
following strategy variables? Please ensure that your scores reflect any differences between
the retailers.
Strategy Variable Retailerl Retailer2
Production Process Development
New Product Development
Supplier (input) Selection
Production Processes
Product Specifcations
Inventories/Stockho1ding
Delivery conditions (amounts, frequency)
Promotional Activity
Customer Portolio
Price to the Retailer
Credit Terms to the Retailer
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Using the scale above please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following
statements for each retailer. Please ensure that your scores reflect any differences between
the retailers.
Retail Specifc Component Retailerl Retailer2
Our brand is the market leader in their category.
They market their own brand as quality brand in its own right.
The loss of their business would be a serious blow to our futue profitability.
Our brand is coming under increasing pressure from other manufactuers' brands.
Most of this retailer's competitors have substantial own brand sales.
The volume of business we do with them helps us to be cost competitive vis a vis other
manufacturers.
Few of our competitors could easily meet their quantity requirements.
We spent considerable effort training our staf to deal with their specific requirements.
They and their competitors have an own brand alternative for almost all products.
Our brand is coming under increasing pressure from their own brand.
The loss of their business would increase our unit costs as a result of lost economies of scale.
Own brands domiate ths retailer's market.
Their own brand is comparable to the best manufactuer brand.
The loss of their account would signcantly reduce our short term profits.
They perceive their own brand to be a quality brand.
Few of our competitors could meet their quality requirements.
We are a major supplier to them in our product category.
The image of their own brand is important to them.
Delisting our brand is likely to reduce their sales.
We would find it very difcult to replace their business if we were to lose it.
Own brands account for a large share of their category sales.
If we discontinued supplying to them, they would have difculty makg up the sales volume in
our product category.
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Retail Specific Component Retailerl Retailer2
Their own brand products are becomig much more complex and sophisticated.
Own brand products account for a large proportion of their total grocery industr's sales
Our business would be in jeoprady if we lost their business.
Brief supply problems of our product would adversely afect their image.
Their delivery conditions are paricularly demanding.
If our product is out of stock their customers are unlikely to purchase a substitute.
Their product specifcations are paricularly demanding.
Our brand is important to their category.
We spent considerable effort establishing procedures and routines to cater to their specific needs.
If we were to cease trading with them we would waste a lot of knowledge that's tailored to their
method of operations.
We have strong personal relationships with them.
They car-out a very time consumng due diligence before approving a new supplier.
We spent considerable resources tailoring our production processes to meet their product
specifcations.
Integrating our inormation systems to cater to their specific needs proved diffcult.
Their buyers and technologists have spent a lot of time and effort providing us with advice and
inormation.
If we were to stop doing business with them they would find it hard to source products quickly
with simlar customer appeaL.
They have allocated a lot of shelf space to our products.
All the equipment we use for their account could be easily adapted to our other customers' needs.
Their reputation for fairess with their suppliers is very important to them.
They have invested so much time and effort in us that they could not just walk away.
If they were to stop doing business with us, their customers would quickly notice.
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U sing the scale above please score the extent to which each retailer monitors your
company's performance on each ofthe following activities. Please ensure you scores reflect
any differences between the retailers.
Retail Specifc Retailerl Retailer2
Production processes
Raw material quality
Product quality
Delivery accuracy
Price competitiveness
Product sales
Promotion effectiveness
Q8
Using the scale above please score each retailer in terms of joint effort in the following
activities with your company. Please ensure you scores reflect any differences between the
retailers.
Reta Specifc Retailerl Retailer2
New Product Development
Production Process Develonment
New Deliverv Procedures
Information Svstems
Sales Forecasting
Retailer's Ran!!e (Assortent) Management
Promotions Planin!!
Product Merchandisina
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Using the scale above please indicate to what extent the following statements are accurate
descriptions of your relationship with each retailer. Please ensure you scores reflect any
differences between the retailers,
Retail Specific Retailerl Retailer2
Providing them with sensitive information helps support our relationship with them.
The nature of our relationship enables both of us to manage changing circumstances well.
We find written contracts very useful in sorting out disagreements with them.
Termination of our relationship is very unlikely.
Both oaries make ioint olans for the futue deve100ment of our businesses.
We expect them to become a greater source of our profits in the future.
Flexibility by both paries in response to requests for change is a characteristic of this
relationship
Communcation between our companies is such that any member of their team can easily
contact any of ours.
They provide us with sensitive information (sales, market shares, pedormance results etc).
Our top level management visit them inequently.
We provide them with a lot of sensitive information about our operations (costs, product
specifcations etc).
I expect them to be (or continue to be) one of our most important customers.
Communication between our companies is such that any member of our team can easily
contact any of theirs.
We provide them with a lot of sensitive inormation about our markets.
We expect to be working with ths retailer for the foreseeable futue
Both paries expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with
changing circumstances.
Both paries expect ths relationship to last a long time.
When some unexpected situation arses both paries would rather work out a compromise
rather than hold each other to the original deaL.
We expect them to become more important to our success in the future
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Appendix A6.1
Additional hypotheses
HI Perceived alternative capacity wil be more correlated with the exercise of retail
power on margin than on the product dimension.
Correlations between perceived retail power along the product and margin dimensions and
alternative capacity are given in table A6.1. The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the
linear association among the variables. The hypotheses being tested is whether or not the
correlation coeffcient among the variables is significantly different from zero. Consequently
we are looking for "p" values below the critical value of 0.05 for a 95% confidence leveL.
The results support a positive and significant relationship between retail power over margin
and the perception of alternative capacity in manufacturing. This suggests that manufacturers'
perception of retailers access to alternative production capacity increases retailers' power over
manufacturers' margin. The results do not support any relationship between the availability of
alternative capacity and retail influence on the product dimension. Consequently, the
hypothesis may be accepted.
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Table A6.1
The Relationship between Retailer Power and Industry Structure
(Pearson Correlation Coeffcients)
Variable Alternative Economies Retail Manufacturer Own Brand 
Canacity of Scale Concentration Concentration Penetration
Retail Coeffciene .040 .187 .151 .051 .397
Power p2 .682 .052 .119 .601 .000
N3 108 108 108 108 108
Power over Coeffcient -.055 .002 .162 -.1 19 .280
Product P .572 .984 .094 .220 .003
N 108 108 108 108 108
Power over Coeffcient .225 .307 .212 .069 .330
Margin P .019 .001 .028 .478 .000
N 108 108 108 108 108
Alternative Coeffcient .054 .087 -.149 .099
Capacity P .577 .369 .123 .305
N 109 109 109 109
Economies of Coeffcient .103 .453 .287
Scale P .286 .000 .003
N 109 109 109
Retail Coeffcient -.076 .009
Concentration P .433 .929
N 109 109
Manufacturer Coeffcient .100
Concentration P .300
N 109
i Pearson Correlation Coeffcient
2Probability Level
3 Number of Obseryations
Correlations in bold are significant at the 95% level
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H2 Retail specifc investments wil be positively correlated with the strategic use of own
brand.
H3 Retail specifc investments wil be positively correlated with manufacturer specifc
investments.
The results below (table A6.2) also support positive and significant associations between
retailer specific investments and both the strategic use of own brands and manufacturer
specific investments. Consequently, both hypotheses may be accepted.
Table A6.2
Retail Specific Investments, Manufacturer Specifc Investments and the Strategic use of
Own Brand
Strategic Use of Manufacturer
Own brand Specific
Investments
Retailer Specific Investments Coeffciene .411 .648
p¿ .000 .000
Nj 107 107
i Pearson Correlations Coeffcient
2Probabi1ity Level
3 Number of Obseryations
Correlations in bold are significant at the 99% level
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H4 Manufacturer specifc investments wil be positively correlated with the expected
continuity and attractiveness of the relationship.
The results in table A6.3 support a significant association between manufacturer specific
investments and expected continuity and attractiveness of the relationship. The association is
positive and significant at the 99% leveL.
Table A6.3
Manufacturer Specific Investments and Relationship Expectations
Expected Continuity and
relationship Attractiveness
Manufacturer Specific Investments Coeffcientl .253
pL
.008
N3 107
1 Pearson Correlation Coeffcient
2Probability Level
3 Number of Obseryations
Correlations in bold are significant at the 99% level
H5 Manufacturer dependency on a retailer is positively related to its specifc investments
in the relationship having accountedfor the retailer's share of the manufacturer's sales.
To test this hypothesis, the partial correlation coeffcient is used. The results are given in table
A6.4. These support a positive and significant relationship between manufacturer dependency
and manufacturer specific investments having controlled for the retailer's share of sales.
H6 Retailer power is positvely related to the manufacturer's specifc investments in the
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relationship having accountedfor the retailer's share of the manufacturer's sales.
Table A6.4 also provides strong evidence of associations between manufacturer specific
investments and all aspects of retail power, having accounted for the retailer's share of the
manufacturer's sales. Consequently the hypothesis is accepted.
Table A6.4
Manufacturer Specific Investments, Manufacturer Dependency and Retail Power
(Partial Correlation Coeffcients)
Controlling for Retailer's Share of Sales Controlling for Retailer's Share of Sales 
Manufacturer Retail Product Margin
Dependency Power Related Related
Power Power
Manufacturer Partial .3738 Manufacturer Partial .5539 .5537 .3861
Specific Coeff Specific Coeff
Investments Investments
NI 101 N 101 101 101
P 2 .000 P .000 .000 .000
¡Number ofObseryations
2 Probability Level
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Table A6.5
Retail Power and Brand Portfolio
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
Retail Power Own Brand Only 16 13.41 5.40 1.5
Brands Only 49 9.28 3.59 .51
Mixed Portfolio 43 11.8 3.54 .54
Total 108 10.73 4.12 .40
Retail Product Related Own Brand Only 16 14.10 6.68 1.67
Power Brands Only 49 7.12 3.60 .51
Mixed Portfolio 43 9.85 3.54 .54
Total 108 9.24 4.77 .46
Retail Margin Related Own Brand Only 16 12.33 5.16 1.29
Power Brands Only 49 10.83 4.61 .66
Mixed Portfolio 43 1308 4.67 .71
Total 108 11.95 4.79 .46
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Appendix A6.2
HetroscedastiCIty and White's Corrective Procedure
Underlying the c1assicallinear model is the assumption that the variance of the disturbance
terms in the model is the homoscedastic, that is, have equal variances. Given the nature of the
research, such an assumption is questionable. For instance, more mature firms may enjoy
some benefit of past experience leading to a type of error learning model resulting in
differences in variances (Gujarati 1995). The consequences of such a violation are that the
estimates, while unbiased, are not effcient i.e. do not have minimum variance. In other
words, if a series of samples were taken the mean coeffcient value would equate to the
population mean. However, the large variance means that one could be less confident in the
sample results. Thus the null hypothesis could be accepted when it should, in fact, be rejected.
In some circumstances, where knowledge of the structure of the disturbances is known,
procedures can be employed to remove the problem. However, in the current study such
knowledge is unavailable. Consequently, an alternative solution must be found.
There is a series of tests for the presence of hetroscedasticity such as the Goldfield Quandt
test, the Breusch-Pagan test, the Park test, Glesjser test and the White test (Kennedy 1996)
(Gujarati 1995) (Pindyck 1991). However Hsieh (1983) argues that these tests for the
presence of hetroscedasticity are weak particularly at the 95% confidence levels. He asserts
that given the inherent weakness of the tests, the most appropriate approach is to employ a
hetroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix for ordinary least squares. In other words,
assume the presence of hetroscedasticity and correct for it. The strength of this approach is
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that there is little loss of power even if the original disturbance terms are homoscedastic, while
the potential pitfall of accepting homoscedasticity in cases where the disturbance terms are
hetroscedastic is avoided. Also no knowledge of the strcture of the disturbance terms is
required to proceed (White 1980). Consequently, in all the ordinary least squares regressions
we wil apply White's hetroscedasticity corrective procedure.
Ramsey's Reset Test
Ramsey's reset test is used to test for model mis-specification errors. In particular, one needs
to test for omitted variables or incorrect functional form. The reset test is based on the
argument that, in the case of an omitted variable, a relationship should exist between the
predicted values of the dependent variable and the observed residuals (Gujarati 1995).
Consequently, by incorporating the predicted value of the dependent variable into the
regression, the overall R2 should increase i.e. the percentage of the total variation in the
dependent variable explained by the model should increase. Thus, the test examines the
change in the R2. If the R2 displays a statistically significant improvement, having
incorporated the predicted values of the dependent variable, mis-specification is likely. The
test statistic is the F -statistic displayed under the reset output. The null hypothesis is that the
difference in R2 results are not significantly different from zero. Consequently, the null
hypothesis wil be accepted for values of the F-Statistic below the critical leveL.
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